Environmental Aesthetics, Ethics, and Ecoaesthetics

I. ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

A number of environmental philosophers suggest that there is an important relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics—between how we aesthetically appreciate our environments and how we should treat them. For example, in his historical study of the development of American environmental beliefs and attitudes over the past three centuries, Eugene Hargrove () demonstrates that aesthetic appreciation has been extremely influential concerning the preservation and protection of some of North America's most spectacular environments. Other environmental philosophers agree. J. Baird Callicott claims: “Natural aesthetic evaluation … has made a terrific difference to American conservation policy and management,” adding that “[w]hat kinds of country we consider to be exceptionally beautiful makes a huge difference when we come to decide which places to save, which to restore or enhance, and which to allocate to other uses. Therefore, a sound natural aesthetics is crucial to sound conservation policy and land management” (2008, 106).

Such observations presuppose that environmental aesthetics is relevant to environmental ethics, a claim made explicitly by others. Ned Hettinger sums up his investigation of the significance of environmental aesthetics for the “protection of the environment” by claiming “[e]nvironmental ethics would benefit from taking environmental aesthetics more seriously” (2005, 76). And Holmes Rolston concludes his essay, “From Beauty to Duty: Aesthetics of Nature and Environmental Ethics” by asking: “Can aesthetics be an adequate foundation for an environmental ethic?” His initial answer is: “This depends on how deep your aesthetics goes. No, where most aestheticians begin, rather shallowly.” But his final answer is: “Yes, increasingly, where aesthetics itself comes to find and to be founded on natural history, with humans emplacing themselves appropriately on such landscapes. Does environmental ethics need such aesthetics to be adequately founded? Yes, indeed” (2002, 140).1

In short, several prominent environmental philosophers agree that environmental aesthetics is important in regard to environmental ethics. But, what exactly is the connection?

II. AESTHETICS, ETHICS, AND ART

To understand the nature of a possible link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics, it is useful to briefly consider the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. As is well known, this relationship has a long and varied history. On the one hand, a tradition going back as far as Plato recognizes that some objects of aesthetic appreciation, most notably works of art, possess aesthetic qualities that have moral relevance and that given such qualities, certain moral evaluations follow. For example, Plato apparently thought that from the fact that some works of art gave unflattering representations of the gods, it followed that they should be banned. On the other hand, a more recent tradition holds that the aesthetic and the ethical are not connected in this way. An extreme version of this tradition is known as “aestheticism,” the view that aesthetics and ethics are two different realms. This view is associated with nineteenth‐century thinkers, such as Oscar Wilde, who held that the sphere of art and the sphere of ethics are absolutely distinct and separate. Were such a view accepted concerning the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics, we might conclude that there is no interesting relationship between these two realms.

I think this conclusion would be premature. Both the Platonic tradition and aestheticism focus primarily on art, and this tendency continues into the present, at which time there is a rewarding body of literature on art and ethics. Although I do not here review this literature, I think there are two points about the treatment of the relationship between art and ethics that are relevant to the consideration of the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. The first point is that although neither the Platonic nor the aestheticism position attracts much support from current aestheticians, a more moderate form of each of these traditions lives on in the positions commonly labeled moralism and autonomism. For example, a contemporary moralist may hold that some works of art, especially narrative fiction, can express, and perhaps even advocate, morally relevant views in such a way that these works generate appropriate moral evaluations. In such cases, the moral evaluations are not irrelevant, since they follow from the aesthetic appreciation of what I call the “morally relevant aesthetic qualities” of the work. By contrast, an autonomist may hold that although there can be both aesthetic and moral evaluations of objects of aesthetic appreciation, these evaluations are not importantly related to one another. The second point is simply the fact that these views are focused almost exclusively on art. The upshot is that the contemporary discussion of moralism and autonomism is informative about the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics primarily insofar as and to the extent that the subject matter of these areas is, or is not, art‐like.

III. HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS AND MODERATE ENVIRONMENTAL MORALISM

The subject matter of environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics is diverse. It ranges from human‐created and human‐influenced environments to ones that are natural and pristine. At one end of this spectrum are environments such as, for instance, a small urban park and, on the other, a near pristine mountain landscape. Insofar as the moralism described above is plausible for some works of art, I suggest that a somewhat similar view applies equally well to environments at one end of this spectrum, such as the above‐mentioned urban park. There are, of course, some differences. Most parks do not have a narrative.2 And it is unclear if they can actually advocate morally relevant views, but they clearly can express morally relevant aesthetic qualities and thereby sometimes engender moral evaluations. For example, a small, rather ordinary urban park can express qualities such as, if it is well cared for, community concern and commitment, or, if it is a memorial park, courage or heroism, or, if it has gone to ruin, perhaps negligence and disregard. Such expressive qualities are morally relevant aesthetic qualities of the park and thus appropriate aesthetic appreciation of the park can result in a moral response suitable to the expressed aesthetic qualities. An urban park expressing community commitment may engender approval and admiration, while one expressing negligence may move a spectator to indignation or even outrage. I call this version of moralism “moderate environmental moralism.”3 It is the position that environments that are human‐created or human‐influenced can sometimes express morally relevant aesthetic qualities and when such environments are appropriately aesthetically appreciated such qualities may engender appropriate moral evaluations.4 In such cases, environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics are connected in the sense that aesthetic appreciation provides grounds for ethical judgments about the object of appreciation.

It is worth emphasizing that moderate environmental moralism applies to a wide range of the subject matter of environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. It is plausible concerning most small human environments, such as our yards and our domestic living spaces, as well as most of the environments in which we live and work: small towns, city centers, suburban neighborhoods, industrial sites, agricultural landscapes. Consider a human environment such as a middle class suburban neighborhood that has developed in response to certain human needs, interests, and concerns. On the one hand, the forces that have shaped and continue to shape it may be, for instance, community engagement, good government, and “family values,” in which case the neighborhood may express such qualities. Consequently, when the neighborhood is aesthetically appreciated, these morally relevant aesthetic qualities may elicit appropriate moral evaluations of the neighborhood. On the other hand, the forces that have shaped the neighborhood may be otherwise: the social forces racist, the economic forces exploitive, and the political forces corrupt. In this case, each of, first, our appropriate aesthetic appreciation of it, second, the morally relevant aesthetic qualities we experience, and, third, our moral evaluations of it may be quite different. I think this same line of thought also applies to many environments that are somewhat more natural yet nonetheless human influenced. Consider the issue of invasive species, often illustrated by the “purple loosestrife problem.” Purple loosestrife is a wetland plant with brilliant purple flowers that was introduced into North America in the early nineteenth century. It is highly invasive and since brought to this continent has taken over vast stretches of wetlands, wiping out other species and devastating entire ecosystems. Although loosestrife appears beautiful, many individuals who are knowledgeable about its effects find it morally problematic. Such cases can be understood in terms of moderate environmental moralism. When appropriately aesthetically appreciated, wetlands choked with loosestrife, although they may look beautiful, also express ecological destruction produced by ignorant or careless human activity and this morally relevant aesthetic quality of the wetlands can engender a negative moral response.5

IV. NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS AND AUTONOMISM

If moderate environmental moralism is applicable to human‐created and human‐influenced environments that occupy one end of the spectrum of the subject matter of environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics, what about the other end of that spectrum? What is the correct position for natural, pristine environments, such as the previously mentioned example of a near pristine mountain landscape? As noted, contemporary moralism is applicable to some works of art that express and even advocate morally relevant views and, I suggest, to some human environments that express morally relevant aesthetic qualities and thus engender related moral responses. Works of art and human environments that express morally relevant views and qualities can do so because they possess other kinds of features: human environments are the products of and reflect the human forces that create and shape them, while works of art have themes, characters, and plots. Such features facilitate the aesthetic expression of morally relevant views and qualities. However, pristine natural environments are not the products of human forces and nature has no themes, characters, or plots. Consequently, although natural environments can have aesthetic qualities, such as the beauty and the magnificence of a pristine mountain landscape, they do not possess morally relevant aesthetic qualities and therefore do not by means of such qualities bring about moral responses. We might say that nature is in this sense “beyond good and evil.” However, as that phrase has been used in a different context, we might rather say that nature is beneath, above, or, perhaps, taking a clue from the story of the Garden of Eden, “before good and evil.”6

