Carter, J. A. and Jarvis, B. (2012) Against swamping. Analysis, 72(4), pp. 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)
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Abstract
The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always swamp the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties (e.g. justification) so that these properties can never add any epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable than mere true belief. We show that the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields the disastrous conclusion that nonfactive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Additional Information: | Benjamin Jarvis would like to acknowledge the Association of Commonwealth Universities and the British Academy (CC100095) for supporting his research on knowledge. |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
Authors: | Carter, J. A., and Jarvis, B. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Analysis |
Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
ISSN (Online): | 1467-8284 |
Published Online: | 09 September 2012 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2012 The Authors |
First Published: | First published in Analysis 72(4): 690-699 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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