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Philosophical Investigations, 2014; 37(1):78-90

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Drew Carter
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Which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12032

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http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83658

Morality and a Scaffolding of Facts[1]

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"In confrontation with another there is both risk and opportunity".[2] I take the risk and

opportunity of replying to Michael Campbell, first by thanking him for the

connections he has made and the re-examinations he has spurred me to undertake.

Below, I discuss what I think are some key issues in the hope of advancing broader

discussion of the resources and challenges that one encounters in attempting to apply

insights made by Wittgenstein to thinking about moral matters. I begin by rehearsing

the critical thrust and motivation of my original paper.[3] I then demonstrate why

Campbell's challenge to my interpretation of Wittgenstein's expression 'form of life'

is well-grounded, but also why it does not undermine my questions of Raimond Gaita,

which can simply be reformulated. I then examine what considerations might remove

the need for my questions before trying to trace then add to Campbell's line of

thinking about what he calls the 'inwardness' of moral concepts.

The questions that I asked in my original paper were mostly earnest rather than

rhetorical. I asked them in a spirit, first, of seeking to understand Gaita then, second,

of inviting others to consider and, if possible, clarify what struck me as a potential

inconsistency. The potential inconsistency that I wondered at was as follows.

Gaita appears to flag two very different types of impossibility. One type owes to grammar, that is, to connections between various concepts and responses, including behavioural responses. X is 'part of the very concept' of Y or, perhaps better, X is part of our grammar of Y. X is partly dependent for its meaning on Y. Put yet another way – one also used by Gaita and, Campbell observes, first favoured by Wittgenstein – X is internally related to Y.[4] The internal relation gives rise to a particular type of impossibility. The other type of impossibility that Gaita appears to flag owes, not to our grammar, but to our human form of life or, it is fair to surmise, to basic facts about our human nature, broadly conceived, i.e. without assuming that this nature resides merely in shared physical or biological traits. (Campbell unnecessarily attributes this assumption to me when he suggests that, on my account, a moral incapacity would be, "at root, a species of physical incapacity".[5]) Examples of basic facts about our human nature include the following. Human beings normally do not and cannot fall passionately in love with flies, nor treasure fragments of cow dung as tokens of their lover's affection. On Gaita's view, this being so is not a product of our grammar of love, namely the particular ways we have of speaking about love, showing love, responding to love, and so on. Rather, it is just the way the world happens to be, which limits what grammars of love are possible for us.

Flagging two very different types of impossibility, Gaita then appears to assign to particular impossibilities one type over another without any clear basis. And, indeed, it struck me that any clear basis may not be attainable, thus throwing into question the value of distinguishing between the different types of impossibility. Moreover, Gaita seeks to assign to moral impossibilities the type owing to grammar, ruling out the

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[4] See "Inwardness and Sociability": 2–3.
[5] Ibid.: footnote 7.

possibility that moral impossibilities may, like other impossibilities, owe to our human form of life and, in this sense, constitute basic facts. I asked whether this ruling out is consistent with what Gaita writes at some points and whether it represents the best account of what we experience as moral impossibilities or, by a different light, absurdities. To press this question, I asked "Why do there exist no *moral* 'mere facts', defining our form of life?"[6] And I suggested that this is a foundational question – indeed, "the central question" – to ask of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Implicitly, I wondered whether the potential inconsistency that I had observed, in which some impossibilities owe to grammar but others to basic facts, betokened a problem with Wittgenstein's thought or with Gaita's extension of it.

It is fair for Campbell to observe that I wondered at Gaita's potentially "vacillating" or "oscillating" between two views.[7] For the most part, Gaita's writings suggest that the truth of moral judgement is relative to a particular grammar *qua* entire way of speaking and acting. However, there are also passages in Gaita's writings that suggested to me another view, namely the view that the content of some moral concepts, and thereby the truth of moral judgements evincing those concepts, is determined by features of our common life as human beings. Campbell argues that both views fail to accurately characterise Gaita's writings and, more broadly, the writings of Wittgensteinian moral philosophers, for reasons that I build up to.