If nature is before good and evil, then for pristine, natural environments, environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics are not linked as they are for human environments, and even moderate environmental moralism does not apply. Rather for natural environments we must look to autonomism. However, the autonomism is not the contemporary position that holds the aesthetic and the moral evaluations of objects of aesthetic appreciation are not importantly related to one another nor is it the extreme aestheticism that holds that aesthetics and ethics are two absolutely distinct and separate realms. Rather the autonomism that applies to natural environments might be called autonomism by default. This is because, in the case of nature, two such distinct and separate realms do not exist and, moreover, even if they did, since natural environments do not express morally relevant aesthetic qualities that could generate correlated moral evaluations, there is no basis for a passage between two separate realms, from an aesthetic domain to a moral domain. Thus, the autonomism that applies to nature is only “by default” and moderate environmental moralism and the connection it makes between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics for human environments does not hold for natural environments. In short, given autonomism by default, there is some question about any link whatsoever between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics in the case of nature.

V. NATURE, ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

The question of the possibility of a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics in the case of natural environments may be somewhat clarified by returning briefly to the environmental philosophers quoted at the outset of this essay, given that Hargrove, Callicott, Hettinger, and Rolston address the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics with an emphasis on natural environments. For instance, Hargrove () focuses on how aesthetic appreciation has played a role in the preservation and protection of natural areas and national parks, and Callicott stresses how what “we consider to be exceptionally beautiful makes a huge difference when we come to decide which places to save” (2008, 106). Likewise, for both Hettinger () and Rolston (), the relevance of environmental aesthetics for environmental ethics concerns, in large part, the “preservation and protection” of natural environments. These observations not only assume that there is an important connection between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics in the case of natural environments, but also, by the emphasis on preservation and protection, indicate the role for environmental aesthetics concerning this link. In short, unlike the case of human environments in which the expression of specific morally relevant aesthetic qualities are the grounds of specific moral evaluations, in the case of natural environments positive aesthetic appreciation is in general taken to provide grounds for a blanket moral obligation to preserve and protect nature. However, the question posed is: Does a connection between this kind of aesthetic appreciation of natural environments and their preservation and protection actually constitute a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics?

One attempt to address this question is by means of the notion of an “aesthetic imperative,” which is mentioned by Rolston. He notes, “Aesthetic imperatives are usually thought less urgent than moral imperatives,” suggesting that there is some parallel between the two kinds of imperatives and, moreover, that the former, although “less urgent,” might still constitute some grounds for preservation and protection (2002, 127). The idea is apparently that a claim such as “X is beautiful, so preserve and protect it” is analogous to “X is good, so preserve and protect it.” In other words, concerning that which is aesthetically appreciable, there is an imperative similar to the imperative concerning that which is good, according to which positively aesthetically appreciable natural environments are to be preserved and protected. However, what Rolston calls a moral imperative seemingly follows from “X is good” only in the case where it means “X is morally good,” in which case there is a moral obligation to preserve and protect. By analogy, what follows from “X is aesthetically beautiful” is seemingly only an “aesthetic obligation.” Consequently, whatever an aesthetic imperative or an aesthetic obligation might amount to and even if they provide some grounds for preservation and protection of nature, they do not appear to involve any moral obligation to preserve and protect. Thus these notions do not seem to forge any link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.7

