Abstract
Frankfurt examples are frequently used in arguments designed to show that agents lacking alternatives, or lacking ‘regulative control’ over their actions, can be morally responsible for what they do. I will maintain that Frankfurt examples can be constructed that undermine those very arguments when applied to actions for which the agent bears fundamental responsibility.
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Notes
Frankfurt examples were first introduced in Frankfurt (1969). For an overview of the literature on Frankfurt examples see Fischer (2002) and Fischer (2011). The arguments of this paper deal with the most common kinds of Frankfurt examples—typical “prior-sign” examples, Mele-Robb style examples, and Pereboom-type examples—as well as the “Fischer-variant” on the Frankfurt type examples. See Fischer (2002) for an overview of these kinds of Frankfurt examples. I will not be concerned with what have come to be called “blockage cases” (also discussed in Fischer (2002)) which I do not consider to be genuine Frankfurt examples.
See the first objection below and the corresponding reply.
One might think that the claim that fundamental responsibility requires regulative control on the part of the agent comes to the same as the weakened form of PAP. It helps to recall that Frankfurt originally attacked PAP as a view shared by compatibilist and incompatibilists. It is far from clear that a compatibilist who advocates PAP would characterize an agent’s ability to do otherwise as involving “the sort of control that involves genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities.” Thus it might appear to beg the question against the compatibilist to simply assume that the weakened form of PAP is equivalent to the view that non-derivative responsibility requires regulative control. So for the purposes of this paper I will treat these as separate issues.
What they don’t tell you is that the Fischer-variant Frankfurt device will incapacitate you by killing you instantly. See Fischer (2002), 288. The philosophical significance of Fischer-variant examples is not changed by having the device merely incapacitate—rather than kill—the agent.
If you say that the agent in the typical example is responsible but the agent in our example is not responsible (because he knew he would make the choice anyway) then modify our example so that the agent does not learn that the device, if triggered, will cause him to make the choice; let him just be aware that the device will be triggered if, and only if, he does not choose on his own.
From the beginning this has been acknowledged by proponents of Frankfurt examples. Thus, in introducing Frankfurt examples, Frankfurt (1969: 836) says, describing the agent, “Of course it is in a way up to him whether he acts on his own or as a result of Black’s intervention”.
Naylor (1984) defends PAP on the grounds that the agent in a Frankfurt example is not responsible for performing the target action but is responsible for performing the action on his own. This position has been criticized for defending PAP by appealing to “flickers of freedom” that do not require robust alternatives on the part of the agent; see, for example, Fischer (2002: 289–90). As we shall see when we turn to the objections, this objection can be answered by considering our Frankfurt example.
The assumption that the potential triggering events are morally insignificant will not apply to the event that triggers the ‘Mele-Robb’ fail-safe device. The trigger in that case is the agent’s not choosing on his own, and that is certainly morally significant. Thus this objection cannot be used to defend the use of Mele-Robb type Frankfurt Examples.
Do not say that the agent who signs such a contract has thereby already done a robust action in virtue of which she will be blameless in the case in which the Frankfurt device is triggered. Remember that one need not intend to carry out the terms of a contract one signs. It is enough for our purposes that nothing in the Frankfurt example precludes the agent from having the power to fulfill the contract. It is perhaps easiest to imagine that at the point the agent signs the contract she has not decided whether to abide by its terms.
See Pereboom (2009), 111–12.
Pereboom calls this formulation, “Robustness (3)”. The remarks I make below apply as well to the other formulations of the robustness requirement he has made elsewhere.
I have benefitted from comments by Sarah Buss and anonymous Philosophia readers on earlier versions of this paper.
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Cain, J. A Frankfurt Example to End All Frankfurt Examples. Philosophia 42, 83–93 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9471-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9471-0