Introduction

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The philosophy of recognition is undergoing a renaissance. Over the course of the last few years, recognition theory has provided an important impetus for philosophical research in a number of areas. Many examples might be given of this development. Within practical philosophy, a number of philosophers have claimed that "being rational" is not a natural characteristic of human individuals, but rather a normative status that is ascribed to humans within the framework of a social practice of mutual recognition (see for instance Pinkard 1994 and Pippin 2009). In the area of social ontology, it has been argued that institutional facts (pertaining for instance to the economy or to politics) are to be analyzed with the help of the category of "acknowledgement" (Searle 1996 and 2007). Furthermore, moral and political philosophers have raised the question of which forms of social recognition are necessary for the formation of a stable individual "identity," and what results this might have for how institutions ought to be structured in multicultural societies (Taylor 1994). Finally, Frankfurt School critical theorists have discussed the possibilities and difficulties of founding a critical theory of society in terms of recognition theory under the political and economic conditions of the twenty-first century (see for instance Fraser and Honneth 2003). As we can see from such examples, philosophers from different schools of thought have started to make fruitful use of recognition-theoretical considerations that have been developed in other disciplines such as psychology, sociology or institutional economics (see for instance Deranty 2010; Renault 2010; Voswinkel 2012; Wildt 2010, and Zurn 2005).

Contemporary philosophy of recognition concerns itself with themes that were of great relevance for German Idealism. In his *Foundations of Natural Right* (1796), Johann Gottlieb Fichte argues that there needs to be a specific form of recognition for a human individual to develop into a self-determining rational being. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel tries to show in his "Philosophy of Spirit" that a rational social order is to be understood as a specific set of relations of what he terms "the will" and thus of recognition. It thus comes as no surprise that many of the contemporary theories sketched above arose in the context of close critical analyses of German Idealism—and especially of the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel. In turn, new interpretations of these philosophies have contributed to a systematic strengthening of the contemporary philosophy of recognition (see for instance Honneth 1995; Siep 1979, and Wildt 1982).

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While the historical interests of contemporary philosophers of recognition were concentrated at first on Fichte and Hegel, the perspective has also broadened in the interim. There are, for instance, current investigations and debates surrounding Rousseau's theory of recognition (Neuhouser 2008). In the course of this development, the following questions have also gained traction: Did Karl Marx develop a philosophy of recognition? If so, then can Marx's philosophy of recognition enrich current debates in the field? Indeed, the research from some of the authors in this special issue has already played a large part in making sure that these questions are on the philosophical agenda today, and this research suggests that Marx is to be taken seriously as a theorist of recognition (see for instance Brudney 1998 and 2010; Chitty 2011, and Quante 2009).

It should be noted that the interest in Marx's theory of recognition is situated within the context of a more comprehensive engagement with his thought. While Marx was treated as a "dead dog" after the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, recent years have seen a renewed interest in discussing his thought in a way that is nuanced and driven by substantive questions. In view of the worldwide crisis of neoliberal institutions, many social philosophers have asked whether Marx's theory does in fact represent an attractive normative ideal, and a number of social scientists are investigating whether Marx's critique of political economy might not fulfill an explanatory function with regard to the development of global capitalism. In both cases, prominent thinkers have answered in the affirmative (see Schmidt am Busch 2011).

Under these circumstances it is vital to clarify the conceptual and theoretical foundations of Marx's theory. Only by doing so might we be able to judge what kind of systematic potential this theory may possess. The present collection aims to instigate one such investigation in that it asks whether Marx was indeed a recognition theorist on a basic conceptual level and also whether he provides good reasons for being one. In the course of discussing these questions, the authors in this volume shed new light on the philosophical conditions under which Marx's theory of recognition emerged and the possibilities for adapting it to present-day circumstances. Their contributions are not restricted to the philosophy of the "young" Marx, but also extend to the foundations of the later critique of political economy.

Andrew Chitty's article, "Recognition and Property in Hegel and the Early Marx," argues that Marx developed a conception of "true property" in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, and that he used this conception to criticize the institutions of private law and the market. In Chitty's view, Marx's conception of true property is to be understood as a transformation of Hegel's theory of private property: while Hegel understood private property as an institution in which men objectify their freedom and articulate their mutual recognition as free citizens, Marx believes that true property enables men to objectify their essential human powers and recognize one another as needy beings. As a result Chitty maintains that Marx criticizes capitalism with the help of a structure of ideas that is of Hegelian pedigree.

In "Three Marxian Approaches to Recognition," Emmanuel Renault investigates the question of whether or not Marx possessed a unified concept of recognition. As his title indicates, Renault argues that Marx makes use of three concepts of recognition in his work, each of which refers to something different: first, the human as a "species being;" second, the disrespect for and degradation of workers in capitalism; and third, the social roles that are constitutive of capitalist societies. Renault believes that the concepts of recognition developed by Marx in these three contexts are incompatible in important respects. In support of his thesis, he offers an elucidating analysis of a number of passages from throughout Marx's work.

As its title indicates, Michael Quante's essay, "Recognition in *Capital*," focuses on the mature Marx's major work. Drawing on a thorough analysis of selected passages from the first edition of *Capital* as well as several of Marx's other writings from the 1860s, Quante tries to show that "recognizing" is a constitutive element of the theory of value that Marx developed during this period. Furthermore, Quante demonstrates how the concept of recognition that Marx employs in this context is derived from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. These findings have instructive implications that range from exegetical points to more broadly systematic insights: they imply that Marx understood value as a social entity that cannot be fully naturalized, and they also demonstrate that there is no genuine break between the theories of the "young" and the "mature" Marx. For Quante, in spite of what many Marx interpreters believe, the concept of recognition plays a constitutive role not only in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* but also in *Capital*.

In his article "Two Types of Civic Friendship" Daniel Brudney tries to show that Marx developed a conception of civic friendship in 1844 that is normatively attractive as well as socially realizable. To this end, Brudney first distinguishes between two types of civic friendship, one of which belongs in the Kantian tradition and refers to a specific form of respect, and the other of which derives from Marx and is fulfilled by a specific form of concern. Brudney argues that the second type of civic friendship is a particularly interesting option for modern societies. In Brudney's view one of the major tasks of modern political philosophy is to develop and defend a theory of civic friendship. He therefore believes that Marx's thought has a broad systematic relevance for contemporary philosophy in this area.

Concluding the present volume is Jean-Philippe Deranty's essay "Marx, Honneth, and the Tasks of a Contemporary Critical Theory." Deranty addresses the tasks that a contemporary critical theory of society must be able to fulfill, and the contributions that a Marxian theory can make towards their fulfillment. He begins with an observation about the state of the field: according to many thinkers, there are unbridgeable differences—from both a normative and a social theoretical standpoint—between critical theories of society that refer to Marx and those that belong to the tradition of the philosophy of recognition. By analyzing the most sophisticated variant within contemporary recognition theory, that of Axel Honneth, Deranty tries to show why this is in fact a false characterization. One of his main arguments is that critical social theories belonging to the tradition of the philosophy of recognition are compatible with functionalist explanations like those that Marx advances in *Capital*. For this reason, it is possible—and indeed very important according to Deranty—to adopt elements of Marx's social theory into a contemporary critical theory of society. For Deranty, one would therefore have to conclude that Marx's thinking continues to be of great interest to critical theory today.

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