The question of a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics that arises because natural environments do not possess morally relevant aesthetic qualities is not resolved by an appeal to an aesthetic imperative since that appeal does not make a connection to ethics. Consequently, one might attempt to link aesthetic appreciation of nature to a moral obligation to preserve and protect it by focusing on the moral itself. Seemingly, moral obligations are dependent upon what kinds of things we take to be proper holders of moral value. If, for example, we take other sentient creatures to have moral value, then our judgment that they should be preserved and protected is a moral evaluation. Thus, one way of attempting to justify moral obligations to preserve and protect natural environments is to claim that such environments and, or, their constituents have moral value. This line of thought would seem to require that nature itself has intrinsic value, for if its value is only instrumental, it need not be moral value. It may be only the value of, for example, the resources necessary for the survival of humans, who presumably have intrinsic value. On the other hand, if nature itself has intrinsic value, then there are grounds for claiming that any obligation to preserve and protect it is a moral obligation. But in this case, the moral obligation follows directly from nature's intrinsic value. The moral obligation does not follow from the aesthetic appreciation or the aesthetic value of nature and, once again, no connection is established between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.

VI. INSTRUMENTAL VALUE AND AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF NATURE

Given the forgoing line of thought, it appears that, since nature has no morally relevant aesthetic qualities, one way of attempting to justify a moral obligation to preserve and protect it might be to simply hold that it has intrinsic value, from which the obligation to preserve and protect it would seemingly follow. As noted, in this case, the aesthetic would be left out of the picture and, consequently, concerning nature, no link would be forged between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. However, the aesthetic might be brought back into the picture by claiming that whether or not nature has intrinsic value, it nonetheless does have instrumental value, and, moreover, that its instrumental value is not only the value of, for example, resources necessary for human survival. In addition to such “resource” value, nature's instrumental value may include the value of the aesthetic experiences that it provides for humans who aesthetically appreciate it. In this case, the obligation to protect and preserve nature would be a moral obligation that follows from the intrinsic value of humans and, perhaps, their experiences. By this line of thought, the foundation of a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics is not the aesthetic value of nature itself, but rather the value of the aesthetic experiences of human appreciators of nature. This means that support for a connection between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics in the case of natural environments seemingly depends upon what account is given of the aesthetic appreciation of nature.

There are a number of different accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of natural environments in the contemporary literature on environmental aesthetics. One practice is to divide these positions into two groups, frequently labeled cognitive and non‐cognitive.8 These labels mark a division between positions that take cognitive resources, such as knowledge and information, to be essential to aesthetic appreciation of environments and other positions that take some alternative feature, such as engagement, emotional arousal, or imagination, to be paramount. Although each group includes several variations, I focus on one prominent position in each group to inquire about the extent to which such accounts might support a connection between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.

In the case of the non‐cognitive group, the most prominent position, which is called the aesthetics of engagement, is defended by Arnold Berleant.9 As Berleant's view is well‐known in the field, I only briefly sketch it. Berleant argues that traditional accounts of aesthetic experience, which endorse a separation between the appreciator and the object of appreciation, have given rise to a mode of aesthetic appreciation that is distancing and objectifying and is therefore out of place in the aesthetic experience of natural environments. He contends that such a mode of appreciation wrongly abstracts both natural objects and appreciators from the environments in which they must be situated if appropriate appreciation is to be achieved. In contrast, Berleant views environments as seamless unities of places, organisms, and perceptions and challenges traditional dichotomies, such as that between subject and object. He argues that appreciators should immerse themselves in natural environments and reduce to as small a degree as possible the distance between themselves and the natural world. In short, when we experience a natural environment from within, as Berleant puts it, “looking not at it but being in it, nature … is transformed into a realm in which we live as participants, not observers. … The aesthetic mark of all such times is … total engagement, a sensory immersion in the natural world” (1992, 170, emphasis original).10