My original paper was partly motivated by my sense that, in discussion of moral matters, appeals to conceptual necessity – to X being 'part of the very concept' of Y – can be experienced as dogmatic or bullying insofar as one might respond 'So I *must*

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[6] "Part of the Very Concept": 38, 55.
[7] "Inwardness and Sociability": 1, 7.

speak and act so? What is going on if I disagree?' For instance, Gaita writes that, in

remorse for wrongdoing, one cannot be consoled by the like wrongdoing of others.

One's remorse for wrongdoing is not diminished by the like wrongdoing of others. In

this sense, there exists a "radical singularity" in remorse.[8] This is part of the very

concept of remorse or, perhaps better, part of our grammar of remorse. It is a

standard internal to our grammar of remorse. For us, it is part of a remorse "worthy

of the name".[9] By contrast, Gaita also writes that, in facing one's mortality and

vulnerability to suffering, one *can* be consoled by the like mortality and vulnerability

of others. There is no radical singularity here: "It is a fact utterly basic to human life

that we are consoled by knowledge that others suffer as we do and must die as we

must".[10] Gaita suggests that only the first consolation is morally corrupt. The second

is just a part of how things are (and one that we are not moved to oppose morally, at

least internal to our particular grammar or, put differently, our particular morality).

This can be experienced as dogmatic or bullying insofar as one may be prompted to

ask the following. Why does one consolation belong to how things are but not the

other? Why does moral corruption belong to one consolation but not the other? Who

is to say, and on what authority? Campbell picks up this last question, which

encompasses the question preceding it, and I examine his answer later. The first

question is a separate one, and I examine it first.

The Meaning of Wittgenstein's Expression 'Form of Life'

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[8] *Good and Evil*: xxv. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": 39.
[9] "Part of the Very Concept": 44, 50.
[10] R. Gaita, *The Philosopher's Dog* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2002): 72. Cited in Ibid.: 53.

In my original paper, I took the term 'form of life' to refer to "those creaturely conditions we share that shape our grammar but are not, in turn, shaped by it".[11] Campbell suggests that this interpretation of Wittgenstein's expression is mistaken and that what I refer to corresponds, not to a shared form of life, but to "very general facts of nature".[12] Forms of life and very general facts of nature represent different ideas in Wittgenstein's thought. I think Campbell is right here and now examine why. In short, I used the expression 'form of life' when I might better have used an expression like a 'scaffolding of facts'. However, my original questions survive the reformulation.

G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker explain that the word 'grammar' was not intended as a technical term but, by use, given a sense that expands on that normally intended.[13] The rules of English grammar, for example, concern what makes sense but only for particular purposes. Wittgenstein's use of the word 'grammar' expands on those purposes. Considered as the network of rules according to which our words make sense, 'grammar' can indeed strike one as less of a technical term. However, the word is less apt and, as such, can strike one more as a technical term when it is used to encompass the rules according to which we make sense of, not only our words, but also our *responses, behaviours and practices*. Indeed, it is especially in reflection on responses, behaviours and practices that we may reach for an expression like 'form of life' over the word 'grammar'. It may be that Wittgenstein simply used the

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[11] "Part of the Very Concept": 52.
[12] L. Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001): 195^e.
[13] See G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity – Essays and Exegesis of §§ 185–242. Volume II of An Analytical Commentary on the* Philosophical Investigations, 2nd, extensively revised edition by P. M. S. Hacker (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2009): "The Scope of Grammar".

expression 'form of life' to help build a sufficiently rich notion of grammar, namely one encompassing more than just words.

