

structural minority of the *Humanwissenschaften*, and that Kant's solution indirectly indicates a way out (p. 527).

Although no one expects modern epistemologists to draw massive inspiration from Kant's anthropology, Sturm is right in insisting on its relevance. The more so, because the immense importance of Kant's transcendental philosophy usually obscures his other contributions to philosophy. Kant himself devoted part of his time and energies to adjust the system of sciences according to the revolutionary ideas developed in the transcendental Dialectics. Investigating the epistemological importance of his anthropology, Sturm's book actually contributes to a welcome reappraisal.

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*Know How*. By J. STANLEY. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 201. Price £25.00.)

What is the relationship between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? Is one a subtype of the other, or do they belong to distinct types? In his recent book, *Know How*, Jason Stanley argues emphatically that knowledge-how is of a kind with knowledge-that. Stanley's arguments encompass not only philosophical material, but also considerations from linguistics and cognitive science.

*Know How* is not an easy read—but for good reason. In order to argue his position, Stanley appeals to material in linguistics and formal semantics which may be unfamiliar to non-specialists. Aware of this, Stanley clearly explains this material through the instructive use of examples, making the crucial points accessible to the reader willing to put in the work. Throughout the book, it is always clear what is at stake, and what must be accomplished for Stanley's view to succeed.

Specifically, the question on the table is whether our knowledge of how to do things and our knowledge of facts are both propositional. In the terms of the debate, to answer in the affirmative is to be an intellectualist, while to answer in the negative is to be an anti-intellektualist. Thus, by arguing that knowledge-how is of a kind with knowledge-that, Stanley puts forth an intellectualist position. His specific intellectualist claim is the following. 'For every *s* and *F*, *s* knows how to *F* iff for some way *w* of *F*-ing, *s* knows that *w* is a way to *F*' (p. 71).

The skeletal structure of *Know How* is as follows: dislodge the presumption against intellectualism (Ch. 1); develop an intellectualist position, and give positive arguments in its favour (Chs. 2–5); then finally address objections to the position developed previously, and explore some of the position's ramifications (Chs 6–8). We will not deal with the latter three chapters, as the most crucial portions of Stanley's argument are the account he gives of propositions, and the notion of practical modes of presentation. The former is the subject of chs. 3 and 4, and the latter the subject of ch. 5.

A default presumption exists in favour of anti-intellektualism, and thus against intellectualism. Stanley, in the first chapter, traces this presumption to its source in the arguments of Gilbert Ryle. Stanley identifies two strains of argument Ryle

gives against intellectualism. The first (which is the primary concern of the ch. 1) is the famous regress argument. Here, the claim is that the intellectualist's putative explanation of intelligent action leads to an infinite regress. According to Ryle, the intellectualist requires that an action be guided by a proposition to count as intelligent. Ryle claims that being guided in this way by a proposition requires that the relevant agent consider the proposition. But considering a proposition is an action which, to count as intelligent, must be guided by a further proposition—and so on, infinitely. Hence, a regress ensues.

Stanley's counter to the regress argument is to claim that explicit, conscious consideration of a proposition is not required for it to be the case that the proposition guides an agent's action. Indeed, Stanley points out that Ryle's own anti-intellectualist account demonstrates a viable alternative. For Ryle, an agent acts intelligently when she performs an action which manifests a disposition. Why can't the intellectualist claim, then, that an action is performed intelligently when it manifests a subject's knowledge of a proposition? Here, Stanley notes that Ryle assumes that propositions are motivationally inert. Stanley, however, promises to demonstrate otherwise, by developing a richer notion of propositions.

Ryle's second strain of argument against the assimilation of knowledge-how with knowledge-that is based on linguistic concerns. Two bits of data are presented. If knowledge-how were propositional, we would speak of people 'believing how'. But we do not speak this way. Also, if knowledge-how were propositional, we would not speak of one agent knowing how to do something better than another. But we do speak this way. To deflect these concerns, Stanley notes that he can demonstrate that they are misplaced, if the intellectualist position on knowledge-how is couched in terms of subjects knowing a proposition which answers the question, 'How do I  $\phi$ ?' Not only would it deflect Ryle's argument, but treating knowledge-how as possessing an answer to a question would grammatically unite knowledge-how with other types of knowledge. Stanley promises to demonstrate this as well.