Like the non‐cognitive group, the group of cognitive accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of natural environments also has several different versions. However, to a greater or a lesser degree, all the accounts hold that a cognitive component is a core feature of the aesthetic appreciation of any object of appreciation.11 This key component is aesthetically relevant knowledge about the nature and the origin of the object of appreciation, that is, knowledge of what it is and how it came to be. In essence, it is knowledge of why the object of our aesthetic appreciation, which is presented to our senses directly, presents itself to our senses as it does. The strength of cognitive positions is perhaps most evident concerning the appreciation of art, for with almost any work of art some knowledge of what it is and how it came to be is vital to its appropriate aesthetic appreciation. However, if the concept of aesthetic appreciation is to avoid equivocation, an account of the aesthetic appreciation of environments must be parallel to that of art. Thus, central to the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of any environment is knowledge of its nature and origin. This is knowledge revealed by science, and therefore one prominent cognitive position, known as scientific cognitivism, holds that the knowledge essential for the appropriate aesthetic appreciation of natural environments is the factual knowledge given by sciences such as geology, biology, and ecology.12

VII. AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF NATURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Now the question is whether either non‐cognitive or cognitive accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of natural environments can provide grounds for a move from the aesthetic appreciation of such environments to a moral obligation to protect and preserve them and in this way establish a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. Concerning this question, non‐cognitive accounts, such as the aesthetics of engagement, seem to face a serious problem involving subjectivity. The problem can be illustrated by returning to Rolston (even though he seems to believe that ultimately it can be overcome).13 After commending Berleant's view for focusing appreciation and conservation on “the nature‐human relationship,” Rolston goes on to note that the “downside” of an environmental ethic based on this orientation is that it is “more dependent on our current aesthetic preferences, more personally idiosyncratic, more culturally relative, even contingent on our changing tastes” (2002, 131). Rolston expresses similar concerns throughout his work. He notes the “need to split aesthetic value off from many other values carried by nature,” in part because “some interpreters” find “aesthetic experience to be inevitably subjective” (1988, 233). He worries about the view that aesthetic values are tertiary qualities, saying “most judges become convinced that these tertiary qualities are overlays, not really there in the natural world. Rainbow‐like, only more so, they are gifts of the spectator's mind” (1982, 128).14 Such concerns are echoed by other philosophers interested in the protection and preservation of natural environments. Hettinger remarks: “If judgments of environmental beauty lack objective grounding, they seemingly provide a poor basis for justifying environmental protection” (2008, 414). Janna Thompson concurs: “A judgement of value that is merely personal and subjective gives us no way of arguing that everyone ought to learn to appreciate something, or at least to regard it as worthy of preservation” (1995, 292). She further observes that the “link … between aesthetic judgment and ethical obligation fails unless there are objective grounds—grounds that rational, sensitive people can accept—for thinking that something has value” (292). The point is succinctly summarized by Noël Carroll: “any … picture of nature appreciation, if it is to be taken seriously, must have … means … for solving the problem of … objectivity” (1993, 257).15

The question remains whether cognitive accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of natural environments can be more successful than non‐cognitive accounts in providing grounds for a move from the aesthetic appreciation of such environments to a moral obligation to protect and preserve them. Initially, it is important to note that cognitive accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature do not face the problem of subjectivity to the same extent that non‐cognitive approaches do. Several environmental philosophers claim that scientific cognitivism gives aesthetic appreciation a necessary degree of objectivity. For example, Hettinger argues that since the “cognitive model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature requires that scientific knowledge ground one's aesthetic judgments,” it provides “resources for buttressing the objectivity of environmental aesthetics” (2005, 76).16 Moreover, it is also claimed not only that this kind of view provides some objectivity, but also that, in doing so, it helps to establish a connection between aesthetic appreciation and the obligation to protect and preserve nature. For instance, Marcia Eaton states that the cognitive model of nature appreciation “is, in my opinion, the most promising so far articulated if one's goal is to produce, protect, or preserve environments that are both beautiful and healthy” (2001, 176).17 Hettinger agrees, claiming that the cognitive approach in environmental aesthetics provides “a wealth of resources for those who would appropriate” it “in the service of environmental protection” (2005, 76).18

