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Controversia con escépticos sobre la justificación de afirmaciones en filosofía de la ciencia con evidencia de la historia de la ciencia
Controversy with Skeptics about the Justification of Claims in Philosophy of Science with Evidence from the History of Science
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v71n8Supl.102871Palabras clave:
carga teoríca, circularidad epistémica, estudios de caso, evidencia histórica, historia y filosofía de la ciencia (es)case studies, epistemic circularity, theory-ladenness, historical evidence, history and philosophy of science (en)
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Una manera de integrar historia y filosofía de la ciencia consiste en usar estudios históricos de caso como evidencia de conclusiones filosóficas sobre la ciencia. A pesar de tener ejemplos representativos en la actualidad, varios autores han puesto esta metodología en tela de juicio con un argumento escéptico de circularidad epistémica. En este artículo reivindico el estatus epistémico de esta metodología mediante una estrategia que muestra que este argumento no funciona o que el escéptico estaría finalmente en desventaja dialéctica. Sobre esta base, señalo cómo esta controvers
The use of historical case studies as evidence for and against philosophical conclusions about science is a form of integrating history and philosophy of science. Although this methodology counts with representative examples today, a sceptical argument on epistemic circularity intended to defeat it has been presented. I defend here the epistemic status of this
methodology by arguing that either the sceptical argument fails, or the sceptic would ultimately be at a dialectical disadvantage. On these grounds, I suggest how this controversy with sceptics might be classified and should be conducted from here on.
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