Baker and Hacker write that, like grammar, "The expression 'form of life' (*Lebensform*) is not a technical one ... The interpretation of Wittgenstein's few observations has occasioned a certain amount of exegetical controversy."[14] The controversy concerns whether there are multiple forms of life among human beings or only one, namely the human form of life. On balance, Baker and Hacker take Wittgenstein to use the expression to refer to something broadly cultural in scale: "There is no uniquely human form of life, characteristic of the species – rather there are multiple human forms of life, characteristic of different cultures and epochs."[15] In defence of their interpretation, Baker and Hacker quote Wittgenstein seeming to identify forms of life with "regular actions … regular forms of action", out of which language "springs up … grows".[16] Grammar, then, may be said to comprise the network of rules according to which we find intelligible both regular forms of action (deeds) and the words that have grown out of these forms of action over time.

Expressions that closely resemble 'form of life' can be found in Wittgensteinian moral philosophy: "ways of living",[17] "the kinds of life lived by human beings"[18], "a

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[14] Ibid.: 218–219.

[15] Ibid.: 221. Baker and Hacker also write "In short, human beings in different epochs, different cultures, have different forms of life. Different educations, interests and concerns, languages, different human relations and relations to nature and the world constitute distinct forms of life." Ibid.: 222. See also P. M. S. Hacker, "Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic Understanding," in R. Allen and M. Turvey's (eds) *Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts* (London: Routledge, 2001).

[16] *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*: 222.

[17] R. Gaita, "Breach of Trust: Truth, Morality and Politics," *Quarterly Essay* (16: 2004): 20. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": 49.

[18] P.Winch, *Trying to Make Sense* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987): 164. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": footnote 46.

certain style of life".[19] Expressions chosen by Gaita suggested to me that he had in mind a single human form of life. For example, the kinds of things that can be treasured

> are marked out by the place they have and can have in human life.[20]

> It is a fact utterly basic to human life that we are consoled by knowledge that others suffer as we do and must die as we must.[21]

> The suspicion that our actual speech may have false metaphysical implications is the suspicion that our human form of life may have shaped our speech in ways that disguise its serious and pervasive errors from us except at moments of philosophical reflection. But to be prone to that suspicion is not to notice the deepest of Wittgenstein's lessons. That lesson is that our human life conditions not only our beliefs, but also, and more importantly, the only concepts that we have, or could have, with which we can express what it is to believe something.[22]

Gaita rarely uses the expression 'form of life', so it is unclear how he interprets Wittgenstein's expression. Furthermore, it is not always clear which of Wittgenstein's ideas Gaita means to draw on, namely the idea of a form of life *qua* the regular forms of action that partly constitute a grammar or the idea of a 'scaffolding of facts', including facts about human nature or our creaturely condition, facts which limit but do not determine our grammar. I take Gaita to at least sometimes draw on the second of these ideas. As such, it is better to reformulate my original questions,

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[19] *Trying to Make Sense*: 190. Cited in "Inwardness and Sociability": 9.
[20] *Good and Evil*: 152. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": 52.
[21] *The Philosopher's Dog*: 72. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": 53.
[22] *Good and Evil*: 296–297.

avoiding the expression 'form of life' in favour of expressions like a 'scaffolding of facts'.

A Scaffolding of Facts

Campbell writes of what is "humanly possible" and in other ways makes use of Wittgenstein's idea of a scaffolding of facts.[23] The word 'fact' risks misrepresenting the idea, insofar as a scaffolding fact is not subject to doubt like other facts on the understanding that we may prove mistaken (e.g. the room is four metres long). In this respect, other expressions are preferable. Wittgenstein also expressed the idea of a scaffolding of facts in terms of grammar's broad, underpinning agreement in judgements, and in terms of grammar's presuppositions, preconditions, framework conditions, and normal conditions.[24]

On the Wittgensteinian picture, grammar is under-determined by a scaffolding of facts, and a scaffolding of facts makes a grammar neither correct nor incorrect but simply useful or useless. I take Campbell to conform to this picture, indeed, in the mode of reminding me of it. The picture serves to structure an answer to a question that Jeff McMahan asks of Gaita. Gaita claims that "at the deepest point in our ethics there is a conception of individuality that is groundless, formed from our attachments".[25] McMahan then asks of this claim: "Does it imply that *whatever* we become attached to and deeply love (or even what *each* of us loves and is attached to)

