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Converging evidence for de-automatization as a function of suggestion☆,☆☆

Previous studies have shown that the speed of identifying emotional words is affected by pre-cues of up or down arrows, called the space-valence congruency effect (Zhang, Hu, Zhang, & Wang, 2015). In the present study, we investigate whether this effect is influenced by hypnotic or non-hypnotic suggestions to ignore pre-cues in highly hypnotizable individuals (HHIs). In all conditions, target words (including positive words, negative words and neutral words) primed by up or down arrows were presented to pre-screened HHIs. They were asked to identify whether the target words had emotional valence. Behavioral results showed that the space-valence congruency effect was absent in the hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion groups, but present in the non-suggestion control group. Consistently, the amplitudes of P2 components elicited by negative words were significantly larger when primed by down than by up arrows in the non-suggestion control group, and this P2 effect was absent in the hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion groups. Moreover, the amplitudes of the late positive components (LPC) showed no significant arrow-priming difference for positive targets in the hypnotic-suggestion and control groups. However, in the non-hypnotic suggestion group, the amplitudes of LPC were significantly larger when primed by down than up arrows for positive targets. Our results showed that suggestions, even without a hypnotic induction, can de-automatize embodied emotional recognition processes and modulate early attentional processing.

Imaging of the living human brain elucidates the neural dynamics of hypnosis; however, few reliable brain patterns emerge across studies. Here, we methodically assess neuroimaging assays of hypnosis to uncover common neural configurations using a twofold approach. First, we systematically review research on the neural correlates of hypnotic phenomena; then, we meta-analyze these collective data seeking specific activation and deactivation patterns that typify hypnosis. Anchored around the role of top-down control processes, our comprehensive examination focuses on the involvement of intrinsic brain networks known to support cognitive control and self-referential cognition, including the executive, salience, and default networks. We discuss how these neural dynamics may relate to contemporary theories of hypnosis and show that hypnosis correlates with activation of the lingual gyrus—a brain region involved in higher-order visual processing and mental imagery. Our findings help to better understand the neurobiological substrates comprising the appellation hypnosis.

Cognitive scientists routinely distinguish between controlled and automatic mental processes. Through learning, practice, and exposure, controlled processes can become automatic; however, whether automatic processes can become deautomatized – recuperated under the purview of control – remains unclear. Here we show that a suggestion derails a deeply ingrained process involving involuntary audiovisual integration. We compared the performance of highly versus less hypnotically suggestible individuals (HSIs versus LSIs) in a classic McGurk paradigm – a perceptual illusion task demonstrating the influence of visual facial movements on auditory speech percepts. Following a posthypnotic suggestion to prioritize auditory input, HSIs but not LSIs manifested fewer illusory auditory perceptions and correctly identified more auditory percepts. Our findings demonstrate that a suggestion deautomatized a ballistic audiovisual process in HSIs. In addition to guiding our knowledge regarding theories and mechanisms of automaticity, the present findings pave the road to a more scientific understanding of top-down effects and multisensory integration.

Cognitive scientists typically classify cognitive processes as either controlled or automatic. Whereas controlled processes are slow and effortful, automatic processes are fast and involuntary. Over the past decade, we have propelled a research trajectory investigating how top-down influence in the form of suggestion can allow individuals to modulate the automaticity of cognitive processes. Here we present an overarching array of converging findings that collectively indicate that certain individuals can derail involuntary processes, such as reading, by “unringing” the proverbial bell. We examine replications of these effects from both our own laboratory and independent groups, and extend our Stroop findings to several other well-established automatic paradigms, including the McGurk effect. We thus demonstrate how, in the case of highly suggestible individuals, suggestion seems to wield control over a process that is likely even more automatic than the Stroop effect. Finally, we present findings from two novel experimental paradigms exploring the potential of shifting automaticity in the opposite direction – i.e., transforming, without practice, a controlled task into one that is automatic. Drawing on related evidence from the neuroscience of contemplative practices, we discuss how these findings pave the road to a more scientific understanding of voluntary control and automaticity, and expound on their possible experimental and therapeutic applications.

The human mind-body possesses a remarkable innate ability to heal. Grounded in the evolutionarily conserved systems of the brain and body, nature appears to function as the fundamental source of wellness along the two vectors of attention and relaxation. Yet, our species is moving away from nature at a time when humanity is just beginning to rediscover its benefits.

Exposure to natural environments may provide a "window" of healing that can be extended through a continuum of intervention through the use of guided meditation and ultimately hypnotic suggestion. The result may be an improved ability to promote greater executive functioning and more robust immune regulation. The time has come for a more holistic medicine guided by the hand of nature.