Abstract
This is the first of two articles in which I reflect on “generalized Darwinism” as currently discussed in evolutionary economics. I approach evolutionary economics by the roundabouts of evolutionary epistemology and the philosophy of biology, and contrast evolutionary economists’ cautious generalizations of Darwinism with “imperialistic” proposals to unify the behavioral sciences. I then discuss the continued resistance to biological ideas in the social sciences, focusing on the issues of naturalism and teleology. In the companion article (Callebaut, Biol Theory 6. doi:10.1007/s13752-013-0087-1, 2011, this issue) I assess generalized Darwinism, concentrating on the roles of theory and model building, generative replication, and the relation between selection and self-organization; and I point to advances in biology that promise to be more fruitful as sources of inspiration for evolutionary economics than the project to generalize Darwinism in its current, “hardened Modern Synthesis” form.
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Notes
I choose this publication as watershed because it arguably lies at the basis of the institutionalization of EE as a field.
Popper’s Objective Knowledge was published in 1972, Lorenz’s Die Rückseite des Spiegels in 1973 (English translation, 1977), and Campbell’s “Evolutionary Epistemology” in 1974. However, this chronology distorts the genesis of the field. Lorenz’s most important contribution, “Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte der gegenwärtigen Biologie,” was published in 1941 (English translation, initiated and edited by Campbell, 1962, reprinted in Plotkin 1982). Campbell (1960) already outlined his naturalistic program. As to Popper, his “three worlds” ontology and rationalist epistemology place him squarely outside the naturalistic current to which genuine evolutionary epistemology belongs (Callebaut 1993).
Brown, Laland, and Hull are not alone in preferring the sketchily drafted, but juicy multi-level ontology part of Campbell’s (1974) evolutionary “epistemology” to his actual epistemology. Griesemer (1984, pp. 102–103) likewise noted that a post-positivistic epistemological account of theories known as the semantic, structuralist, or non-statement account (Callebaut 1993) “can be elaborated to provide a suitable metaphysical foundation for a cluster of accounts of the growth of scientific knowledge, known, unfortunately, as evolutionary epistemology.”
Quine (1969, pp. 82–83) famously remarked: “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input—certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance—and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one’s theory of nature transcends any available evidence.” The argument underlying Quine’s suggestion that “epistemology still goes on” in this “new setting” (p. 82) seems far-fetched, though: “Such a study could still include, even, something like the old rational reconstruction, to whatever degree such reconstruction is practicable; for imaginative constructions can afford hints of actual psychological processes, in much the way that mechanical simulations can” (p. 83).
“Social evolution” is common social science parlance, but anthropocentric from a biological point of view. Many animal species are social, whereas very few species other than Homo sapiens exhibit social learning, the hallmark of culture. Hence most biologists interested in (human) evolution prefer the term “sociocultural evolution.”
Just two examples of déjà vu: Van Parijs (1981) already dispensed with arguments to the effect that human intentionality precludes the application of the variation-and-selective-retention principle: as long as selection is partly decoupled from variation (which, given the unpredictability of the outcomes of much individual and collective human action, may be assumed as given), there is room for evolution to operate. Likewise, Hodgson and Knudsen’s discussion of Lamarckism doesn’t add much to what Hull (1982) already pinned down.
One arbitrary example out of many: In their response to Pelikan’s (2011) plea for an “evolutionary developmental economics,” Hodgson and Knudsen (2012, p. 10) claim that in their work they “have likewise raised the famous ‘evo-devo’ dispute and affirmed that ‘development and selection are… essential features of evolution.” But this never went beyond paying lip service to developmental evolution.
They are in good company here. Pace Kuhn (1970), who held that “normal” science is oblivious of the past, many practitioners of contemporary evolutionary biology invoke Darwin’s authority. This habit can be related to the intrinsically historical nature of biological science (Callebaut 1993, pp. 18, 77–78).
The label “GD” smoothens Dawkins’ (1983) quasi-religious call for “universal Darwinism.” Dawkins’ appealing writing appears suddenly different when the myth beyond his metaphors is uncovered: “Humanity is born in sin; we have a base inheritance” (selfish genes); “Humanity is therefore condemned to a life of conflict and… perpetual toil” (endless struggle between genes to get fitter); “by faith and moral effort humanity can be saved from its fallen, selfish state” (memes may outcompete genes) (Goodwin 1994, pp. 28–32). Dawkins is actually pleased to be labeled “neo-Paleyist” (Walsh 2012, p. 90). Although highly relevant for sociocultural evolution, a discussion of the design stance is beyond the scope of this article; see Krohs and Kroes (2009).
