Abstract
While commentators recognize the centrality of the notion of Geist in Hegel’s philosophical project, there is no consensus about what the term exactly designates and what its role is within his system. One interpretation, which has (re)appeared on the scene in recent years, overemphasizes the onto-theological connotations of the Hegelian term and understands it as a kind of supernatural or divine force determining the development of the system and guiding human history. Critically opposing this reading and showing its conceptual shortcomings, the paper clarifies Hegel’s concept of Geist and discusses its real place in the philosopher’s system.
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Notes
In his early book, R. Solomon formulates this idea even more clearly: “[I]t is undeniable that “Spirit” has inescapable religious connotations, and in the Logic, Hegel openly equates Geist […] with God” (Solomon 1985, 197).
For discussion on Taylor’s interpretation of Geist in Hegel see (Fritzman and Parvizian 2014, 614–615).
Michael O. Hardimon openly identifies Hegel’s notion of (absolute) Geist with the Judeo-Christian God with all its traditional features and characteristics. Cf. Hardimon (1994, 51).
This view was initially introduced by Honneth (1995) and Williams (1997), and further developed in their later works, such as Honneth (2010) and Williams (2013). A similar yet more elaborated position that emphasizes a normative aspect of Hegel’s concept of Spirit is developed by Robert Brandon and some other analytic Hegelians. See, for example: Brandom (2011) and Ikäheimo (2011).
Hegel himself may be partially guilty of this misinterpretation. Because he does not give a clear definition of what he means by “Geist,” it is quite easy even for an attentive reader to be misguided. Consider, for example, the following statements from Hegel’s Introduction to The Philosophy of History: “World History in general is thus the unfolding of Spirit in time…” (Hegel 1988, 75); “It is spirit alone that manifests itself in all the actions and tendencies of a people…” (Ibid, 75); “The principles of the various National Spirits, progressing in a necessary series of stages, are themselves only phases of the universal spirit: through them, that world spirit elevates and completes itself in history, into a self-comprehending totality” (Ibid, 82). It is easy to see how somebody, who comes across these and other similar statements, might develop the teleological, transcendental, and eventually theological views of Spirit (Geist) in Hegel. To be sure, in statements like these, it is quite easy to interpret “Geist” as some kind of immortal, trans-temporal deity who drives all of world history forward only in order that it might see itself reflected in the world.
Solomon’s essay is an example of a very narrow reading of Hegel’s concept of Geist which does not take into account his other fundamental notions and intuitions. Such a reading is still typical of the Anglophone scholarly literature on Hegel, especially if one is working on specific terms and conceptions within Hegel’s philosophical system.
Hegel makes a similar point in his Philosophy of Right when he emphasizes the relation of individuals to the ethical order (Hegel 1991b, §145).
For more on the intersubjective dimension of Geist see Bykova (2009, 282–285).
For more detailed discussion of the role of intersubjectivity and intersubjective recognition in Hegel’s system see (Bykova 2013).
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Bykova, M.F. What is wrong with the divine interpretation of Geist in Hegel?. Stud East Eur Thought 68, 181–192 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-016-9255-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-016-9255-8