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[23] "Inwardness and Sociability": 13.
[24] See *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*: especially 211–212, 215, 218, 230.
[25] *The Philosopher's Dog*: 200. Cited in J. McMahan, "Our Fellow Creatures," *The Journal of Ethics* (9: 2005): 353–380: 378. Cited in "Inwardness and Sociability": 4.

thereby becomes precious and irreplaceable?"[26] Gaita and, with him, Campbell could well answer as follows. Yes, that which is irreplaceable is whatever we become attached to and deeply love. However, what we are *able* to become attached to and deeply love is limited by our grammar of love, which we share with our fellows and which is sometimes extended by exceptional individuals, namely those in whom we register an authority. Furthermore, like all grammars, the grammar of love can only be extended so far, namely within limits set by a scaffolding of facts.[27]

My Questions Reformulated and Potential Answers

My questions can be reformulated in line with this picture. Gaita writes that "Not anything can be" loved.[28] I replied with questions. What can be loved? And how do we answer this question? There are impossibilities that owe to scaffolding facts and others that owe to grammar. But how do we tell which is which? Where does the scaffolding of facts end and grammar begin? For instance, where does the first's agreement in judgement end and the second's regular forms of action begin? If we struggle to answer these questions, then what implications, if any, does this have for

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[26] "Our Fellow Creatures": 379.

[27] A question remains as to whether a scaffolding of facts, and not just a grammar, can change over time. A scaffolding of facts comprises judgements that come naturally to us, agreement in which makes grammar possible. I take Baker and Hacker to suggest that even a scaffolding of facts can change over time when they write that "What is unnatural here today for us may be natural elsewhere at another time for others". *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*: 342. To my mind, this further prompts the question of where a scaffolding of facts ends and grammar begins. Wittgenstein imagined a river-bed and its waters: "I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other … the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited". L. Wittgenstein and G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds), *On Certainty* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003): §97, §99. I thank Andrew McGee for alerting me to this metaphor.

[28] *Good and Evil*: xxiii. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": 51.

Wittgensteinian moral philosophy? If we cannot agree on what to include among the scaffolding of facts, then there may be no point in having the idea at all.

It is fair for Campbell to observe that there is no inconsistency in saying, on the one hand, that it is impossible to treasure fragments of cow dung as tokens of a lover's affection and, on the other, that it is possible for someone to delight in a bare-foot slipping and sliding in cow dung. There is no inconsistency, for this is simply to observe different scaffolding facts. However, I raised the possibility of delighting in cow dung, or loving cow dung in the mode of delighting in it, as a means of pressing the above questions, namely 'Who decides on what counts as a scaffolding fact and on what basis do they decide?'

There are a number of potential answers to these questions or, more precisely, there are a number of considerations which might remove the need for these questions. First, the mere fact that we encounter borderline cases need not be a problem. We may encounter cases that we find difficult to judge or agree on with respect to which of two categories they belong to, but this need not undermine the categories themselves. Borderline cases do not render the categories incoherent or useless. Indeed, they are to be expected. But what if *every* case strikes us as borderline? If we are never confident to which an impossibility owes – our grammar or its scaffolding of facts – then this sorely challenges the relevance of the categories.