Evolutionary psychology “has become detached from recent developments in evolutionary thinking, which … have increasingly stressed a wide range of processes, including the importance of mutation, recombination, genetic drift, and multi-level selection” (Laland and Brown 2011, p. 131). Bolhuis et al. (2011), Buller (2005), Richardson (2007), and Rose and Rose (2001) offer additional critical perspectives on evolutionary psychology.
In Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), Edward O. Wilson expected the social sciences to soon be “subsumed” under biology. In Consilience (1998), he extended his annexationist program even further to include the humanities, art, and ethics (Callebaut (2010). Needless to say, Wilson-style sociobiology is gene-centric and adaptationist.
Malthus’s influence on both political economy and evolutionary theory is discussed in, e.g., Richards (1987), Hodgson (1993), and Depew and Weber (1995). I note that neither Lewontin’s (1970) abstract characterization of evolution nor niche construction theory are constrained in principle by the Malthusian “imperative” (Callebaut 2007; 2011, this issue).
It is important for my argument to distinguish the “empirical” issue of scarcity from the “logic” of evolution, which does not seem to require the Malthusian assumption (Callebaut 2011, this issue). On the former issue, a concerned plant geneticist has this to say as far as humans are concerned: “We often read ... about the arrogant intellectuals who keep quoting Malthus whilst the man has been wrong for more than 200 years. Indeed, while the world population tripled during the 50 years after the second World War, agricultural production increased by a factor of 3.5. But the scenario has now changed. The yield increase through classical breeding programs has reached a plateau and food production has to take into account ... global pollution .... We now realize that, unfortunately, Malthus’s prediction of risks finally materialises. Current agriculture faces the challenge of doubling food production to meet the food needs of a population expected to reach 9 billion by mid-century whilst maintaining soil and water quality and conserving biodiversity. The task becomes particularly tough when it has to be accomplished with limited land” (Van Montagu 2010, pp. 641–642).
Hirshleifer did not explain away the reality of cooperation, but reduced it analytically to Hamiltonian kinship fitness.
The “New Mechanism” that is now fashionable in the philosophy of biology is compatible with mild forms of organicism (Callebaut et al. 2007).
Ghiselin (2001, p. 57) thought of bioeconomics more as a research program than a paradigm “insofar as exploring the possible interrelationships between biology and economics may be more of a matter of asking new questions than of plugging in answers drawn from previously existing theory.” Cf. the Clark quote on evolutionary epistemology above.
See, e.g., the website of the “Post-Autistic Economics Network,” http://www.paecon.net/.
Gintis’ “Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints” (BPC) model posits that an agent makes choices to maximize a preference function, subject to the material, informational, and other constraints it faces, and subject to its beliefs concerning the effect of its actions on outcomes (Gintis 2006, p. 124). Recast in this way to avoid any misleading connotations of “rationality,” Gintis is convinced, the criticisms of the rational actor model lose their force. His move provides a nice illustration patching the rationality principle with ad hoc assumptions of bounded rationality (Callebaut 2007, p. 82).
Alex Mesoudi and Andrew Whiten are psychologists, Kevin Laland is a zoologist.
But see Nelson (2011, this issue), where he focuses on the cognition and behavior that shape, constrain, and empower economic agents (“technological paradigms,” etc.).
To mention an example from my own field, the philosophy of science: many of the skirmishes that took place between philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science in the 1980s and 1990s can be traced back to the circumstance that these fields became professionalized in a particular order: first philosophy (1930s), then history (1950s), and last sociology (1970s) (Callebaut 1993; Zammito 2004).
One reason why biology appeals to economists, Viskovatoff argues, is that it seems to have achieved the kind of methodological pluralism that economic methodologists often advocate for economics: “Specifically, [biologists] have been able to develop a unified body of theory that recognizes the contingent, historical nature of evolutionary phenomena while also allowing one to use mathematical models based on optimizing assumptions, when these are helpful for convincing one of the soundness of one’s reasoning” (p. 74). However, such pluralism also opens the door for inconsistent naturalism, as I argue below.
