Abstract
In Part I of “Of Miracles,” Hume argues that belief in miracle-testimony is never justified. While Hume’s argument has been widely criticized and defended along a number of different veins, including its import on scientific inquiry, this paper takes a novel approach by comparing Hume’s argument with Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific anomalies. This paper makes two arguments: first that certain types of scientific anomalies—those that conflict with the corresponding paradigm theory—are analogous to miracles in the relevant ways. Note, importantly, that the argument applies only to the first definition of ‘miracle’ that Hume offers (i.e. ‘miracle’ as a “violation of the laws of nature.”) Second, it argues that we are sometimes rationally justified in believing testimony for scientific anomalies (that conflict with the corresponding paradigm theory), because there have been several cases of scientists accepting such anomalies and—assuming certain criteria are met—we are rationally justified in believing these scientists. If both arguments are successful, then it is possible to be rationally justified in believing miracle-testimony, though the extent of justification depends on various criteria and comes in degrees. After examining a few objections, the paper concludes by contextualizing this argument in relation to Part II of Hume’s essay and in relation to broader apologetic concerns. In short, it is vital to recognize that this paper’s focus is Hume’s first account of ‘miracle,’ rather than his argument against miracle-testimony more broadly, but the argument could be coupled with other arguments against Hume’s broader attack on miracle-testimony.
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Notes
This type of anomaly conflicts with the paradigm theory, rather than the paradigm as such. A PCA does, in fact, also conflict with the paradigm, but other anomalies might conflict with the paradigm without conflict with the corresponding theory. For example, while the discovery of X-rays did not conflict with the existing paradigm theory, it went against other aspects of the paradigm, such as expectations and instrumentation (Kuhn 2012).
Hume actually offers two definitions of ‘miracle’ in Part I of his essay. The second definition adds the aspect of supernatural agency, which he further explores in Part II of the essay. Yet in Part I he continues as if he had not mentioned the second definition. Thus I treat Part I as espousing the first definition and Part II as espousing the second definition (though he also adds a third account—miracle as the foundation of a religion—in the essay’s second part, which I do not address in this paper).
Though Hume seems to be using ‘prescribe’ and ‘describe’ interchangeably, I use ‘describe’ to avoid the normative sense of ‘prescribe’.
It is unclear whether the laws of nature are the operations of matter themselves, or our descriptions of those operations (i.e. whether the laws are ontological or epistemological); furthermore, Hume uses both ‘operations of nature’ and ‘laws of nature’. I leave this issue open for the purposes of this paper.
Given that experience is probabilistic, laws of nature are statistical, rather than ideal.
The probability need not be specified to a high degree, or quantified whatsoever, for Hume’s point to hold.
Hume does not answer, and I leave alone, the questions of what constitutes a “sufficient number of people” and “the proper conditions.”
He does not use this terminology often; I suspect this is because Kuhn thinks ‘paradigm theory’ is identical with or captured by ‘law’, which he considers one aspect of a paradigm.
For Hume, laws of nature are statistical, so a violation of expectations may either fall within the statistical distribution of experience (i.e. it's a marvelous event) or not fall within the statistical distribution (i.e. it's a miracle). Likewise for Kuhn, an anomaly may fall within the general purview of a theory (e.g. a theory is tested under new parameters and yields unexpected yet acceptable results) or outside the purview of the theory, prompting reformulation of the theory itself.
Kuhn distinguishes between ‘counter-instance’ and ‘puzzle’ when comparing competing paradigms, saying that a normal science deals with ‘puzzles’, but then he claims that all theories (including those in the normal science stage) deal with counter-instances (2012). To avoid this ambiguity, I use the generic ‘anomaly’ and distinguish between types of anomalies.
Kuhn claims that crises close in three ways: the anomaly that led to crisis is either explained by the prevailing paradigm or it is not (2012). If it is not, sometimes the problem is set aside for future research while at other times a new paradigm emerges. The possibility that the anomaly is set aside is not captured in Table 1.
Notice that paradigms are not necessarily static and unchanging. Rather, scientific communities may update their paradigms—to align with new findings or updated technology, for example. Some would even say that scientific communities are justified only insofar as they explain the history of their held paradigm (Murphy 1995).
Kuhn highlights various features of what I call PCA's that distinguish them from Normal Science Anomalies: “Sometimes an anomaly will clearly call into question explicit and fundamental generalizations of the paradigm,” and sometimes an anomaly will resist the scientific community's repeated attempts to explain it away (2012). He offers the examples of the problem of ether drag, length of the calendar year, relation between celestial and terrestrial mechanics, relation between gas-identity and weight relations, and relation between electrodynamics and a revised science of motion. The underlying idea is that PCA's fundamentally clash with the paradigm, requiring a new paradigm, whereas Normal Science Anomalies do not.
