Abstract
This article critically focuses on the methodological aspects of Scott Shapiro’s book Legality. Indeed Shapiro’s book sets out several original theses about not only the nature of law and the main problems of jurisprudence, but also about how the nature of law can be discovered by jurisprudence. In this sense, the method of inquiry adopted by Shapiro can be considered as one of the most challenging outcomes of his research. The article is divided into two parts. In the first two sections I shall analyze Shapiro’s jurisprudential approach by focusing on its resort to metaphysical vocabulary, conceptual analysis, constructive reasoning, and institutional explanation of law. In the following sections I will consider some of the problems that this approach gives rise to, and outline an alternative view on the nature of law stimulated by the discussion of Shapiro’s work.
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Canale, D. Looking for the Nature of Law: On Shapiro’s Challenge. Law and Philos 31, 409–441 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-011-9125-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-011-9125-y