Thus, the first chapter neatly sets the stage for the remainder of the book. Ryle's arguments are, in Stanley's view, the primary basis for the contemporary presumption against intellectualism. Hence, by dislodging the primary support for contemporary anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how, Stanley aims to dissolve the contemporary resistance to intellectualism. He has told us how he will do this: 1) he will demonstrate the grammatical unity of know-how with other types of knowledge when the former is taken to consist in possessing the answers to questions; and, 2) he will develop an account of propositions which dispels the suspicion that they are motivationally inert.

Ch. 2 is a survey of the classic account of the semantics of questions, also containing a brief defense of this account from objections by Jonathan Schaffer and Jonathan Ginzburg. Stanley's attention focuses on the work of Lauri Karttunen and Jeroen Groenendjik, and Martin Stokhof in outlining the account of the semantics of questions. This linguistic framework treats ascriptions of knowledge-*wh* (i.e., knowledge concerning who, where, what, why and how) as doing the

same work as ascriptions of knowledge-that: viz positing a relation between the knowing subject and a proposition.

Building on ch. 2, the third chapter focuses two distinct linguistic interpretations of unpronounced elements in the semantics of questions: the predicational and propositional theories. Stanley argues for the adoption of the propositional theory, with its use of an unarticulated pronoun place referred to as 'PRO'. An important feature of the propositional account, says Stanley, is its ability to cope with *de se* readings of pronouns. Indeed, Stanley proceeds to give a Fregean account of propositions wherein pronouns, read *de se*, are referring expressions. To do this, Stanley rejects the David Lewis' conclusion based on his thought experiment concerning the two gods, Manna and Thunderbolt. Lewis concludes that if Manna and Thunderbolt only have all propositional knowledge, then neither god knows of itself whether it is Manna or Thunderbolt. This is because Lewis claims that all propositions are perspective independent, but a given agent's knowledge of who she is perspective dependent. Stanley, however, insists that a theory of propositional content ought to account for the fact that some contents are perspective dependent, and that a distinctive first-person way of thinking contributes to the contents of propositions the expression of which contains *de se* pronouns. He proceeds to argue that his Fregean gloss of PRO can deal both with the various phenomena and familiar philosophical cases concerning the *de se*—e.g., IEM judgments and John Perry's Heimson/Hume case (sections 5 and 6).

Ch. 4 deals exclusively with so-called 'ways of thinking', in order to fill out Stanley's view of propositions. At the beginning of this chapter, we are reminded of why an account of propositions is so important to Stanley's project. 'Knowing how to do something is first-person knowledge. It is knowledge of oneself, or knowledge *de se*. My favoured account of the *de se* appeals centrally to *ways of thinking* of things' (p. 98) (original emphasis). In this chapter, Stanley also aims to fulfill the promissory note of the first chapter, by arguing that his conception of ways of thinking '... [entails] that propositional knowledge is not behaviorally inert ...' (*ibid*).

After a brief defense of the concept of ways of thinking from charges of metaphysical mysteriousness, Stanley paints a picture of propositions as abstract entities composed of ways of thinking of objects. Importantly, some of these ways of thinking are of the first-person sort. Moreover, Stanley argues that if an agent entertains a proposition with a first-person way of thinking, she thereby possesses certain dispositions to act. 'To think of an object in the world as myself is to possess certain dispositions involving that object in the world. If that object in the world is cold, I will clothe it; if it is wet, I will dry it, etc.' (p. 109). Here, Stanley claims to have resolved the essence of Ryle's dissatisfaction with intellectualism: viz the notion that possessing propositional knowledge does not entail the possession of any dispositions.

This is the fulcrum of the book's overall argument. Stanley doesn't see himself as denying a datum which calls for explanation when he argues that propositions are motivationally efficacious. Instead, he claims that it has always been apparent that agents possess dispositions in virtue of possessing epistemic states. 'Yet it is

impossible to deny that agents do possess dispositions to behave in various ways ... in virtue of attitudes they possess ... When it comes to thoughts about oneself, there is simply no possibility of [contemplating a proposition] without the disposition to execute' (p. 110). A great burden lies on this intuition. What sort of impossibility is involved—logical or psychological? Each answer leads to a theory with different scope, which could provide anti-intellectualists with room to maneuver. In either case, Stanley's opponents will want more motivation for the intuition. As it stands, anti-intellectualists are seen as occupying an unstable position, being forced to deny the obvious because they lack an account of how propositional knowledge can entail the possession of dispositions. By giving such an account, Stanley takes himself to explain more pre-theoretical data than the anti-intellectualist, giving intellectualism a dialectical advantage over its rival.