Campbell implies a second potential answer to my questions. There need be no clear, general basis for assigning to impossibilities one type over another. The distinction between a grammar and a scaffolding of facts can be, to borrow an expression from

Baker and Hacker, "vague and purpose-relative".[29] Campbell writes that, for

Wittgenstein, the purpose of observing scaffolding facts was "purely negative".[30]

Imagine if very general facts of nature were different. Then you can imagine how our

usual concepts would have no application and, indeed, would not have arisen. We

would have different concepts. This helps us to appreciate how our concepts are not

independent of very general facts of nature, like the fact that objects do not normally

expand and contract in size every minute. Our concepts – of size, length and width,

for example –can be seen to *depend*, *hinge*, or *build* on such facts. But we are not

trying to put together a 'positive' list of all such scaffolding facts. That is not our

purpose, for we are doing philosophy: "We are not doing natural science; nor yet

natural history – since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes".[31]

We simply want to illustrate how particular concepts are not necessary but, instead,

contingent upon very general facts *qua* agreements in judgement: "Such facts as

mostly do not strike us because of their generality".[32] Baker and Hacker put it well:

> Philosophy investigates grammatical, conceptual structures, not the background
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> preconditions that *as a matter of fact* [not hypothesis] make them possible. But the
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> *distinction* between these [grammatical structures and their background preconditions] is
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> of capital importance.[33]

In other words, it is not for a philosopher to exhaustively answer the question 'What

can be loved?' It is for a philosopher to observe what can and cannot be loved only

when somebody transgresses the bounds of sense, bounds set by our grammar and, in

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[29] *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*: 229.
[30] "Inwardness and Sociability": 8.
[31] *Philosophical Investigations*: 195^e.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Baker and Hacker's emphases. *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*: 214.

some sense further down, by our grammar's scaffolding of facts. In this respect, it is for a philosopher to assemble reminders of the different ways in which we make sense of one another *loving*, as distinct from one another's lusting, coveting and, further afield, hammering, erasing, and so on. But it is just here that the question of bullying can arise. On what authority does a philosopher observe that, in professing love, somebody has transgressed the bounds of sense?

The 'Inwardness' of Moral Concepts, or My Life with Our Words

This question equates to my earlier one, 'Who decides what can be loved and on what authority?' Campbell's main answer to this question is, I think, consistent with the bulk of Gaita's writings. Who decides? "We do",[34] collectively and individually, purely on the basis of the manifest absurdity of the alternatives and by the light of exceptional individuals who guide us with what strikes us as a particular authority. Campbell argues that the impossibilities I discuss in my original paper do *not* differ in type, as I took them to differ in Gaita's writings. In Campbell's words, the impossibilities are each "a product not merely of features of a shared creaturely condition, but rather of the features of that condition as they occur within the lives of the individuals [concerned] and as they are understood by them".[35] In other words, the impossibilities each owe to our individual "lives with language" or, to use a different expression, to *my* life with *our* words.[36] Perhaps both of these expressions do well to capture what Campbell means by the inwardness and sociability of moral concepts.

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[34] "Inwardness and Sociability": 14.
[35] Ibid.: 13.
[36] Ibid.: footnote 25, 10, 13.

Campbell endeavours to show how, for Wittgensteinian moral philosophers such as Gaita and Peter Winch, there are no concepts that are both moral in kind and inescapable among human societies simply given how things are. The moral belongs to the grammatical and is thus limited but under-determined by a scaffolding of facts. Campbell describes Winch's holding then later rejecting the view that some moral concepts are defined by features of our common life as human beings. Winch rejected the view for two reasons. First, let us "look and see".[37] Are we able to identify any concepts that are both common to all cultures and still "yet substantial enough" to qualify as moral in kind?[38] It is "unlikely" that we can.[39] The universally shared concepts would probably be so thin as to be empty, no longer substantively moral in kind. Second, even apparently universal moral concepts have a certain inwardness that cannot be explained by the idea that moral concepts follow directly from features of our common life as human beings. This second line of thought calls for tracing.

