Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Fuller on legal fictions

  • Published:
Law and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

What are legal fictions? Professor Lon Fuller discussed the matter at some length. One interpretation of his answer is this: they are lies that are not intended to deceive. This solution fails, in the end, to be convincing. But some remarks of Fuller provide the clue to another way of looking at the problem: fictions are means of changing the application of the law by relying on a tension between two classifications of fact.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Law, University of Reading, RG6 2AH, Reading, England

    Kenneth Campbell

Authors
  1. Kenneth Campbell
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

I am grateful to Professor Paul Jackson and Dr. Joseph Raz for a number of helpful comments on a draft of this article.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Campbell, K. Fuller on legal fictions. Law Philos 2, 339–370 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144950

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144950

Keywords

Search

Navigation