Abstract
It is arguable that beneath the fast and loose surface of recent official and/or semi-official documentation devoted to advice and guidance on moral education, there lurks systematic error about the bases of moral authority - turning upon a distinction between common and personal values. In what follows, it is claimed that the heart of this error lies in mistaking a logical distinction between different levels of moral evaluation for a statistical distinction concerned more with the distribution of moral values. To the extent that common value is identified with ideas of consensus or agreement, and personal value with values clarification and personal search, it seems that no coherent or viable conception of moral reason could possibly be constructed on the basis of currently available official guidance.
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Carr, D. Common and Personal Values in Moral Education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 17, 303–312 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005155500923
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005155500923