The final piece of Stanley's positive argument comes in ch. 5, with the explication of ways of thinking—in particular, practical ways of thinking. Stanley argues that the existence of practical ways of thinking is a straightforward consequence of acknowledging the existence of modes of thinking in general. Favourably citing Christopher Peacocke, Stanley argues that we can clearly think of one-and-the-same bodily movement in different ways. That it can come as a surprise that a particular way of swinging one's arms and kicking one's legs is also a way to swim is the sort of example which Stanley has in mind. However, this is not really a motivating example—but a mere example. The work done to establish the existence of practical ways of thinking is accomplished entirely by the acceptance of the Fregean framework. 'Anyone who accepts that cognitive states involves ways of thinking will have to accept practical ways of thinking' (p. 123) (original emphasis).

Clearly, the importance of the Fregean framework in Stanley's argument cannot be overstated. In order to go through, his argument requires the existence of propositions composed (in part) of practical ways of thinking, and which have both motivational efficacy and *de se* content. All of these features are supposed to be direct consequences of adopting the Fregean picture Stanley advocates. Thus, if his attempts to defend Fregeanism are insufficient, Stanley's argument for intellectualism does not succeed. Or, at least, if his arguments fail to convince the anti-Fregean, then Stanley's argument for intellectualism will be dialectically ineffective.

Here ends Stanley's construction of his intellectualist position. As we have seen, it is predicated primarily on the success of two things: 1) defusing Rylean arguments against intellectualism; and 2) defending a particular, Fregean account of propositions. While Stanley tells us that his particular arguments are not the only way one might establish the truth of intellectualism, his arguments are the only ones we are given. The place where most people are likely to get off the intellectualist boat, then, will be with the Fregean account of propositions.

*Know How* is a concise and ambitious defense of intellectualism about knowledge-how. Along the way, Stanley puts forth solutions to classical puzzles in the philosophy of language and delves into subtle issues of interpretation in formal linguistics and semantics. Despite the breadth and difficulty of the material cov-

ered in the book, it is always clear what Stanley wishes to say. Ultimately, he argues that no objection remains to his Fregean framework, and that the intellectualist positions which results is consistent with the state-of-the-art in cognitive science and epistemology.

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*The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology.* BY JASON BAEHR.  
(Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. viii + 235. Price £35.00.)

Leading virtue epistemologists (e.g. Sosa 1991; 2007; 2009 and Greco 1993; 2010) have spilled plenty of ink in analysing the nature and place of (to use Baehr's terminology) *intellectual faculties* (like vision and memory) in epistemology. These cognitive faculties are thought to qualify as intellectual virtues in part because they are reliably truth-conducive, and (as Sosa and Greco argue) they deserve a prominent place within the projects of traditional epistemology: we can (they argue) analyse knowledge *in terms* of these reliable faculties.

Jason Baehr's *The Inquiring Mind* is an extremely clearly written book that, in an admirably systematic way, challenges this picture on several fronts: as Baehr notes, virtue epistemologists of a reliabilist bent too often overlook the importance of *character virtues* (as opposed to mere reliable faculties) in successful inquiry. Intellectual character virtues include such traits as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual integrity, perceptiveness, creativity, fair-mindedness, inquisitiveness and curiosity.

Given the comparative dearth of work on *character virtues* in epistemology, two guiding questions are deserving of attention: first, is the concept of intellectual *character virtue* (hereafter intellectual virtue) useful for addressing (one or more) problems in *traditional epistemology* (i.e. the analysis of knowledge)? Secondly, can the concept of intellectual virtue form the basis of an approach to epistemology that is *independent* of traditional epistemology?

These broad questions guide the direction of the monograph, and provide a helpful way to cut up the landscape. Baehr labels *Conservative VE* the view that the first question should be answered affirmatively, *Autonomous VE*, the view that the second should. He notes there is scope for strong and weak forms of both. Within Conservative VE, there is scope for arguing that the concept of intellectual virtue is useful for addressing problems in traditional epistemology by playing either (i) a central and fundamental role (i.e. *Strong conservative VE*), or (ii) by playing a secondary or background role in these projects (i.e. *Weak Conservative VE*). Similarly, one could endorse Autonomous VE by holding either that an independent focus on intellectual character and virtues (i) should *replace* or supplant traditional epistemology (*Strong Autonomous VE*) or (ii) *complement* traditional epistemology (*Weak Autonomous VE*).

Baehr endorses the weaker version of both *Conservative* and *Autonomous VE* and so thinks that the concept of intellectual virtue should play a *secondary role* in