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Descriptivism, scope, and apparently empty names

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Abstract

Some descriptivists reply to the modal argument by appealing to scope ambiguities. In this paper, we argue that those replies don’t work in the case of apparently empty names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Stanley 1997, Sosa 2001, and Nelson 2002.

  2. See, for example, Dummett 1981a, b; Sosa 2001; and Hunter 2004.

  3. In conversation, Philip Bricker has endorsed neutralism. In “On Denoting,” Russell (1905) endorses a view in the vicinity of neutralism.

  4. (2) is modeled on an example of Everett’s (2003, p. 16). (See note 5.) Everett uses ‘John Perry’ and ‘Santa’ instead of ‘Joss Whedon’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’. This change is relatively unimportant. What is more important is that Everett’s example doesn’t contain modal or other operators, so he doesn’t discuss scope. (He discusses scope elsewhere, in Everett 2005. But he doesn’t discuss apparently empty names there.) That the apparently empty name is embedded under an operator like negation (or ‘According to the fiction’, or ‘Sam believes that’) is what allows many direct reference theorists to accept the truth of (2). See note 9.

  5. For example, Everett (2003, p. 16) says that

    (i) Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes.

    expresses a necessary falsehood and that “There is no possible circumstance in which [Joss Whedon] is [Sherlock Holmes].” (We have changed the example; see note 4.) Everett uses the example against a view held by Adams and others. In reply, Adams and Dietrich (2004, p. 136) don’t reject Everett’s claim about the modal profile of (i); rather, they accept “the modal intuition that [(i)] expresses a necessary falsehood” and attempt to explain that intuition away. Everett and Adams and Dietrich thus accept that (i) expresses a necessary falsehood. And, if (i) expresses a necessary falsehood, then (2) is true.

  6. Thanks to an anonymous referee and to Synners for pressing us here.

  7. Another line of thought starts with the intuition that there is at least one reading of

    (i) It is necessary that it is not the case that Joss Whedon is Arthur Conan Doyle.

    on which it is true. (Speakers who don’t start with the intuition that there is at least one reading of (2) on which it is true might have the intuition that there is at least one reading of (i) on which it is true.) The reasoning behind the intuition that there is at least one reading of (i) on which it is true might go like this: “If (i) is false, then there is a possible world in which Joss Whedon is Arthur Conan Doyle. But there is no such possible world, since, in any possible world in which Joss Whedon and Arthur Conan Doyle both exist, they will differ in their modal properties: for example, in any possible world in which Joss Whedon and Arthur Conan Doyle both exist, Joss Whedon will have the property being identical with Joss Whedon in the actual world, which Arthur Conan Doyle will lack.” Similar reasoning might lead one to conclude that there is at least one reading of (2) on which it is true: “If (2) is false, then there is a possible world in which Joss Whedon is Sherlock Holmes. But there is no such possible world, since, in any possible world in which Joss Whedon and Sherlock Holmes both exist, they will differ in their modal properties: for example, in any possible world in which Joss Whedon and Sherlock Holmes both exist, Joss Whedon will have the property existing in the actual world, which Sherlock Holmes will lack.”.

  8. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.

  9. Brock (2004, pp. 16–17) argues that widescopism yields the incorrect result that

    (i) It is possible that Sherlock Holmes is a famous detective who lives at 221B Baker Street.

    is false. (Brock uses a ‘Santa Claus’ example. But replacing his example with ours doesn’t affect the cogency of his argument.) But Brock’s argument has two limitations. The first limitation is that it cannot be endorsed by many direct reference theorists, since many direct reference theorists reject (i). (See Brock 2004, pp. 13–15.) The second limitation is that descriptivists can avoid Brock’s argument by rejecting widescopism in favor of neutralism (provided that they can explain why, in some cases, the wide-scope reading is hidden or silent, whereas, in other cases, it is the narrow-scope reading that is hidden or silent).

    The argument that we present in the text does not have either of these limitations. First, the argument can be endorsed by many direct reference theorists, since many direct reference theorists can accept (2). (Direct reference theorists who accept both (a) that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is genuinely empty and (b) that sentences that contain genuinely empty names fail to express propositions will reject (2). But direct reference theorists need not accept both (a) and (b), and those who reject at least one of them can accept (2). On rejecting (a), see, for example, Salmon 1998, Soames 2002, and Braun 2005. On rejecting (b), see, for example, Kaplan 1989; Braun 1993, 2005; and Salmon 1998.) And, second, descriptivists cannot avoid the argument by rejecting widescopism in favor of neutralism.

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Correspondence to Andrew Cullison.

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For comments and discussion, thanks from both authors to Neil Feit, Stephen Kershnar, Michael McKinsey, David Sanson, Dale Tuggy, and an anonymous referee; to Peter Culicover, Carl Pollard, Judith Tonhauser, and other participants in the Synners (Syntax and Semantics) discussion group at Ohio State in September 2009; and especially to students—in the first author’s Epistemology class at SUNY Fredonia in Spring 2010 and the second author’s Advanced Philosophy of Language class at Ohio State in Winter 2010—who let us plumb their intuitions.

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Cullison, A., Caplan, B. Descriptivism, scope, and apparently empty names. Philos Stud 156, 283–288 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9589-x

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