Nonetheless, cognitive accounts may face problems that are also impediments to any link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. For example, it might be thought that the degree to which scientific cognitivism requires appropriate appreciation of nature to be dependent of scientific facts makes such appreciation less a matter of aesthetic value and more of something like cognitive interest.19 In this case, it might be argued that instead of a possible movement from aesthetic value to moral value, there is a difficulty of moving from factual aesthetic interest to moral values. This would be a problem somewhat akin to a traditional problem in ethics, that of attempting to connect facts and values. The problem can be highlighted by again turning to Rolston's work, in which he worries that some research in environmental ethics may run afoul of, as it is sometimes called, the venerable dogma of the logical gap between is and ought. Rolston addresses the issue in a number of places, describing it as “the basic cleavage that runs through the middle of the modern mind dividing every study into the realm of the is and the realm of the ought” (1979, 16, emphasis original). In short, the problem for cognitive accounts of aesthetic appreciation of nature may be that they are too cognitive, so burdened with factual knowledge that they cannot effectively move from fact‐based appreciation to moral values, and thus cannot establish a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.20

VIII. ECOAESTHETICS

The difficulty now faced can be summarized as follows: Since natural environments are before good and evil, they themselves do not seem to provide resources for connecting environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. Moreover, if, in light of this, we instead seek support for such a link in the value of human aesthetic experiences of nature, we confront what may be a dilemma. Considering different contemporary accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature, we find that, on the one hand, so‐called non‐cognitive positions provide an account of aesthetic experience that seemingly makes it too subjective to be the foundation for an environmental ethic. And, on the other hand, it seems that so‐called cognitive positions give an account of aesthetic appreciation that is so heavily fact‐based that moving from such appreciation to any moral obligations is possibly blocked by something like the traditional fact‐value distinction. In light of this seeming dilemma, I now explore some recent attempts to connect aesthetic appreciation to the preservation and protection of nature that are called ecological aesthetics or, sometimes, ecoaesthetics.21

It is not completely clear exactly what constitutes an ecoaesthetics. A number of different positions are occasionally given this label. Part of the reason I select the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism to represent non‐cognitive and cognitive orientations in environmental aesthetics is that each of these positions is sometimes referred to as an ecological aesthetics or an ecoaesthetics. For example, Ted Toadvine identifies Berleant as “a leading figure in the development of a specifically ecological aesthetics” who “has been the first to offer a comprehensive phenomenological theory of ecological aesthetics,” adding that among “non‐phenomenological contributions to ecological aesthetics, the dominant line of development has been the cognitive approach” (2010, 85–86, 89). He also sketches his own ecoaesthetics that he argues avoids the criticisms of each of these two approaches by “incorporating the best features of both,” concluding that the “two accounts may be fruitfully combined for a richer understanding of our holistic aesthetic engagement with the world” (2010, 89, 90). The proposal to incorporate the core ideas of each of the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism into one position, thereby avoiding the problems of each, is likewise suggested by Rolston, who also calls this approach an “ecological aesthetics” (2002, 131). Recall the passage quoted at the outset of this essay in which Rolston asks: “Can aesthetics be an adequate foundation for an environmental ethic?” He answers “no” if aesthetics is shallow, but: “Yes, indeed” if it is “deep.” By a deep “adequate foundation of an environmental ethic” he means an aesthetics, like scientific cognitivism, that “comes to find and to be founded on natural history” and one, like the aesthetics of engagement, “with humans emplacing themselves appropriately on such landscapes” (2002, 140). This suggestion, as does Toadvine's ecoaesthetics, draws on resources from both cognitive and non‐cognitive positions. But how are such combination approaches meant to meet the problems seemingly facing the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism, subjectivity on the one hand and the is‐ought dogma on the other?

