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Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

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Abstract

We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology.

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Correspondence to J. Adam Carter.

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Carter, J.A., Jarvis, B. & Rubin, K. Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability. Synthese 190, 3715–3729 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0220-x

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