In a discussion of cultural evolution as “a proper player in the now rearticulating Darwinian and human sciences,” Wimsatt (2006, p. 342) points out: “These mega-science complexes are rearticulating in a nonreductionistic manner. Cavalli-Sforza’s multilocus gene samples… are not determinants of behavior sensu 1975 sociobiology, but tracers for migrations to be coupled with archaeological and linguistic data to illuminate patterns in all three.” The abuses of social Darwinism according to “progressivist” conceptions of evolution “are not serious threats any longer—at least from modern advocates of cultural evolution.”
My own guess, for what it’s worth, is that “we’re finally getting there,” and my current favorite example of an impressive achievement is cultural niche construction theory (Laland and O’Brien 2011).
Specifically, “the memetic approach cannot explain who acquires what memes—and in what order, as their acquisition is often order-dependent—nor can it give any account of the complex organization of culture” (Wimsatt 2010, p. 273). To make progress toward a theory of cultural evolution, Wimsatt urges us to incorporate “a rich account of the role of individual and institutional development” (p. 287). In the second edition of Laland and Brown’s Sense and Nonsense (2011), the chapter previously devoted to memes has been restyled as a chapter on cultural evolution in general.
To complicate things, Julian’s grandfather Thomas Henry Huxley in 1894 proposed a “doctrine of continuity” (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010, p. 3.4) that I don’t need to discuss here.
I considered this issue in terms of “complexity gain versus drain” in an unpublished paper presented in the session “Evolution of Biological Complexity” at the 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Nancy, 20 July 2011. McShea and Brandon (2010) is a good entry to the biological debate.
The biological language police point out that “growth” is an aspect of development, not evolution. But “economic growth” is so entrenched in economic terminology that it will probably resist linguistic reform.
Here is another instance: More often than not, Berninghaus et al. (2003, p. 386) complain, “adaptive modeling leads to the complete elimination of all purposeful choice from the explanation of social behavior. However, as a matter of fact there is purposeful forward-looking choice and thus a teleological element in the real world behavior of higher organisms that must be taken into account along with non-teleological springs of action. For a balanced view of human behavior we need both the teleological and the evolutionary (adaptive) perspective.” They urge economists to “explore the full spectrum of conceivable approaches, ranging from those based exclusively on ‘farsighted teleology’ to purely adaptive ones that explain phenomena in terms of ‘blind evolution’ only.”
The biological language police intervene again: “Another category mistake: stages belong to embryology/development not evolution.” I anticipated this objection by using quotation marks before when talking about “lower” and “higher” critters. Kuhn’s (discredited) stage view of science is discussed at some length in Callebaut (1993).
This is an allusion to the historian of science George Sarton’s famous dictum that the acquisition and systematization of positive knowledge are “the only human activity which is truly cumulative and progressive” (Sarton was a disillusioned former socialist). See Richards (1987, Appendix I) for a critical appraisal.
Contrary to naturalistic philosophers of science such as Ronald Giere, Thomas Nickles, and William Wimsatt (Callebaut 1993), naturalized epistemologists have paid little or no attention to the Carnegie-Mellon group’s work. But see Stich (1993), who, after having dismissed Quine’s “epistemology naturalized” as “incoherent,” regards Simon’s “computational pragmatism” as an excellent beginning on a pragmatist naturalization of epistemology.
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Acknowledgments
The ideas developed in this article were presented and discussed at the 22nd Altenberg Workshop in Theoretical Biology, “Models of Man for EE,” KLI, Altenberg, September 2009; in a talk at the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et Techniques (IHPST), Paris, March 2011; in a session on “Darwin’s Conjecture: Discussing the Ontological Foundations of Evolutionary Economics” at the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE) Conference on Schumpeter’s Heritage, “The Evolution of the Theory of Evolution,” Vienna, October 2011; and at the Ringberg Symposium, “Biological Determinants and Contingencies of Economic Behavior—Perspectives from Evolutionary Biology, Psychology, and Economics,” Tegernsee, August 2012. I would like to thank my audiences at these occasions, and in particular Kurt Dopfer, Jean Gayon, Geoff Hodgson, Michael Ghiselin, Dick Nelson, Jan-Willem Stoelhorst, Jack Vromen, Manuel Wäckerle, David Sloan Wilson, and Ulrich Witt, for very useful feedback. Error clause as usual.
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Callebaut, W. Beyond Generalized Darwinism. I. Evolutionary Economics from the Perspective of Naturalistic Philosophy of Biology. Biol Theory 6, 338–350 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-013-0086-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-013-0086-2