Lo Statuto Metodologico dei Contenuti Intenzionali

Silvano Zipoli Caiani

Abstract


Riassunto: Il dibattito in filosofia della mente è caratterizzato dal crescente interesse per nuove forme di eliminativismo, note con il nome di teorie enattiviste radicali della mente. Secondo la concezione enattivista radicale, il contenuto intenzionale di uno stato mentale è empiricamente sottodeterminato, pertanto non può essere utilizzato quale elemento di una spiegazione naturalistica del comportamento. Tuttavia, sebbene il riferimento ai contenuti intenzionali non sia conciliabile con il naturalismo ontologico, esso è invece compatibile con una forma di naturalismo metodologico. Seguendo l’analisi semantica proposta da Carnap per i termini teorici, è possibile concepire uno stato mentale come un veicolo simbolico il cui significato è stabilito per mezzo di osservazioni e scelte convenzionali. Attraverso un caso di studio riguardante le funzioni cognitive della corteccia somatosensoriale, l’articolo fornisce le indicazioni programmatiche per un’interpretazione delle spiegazioni intenzionali del comportamento in accordo con la metodologia delle scienze naturali.

Parole chiave: Contenuto mentale; Enattivismo radicale; Intenzionalità; Naturalismo; Teleosemantica; Teoria della spiegazione

 

The Methodological Status of Intentional Contents

Abstract: The philosophy of mind debate is characterized by increasing consensus regarding a new type of eliminativism, also known as the radical enactivist theory of mind. According to the radical enactivist view, the intentional content of a mental state is empirically undetermined, therefore it cannot figure as part of a naturalistic explanation of behavior. However, although the notion of intentional content is not compatible with any form of ontological naturalism, it is compatible with a form of methodological naturalism. Following Carnap’s semantic analysis of theoretical concepts, it is possible to conceive of intentional mental states as a symbolic vehicles whose meaning can be conventionally established on the basis of empirical observation. In order to support this claim, I refer to a case study on the cognitive functions of somatosensory cortex. This article provides arguments for building an intentional explanation of behavior based on methodological approaches in the natural sciences.

Keywords: Mental Content; Radical Enactivism; Intentionality; Naturalism; Teleosemantics; Theory of Explanation


Parole chiave


Contenuto Mentale; Enattivismo; Intenzionalità; Naturalismo; Teleosemantica; Teoria della Spiegazione

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2019.0023

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