In response to this question, it is plausible to argue that adding scientific cognitivism to the aesthetics of engagement might help answer the charge of subjectivity, for, as noted, a cognitive approach seems to supply a degree of objectivity. For example, Hettinger argues that the “cognitive model” provides “resources for buttressing the objectivity of environmental aesthetics,” in part because “[a]esthetic judgments about environments can be dismissed out of hand if they are based on biological, geological, or ecological ignorance” (2005, 76). By ruling out such judgments, scientific cognitivism could support the aesthetics of engagement by restraining its subjective tendencies. Nonetheless, even if a combination approach helps meet the subjectivity criticism by means of scientific cognitivism supplying a degree of objectivity to the combination, it is not immediately clear how the aesthetics of engagement could aid in addressing what may be scientific cognitivism's problem, the is‐ought issue. Perhaps it could be argued that the aesthetics of engagement's conception of environments as “seamless unities of places, organisms, and perceptions” together with its rejection of traditional dichotomies, such as that between subject and object, might give support for a similar rejection of the is‐ought dichotomy. However, to explore this possibility, it is useful to consider ecological aesthetics or ecoaesthetics positions that are both “deeper” and broader or, perhaps, more robust than simply the combinations of the engagement and the cognitive approaches that are suggested by Toadvine and Rolston.

IX. CHINESE ECOAESTHETICS

Several versions of a more robust ecological aesthetics are developed by Chinese aestheticians, who also use the term “ecoaesthetics” (生态美学).22 Some of these positions, like those of Toadvine and Rolston, incorporate the central ideas of the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism. One such position is presented by Chinese aesthetician Xiangzhan Cheng when he observes that the main issue facing ecoaesthetics is “how to form an ecological aesthetic way (or manner) by letting ecological awareness play a leading role in human aesthetic activity and experience” (, 221).23 In this essay Cheng presents the essentials of the Chinese approach as four of what he calls “keystones,” the first and third of which are similar to the core ideas of the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism. As he puts it: “The first keystone of ecological aesthetics is that it completely abandons a conventional aesthetics that is predicated on an opposition between humanity and the world. Subsequently it is replaced by the model of aesthetic engagement that promotes the idea of the unity of humans and the world,” and the “third keystone … is that it is imperative for ecological aesthetic appreciation to rely on the ecological knowledge to refine taste and to enjoy the hidden rich aesthetic properties of the ordinary. …. Without basic ecological knowledge, it will be impossible to engage a full ecological aesthetic appreciation” (, 222, 228). In addition to these two keystones, which combine engagement and cognitivism, Cheng proposes two others, which go beyond the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism or any simple combination of the two. His “second keystone … is that ecological aesthetic appreciation is an aesthetic activity predicated on ecological ethics. It revises and strengthens the relationship between aesthetics and ethics in traditional aesthetics, and it takes ecological awareness as the premise of ecological appreciation. In this sense, the presupposition of ecological aesthetic appreciation is to have ecological consciousness,” while the fourth keystone holds that “the two guiding principles of ecological value for ecological aesthetic appreciation are biodiversity and ecosystem health. Humanity must overcome and transcend anthropocentric value standards and human aesthetic preference, reflecting and criticizing anthropocentric aesthetic preferences and habits” (, 224, 231).

How do such more robust Chinese versions of ecoaesthetics, which go beyond simply combining the central ideas of the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism, help address some of the weaknesses and problems facing Western attempts to link environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics? I think that part of the answer to this question is that in general Chinese ecoaesthetics does not address specific problems so much as it presents an overall program for promoting, protecting, and preserving the environment. A case in point is the problem that may face the cognitive position, that its account of aesthetic appreciation of nature is so heavily fact‐based that moving from such appreciation to a moral obligation to preserve and protect natural environments is seemingly blocked by the traditional fact‐value dichotomy. The answer to the question of how Chinese ecoaesthetics addresses this problem is simply that it makes no attempt to move from ecological facts to ethical values. Rather within the framework of the first keystone, that is, a “model of aesthetic engagement that promotes the idea of the unity of humans and the world,” Chinese ecoaesthetics just straightforwardly accepts both the second keystone “that ecological aesthetic appreciation is an aesthetic activity predicated on ecological ethics” and the third “that it is imperative for ecological aesthetic appreciation to rely on the ecological knowledge.” In short, given the first keystone, there is no recognition of a significant gap between facts and values and thus there is no need to attempt to move from the third to the second keystone, that is, from the necessity of ecological knowledge in aesthetic appreciation to the centrality of ecological ethics. Each is just presupposed as an essential element of what it is to be an ecoaesthetics. In this sense, in Chinese ecoaesthetics, environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics are not linked by any movement from one to the other; rather they are brought together simply by each being built into one overall position.24

