Abstract
Call the realist thesis that the truth of statements of the form “a is F” entails the existence of properties only via the schema “a is F iff a instantiates F-ness” introductionism; call the nominalist thesis that the schema “a is F iff a instantiates F-ness” doesn’t really introduce properties into the domain of discourse anti-introductionism. I’ll show that both introductionism and anti-introductionism presuppose two crucial assumptions concerning abstract singular terms and predicates, that in turn constitute the pivots of an (allegedly) cogent argument against realism, that is the so-called nominalist’s gambit. Moreover, moving from the phenomenon that I’ll call property-anaphora, I hold that these presuppositions are reciprocally incompatible. I’ll conclude that introductionism and anti-introductionism are positions based on an inconsistent ground, and that the nominalist’s gambit is without force.
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank David M. Armstrong, Andrea Borghini and Achille Varzi for helpful discussion on some of the topics discussed herein. I am also very grateful to the anonymous referees for their very constructive comments.
References
Armstrong, D. M. 1978a. Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. 1978b. Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Calemi, F. F. 2012. Dal nominalismo al platonismo. Il problema degli universali nella filosofia contemporanea. Milano: Mimesis.Search in Google Scholar
Devitt, M. 1980. “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly61:433–39.10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00031.xSearch in Google Scholar
Gracia, J. J. E. 1988. Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Search in Google Scholar
Hochberg, H. 1965. “Universals, Particulars, and Predication.” The Review of Metaphysics19:87–102.Search in Google Scholar
Hochberg, H. 1967. “Nominalism, Platonism and ‘Being True Of’.” Noûs1:413–19.10.2307/2214627Search in Google Scholar
Hochberg, H. 1970. “Metaphysical Explanation.” Metaphilosophy1:139–66.10.1111/j.1467-9973.1970.tb00600.xSearch in Google Scholar
Hochberg, H. 1977. “Mapping, Meaning, and Metaphysics.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy2:214–24.10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00041.xSearch in Google Scholar
Hochberg, H. 1978. “Sellars and Goodman on Predicates, Properties and Truth.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy3:360–68.10.1111/j.1475-4975.1978.tb00367.xSearch in Google Scholar
Jubien, M. 1997. Contemporary Metaphysics: An Introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Künne, W. 2006. “Properties in Abundance.” In Universals, Concepts and Qualities: New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates, edited by P. F.Strawson and A.Chakrabarti, 249–300. Aldershot: Ashgate.Search in Google Scholar
Loux, M. J. 1978. Substance and Attribute: A Study in Ontology. Dordrecht: Reidel.10.1007/978-94-009-9874-2Search in Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2006. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Search in Google Scholar
MacBride, F. 2006. “Predicates and Properties: Sen’s Universals.” In Universals, Concepts and Qualities: New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates, edited by P. F.Strawson and A.Chakrabarti, 67–90. Aldershot: Ashgate.Search in Google Scholar
McGinn, C. 2000. Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/0199241813.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Mill, J. S. 1843. System of Logic. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. 1961. “On What There Is.” In From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, edited by W. V. O.Quine, 1–19. New York: Harper and Row.Search in Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Search in Google Scholar
Rosenkrantz, G. S. 1993. Haecceity: An Ontological Essay. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.10.1007/978-94-015-8175-2Search in Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1951. “The World of Universals.” In The Problems of Philosophy, edited by B.Russell, 91–100. New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Schnieder, B. 2006. “Canonical Property Designators.” American Philosophical Quarterly43:119–32.Search in Google Scholar
Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139173438Search in Google Scholar
Siegel, M. E. A. 1994. “Such: Binding and the Pro-Adjective.” Linguistics and Philosophy17:481–97.10.1007/BF00985832Search in Google Scholar
Strawson, P. F. 2003. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
Swoyer, C. 1999. “How Ontology Might Be Possible: Explanation and Inference in Metaphysics.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy23:100–31.10.1111/1475-4975.00006Search in Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. 2004. “A Theory of Properties.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1, edited by D. W.Zimmerman, 107–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
©2014 by De Gruyter