Given the transitive property, it appears that ‘laws of nature’ simply are ‘paradigm theories’ and, thus, that miracles simply are PCA’s. Nevertheless, ‘miracle’ is understood in many ways, so PCA’s are, at best, one species of miracle. Even that assertion, though, is not taken for granted, as several potential dis-analogies are addressed.
There is a distinction here: did the person actually witness the phenomenon itself (e.g. the delirious person), and is the person’s explanation of the phenomenon credible (e.g. the person noted for falsehood). Both the phenomenon and explanation thereof must be judged.
Compare Bagger’s distinction between the external and internal evidence of the witness (1997).
Though it is focused on the authority of testimony more broadly, Jonathon Adler’s presentation of six forms of background evidence provides a general guideline that one might take in setting out the various factors of miracle-testimony (2012). For a recent example of how to apply Adler’s factors to religious testimony, see Boespflug (2016).
Another way of putting this point is to talk about the “track records” of science and “miracles talk” (personal conversation with Timothy Shanahan 2015). Science has a strong track record of confirming or dis-confirming anomalous events, including those that cannot be explained by the paradigm, whereas “miracle talk” does not have a strong history of confirming miracles. In fact, most accounts of miracles end up being disproven.
For example, the New Testament records the bodily resurrections of Jesus, Lazarus, and several others.
Along a rather different line, W.V. Quine argues that we are justified in changing even our ontology if empirical observation warrants as much; he offers the example of the imaginary number i, which has made mathematics simpler (1951). Using Quine's point, it could be reasonable to accept the non-repeatable counter-instance if it proves efficacious, though he does note that our observations of the external world should be considered “not individually but only as a corporate body” (1951), so a single observer of a single violation would be insufficient on this Quinean picture. I highlight Quine to recognize his connection to this point, though I remain non-committal about the strength of his view.
Examples would include Yahweh speaking to Moses through the burning bush and Jesus walking on water.
For example, maybe experience taught certain first-century people that a Jewish man named Jesus had a knack for producing miracles (i.e. that non-repeated miracles often occurred under those circumstances in which Jesus was present).
Moreover, it is important that we follow the (in this case scientific) evidence where it leads; as Bagger says, “The notion that well-attested anomalies … impugn our current understanding of natural law and require investigation fits more easily with our modern conception of epistemic goodness” (1997).
I leave open what such methodological criteria might be, though Kuhn offers five in particular (1977).
Quine's concept of a “web of beliefs”—in which “any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system” (1951)—and Imre Lakatos' concept of a “research programme”—in which auxiliary (i.e. secondary) beliefs can be modified while the core (i.e. primary) beliefs remain—provide further support for the claim that scientific beliefs can be justifiably held on limited, even anomalous evidence. I cite these views as possible further support for this paper's corresponding claim about scientific belief, though I here remain non-committal about the strength of these views.
This rational justification applies even if the anomaly is disconfirmed, as was the case with the 2011 OPERA team, if justification comes from a reliable process and/or properly functioning agent.
In so doing, the scientist would be utilizing an externalist version of proper functionalism. I leave open whether or not an internalist account could work, and which version is correct.
Various critics have argued that Kuhn’s account is irrational insofar as it lacks objective standards for theory-choice. Yet Kuhn offers five such criteria (1977). The criteria are not algorithmic, as the critic wishes, but nothing about the process of theory-choice “implies either that there are no good reasons for being persuaded or that those reasons are not ultimately decisive for the group” (2012). The problem is not that Kuhn’s account is irrational. The issue is that Kuhn’s account is not rational in a mathematical or strictly logical sense. Murphy describes Kuhn as rejecting the neopositivist account of rationality in much the same way that Hume rejected the Cartesian account of rationality (1990). Also Kuhn points out that science itself requires that rational people be able to disagree: otherwise “no one satisfying the criterion of rationality would be inclined to try out a new theory and to articulate it in ways which showed its fruitfulness or displayed its accuracy or scope” (1977). In short, science is rational in its own way. I would also point out that philosophy, likewise, does not always operate in a strictly logical way: some philosophers have embraced various forms of relativism while other philosophers have argued that intuition, affectivity, and/or will ought to precede reason at times; and determining broad principles (e.g. justice) and their applications cannot be reduced to crafting a simple categorical syllogism.
Compare Mackie’s language of “supposed” and “genuine” violations (1982).
Compare ‘miracle’ as an event that exceeds “the productive power of nature” (McGrew 2014).
Some theistic scientists allow for this possibility (e.g. Intelligent Design science), though I overlook the potential legitimacy of such a view for this paper.
For further information, see Corner (n.d., 2007).
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Kulmac Butler, J. A Kuhnian critique of Hume on miracles. Int J Philos Relig 86, 39–59 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09699-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09699-x