However, it might be objected that this Chinese position simply begs a number of questions. For example, consider again the is‐ought issue as a case in point. It seems possible to challenge the effectiveness of the first keystone in undercutting the traditional Western distinction between facts and values simply by abandoning the “opposition between” and promoting “the unity of” humanity and the world. It may be argued that this does not justify accepting both ecological facts and ethical values within the same position as if there were no gap between them. However, perhaps this is to miss the point. The traditional Western problem is that of bridging a supposed gap between facts and values that makes moving from the former to the latter problematic. But, as noted, the Chinese approach does not make this move; it does not attempt to bring facts and values together by means of bridging a gap between them. It is as if the Western tradition presupposes the view that if values do not seem to follow logically from facts, there is a gap between them such that the two cannot be brought together. But defenders of the Chinese approach might argue that they are not addressing a philosophical question generated by the Western conceptions of facts and values. Rather, Chinese ecoaesthetics simply just puts both facts and values into a single position within which they can work together to achieve certain ends. In short, the focus of Chinese ecoaesthetics is in developing one overarching position that incorporates several resources—human‐world unity, ecological facts, aesthetic appreciation, ethical values, biodiversity, ecosystem health—that are important for addressing contemporary environmental issues.25

X. CONCLUSION

In this essay, I offer four lines of thought concerning the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.

First, if we divide the subject matter of environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics into human‐created or human‐influenced environments and natural environments, the former, because they can possess some features similar to those of certain works of art, sometimes express morally relevant aesthetic qualities that can generate moral responses. Therefore, a position that I call moderate environmental moralism is applicable to such environments, and thus in this case there is a significant link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.

Second, since natural environments do not express morally relevant aesthetic qualities, what I call autonomism by default is applicable to them. Thus, two alternative attempts to link environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics in the case of such environments are problematic. The first appeals to the idea of an aesthetic imperative, but, although such an imperative might support preservation and protection of natural environments, it does not appear to generate a moral obligation to do so, and thus it fails to link environmental aesthetics to ethics. The second alternative appeals to the possibility of intrinsic value of natural environments in order to justify a moral obligation to preserve and protect them, but even if this alternative is successful, since it does not base this moral obligation on aesthetics, it fails to link aesthetics to environmental ethics.

Third, since natural environments might nonetheless be morally preservation‐ and protection‐worthy due to their instrumental value of providing intrinsically valuable humans with aesthetic experiences, some standard accounts of human aesthetic appreciation may help to establish a connection between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. However, a consideration of non‐cognitive approaches, represented by the aesthetics of engagement, and of cognitive approaches, represented by scientific cognitivism, poses the concerns that the former provides an account of appreciation that may be too subjective to support a move from environmental aesthetics to environmental ethics, while the latter provides an account of aesthetic appreciation so burdened with facts that an attempt to move from environmental aesthetics to environmental ethics may be blocked by the traditional Western gap between facts and values.

Fourth, in attempting to address these apparent problems, two contemporary Western presentations of ecoaesthetics, both of which adopt the core ideas of the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism, may have some success in dealing with the subjectivity problem, but seem less effective concerning the fact‐value problem. However, research by Chinese aestheticians offers a more robust combination position, not only bringing together the central ideas of the aesthetics of engagement and scientific cognitivism, but also including ecological ethics within the position itself. In this way Chinese ecoaesthetics simply avoids certain traditional Western presuppositions such as the necessity of moving from the aesthetic appreciation of nature to moral obligations concerning it. Thus they succeed in bringing together environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics, even if not in the way in which this connection is often envisioned within Western philosophy.26

REFERENCES

Footnotes