Campbell presents Winch's example of the moral concept of truthfulness, which Winch first thought to be defined by our common life as human beings: "there could not be a human society in which truthfulness were not in general regarded as a virtue".[40] In other words, the moral concept of truthfulness is a precondition for any human society to arise and endure and it is therefore defined by our common life as human beings. Campbell presents R. F. Holland's reply to Winch. The only truthfulness explained by the existence of human society is one that merely "supports

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[37] *Philosophical Investigations*: §66.
[38] "Inwardness and Sociability": 8.
[39] Ibid.
[40] P. Winch, *Ethics and Action* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972): 69. Cited in Ibid.: 7.

the surrounding organisation or gets you by without disrupting the social pattern".[41]

However, a person's striving to be truthful can comprise a "spiritual demeanour".[42] A

person can strive to be truthful irrespective of how it helps society and irrespective of

how it helps one in society. What is the origin of such a striving and of the moral

concept of truthfulness it evinces? Such a truthfulness cannot be explained simply by

reference to our common life as human beings, for it is not required as a precondition.

For this reason, Winch came to think that no moral concepts follow directly from our

common life as human beings.

Moral concepts "can only be understood by seeing them in the context of the lives of

their adherents".[43] Only such an understanding adequately accommodates the ways in

which moral concepts "may be informed by the distinctive attitudes of especially

committed individuals".[44] Particular attitudes are inexplicable when explanation is

limited to gauging preconditions of our common life as human beings. Therefore, as

a moral concept, "The limits of love [for instance] are fixed by a combination of

biological and grammatical features of our lives."[45] I take this 'biological' to refer to

one particular scaffolding of facts. Here we have the sociability of moral concepts,

namely their shared, communal nature. What is more, the limits of love, as of other

moral concepts, are also "fixed by the responses of exceptional individuals".[46] Here

we have the inwardness of moral concepts, namely their personal nature. In moral

matters, there is an important sense in which an individual, and not only a society or a

people, affirms that something is 'worthy of the name'. It is in precisely this sense

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[41] R. F. Holland, *Against Empiricism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980): 107. Cited in "Inwardness and Sociability": 8.
[42] *Against Empiricism*: 107. Cited in "Inwardness and Sociability": 8.
[43] "Inwardness and Sociability": 9.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.: 13.
[46] Ibid.

that a moral philosopher may find herself providing not only a grammatical reminder, which "leaves everything as it is",[47] but also a personal invitation or exhortation, namely to reaffirm or newly adopt a particular grammar, in what may amount to a "reclamation" or "recuperation", for instance.[48]

Campbell observes that "grammar is not (and cannot be) under the control of any individual".[49] Individuals cannot impose or change rules for making sense of words and practices on a whim. But individuals can, exceptionally, extend a moral concept or at least, in some vague sense, participate in the extension of a moral concept.[50] In my original paper, I did not discuss at length the significance of individual difference or "personal variance"[51] in moral judgement, short of footnoting Gaita's emphasising this[52] and mentioning that, for Gaita and Christopher Cordner, something worthy is "that to which others have testified with an authority that, by the quality of their individual voices and lives, we are drawn to register".[53] I did write of moral judgement occurring, for Gaita and Cordner, not outside of but within a particular grammar, "even if at its open, fraying edges".[54] This admittedly unexplained and merely tantalising qualification connects, I think, to something Campbell has is mind, namely the ability of a grammar to change over time and for an individual to play a part in this.

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[47] *Philosophical Investigations*: §124.
[48] "Breach of Trust": 65. C. Cordner, *Ethical Encounter: The Depth of Moral Meaning* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002): 44. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": footnote 26.
[49] "Inwardness and Sociability": 10.
[50] See Ibid.: footnote 57.
[51] Ibid.: 8.
[52] See "Part of the Very Concept": footnote 32.
[53] Ibid.: 50.
[54] Ibid.: 47.

What Campbell calls the inwardness of moral concepts also connects, I take it, to something Gaita and Cordner both emphasise, namely the seeming capacity of moral reflection and understanding to "deepen without limit".[55] What it means to make a promise, to love another, to be a "craftsman", to have a "vocation" – each seems open to deepening without limit.[56] Here grammar cannot be laid bare, made "perspicuous", in the same way as in the case of, say, a 'chair'.[57] The explication or elaboration of moral concepts is different, more open-ended, and this may well be related to its being more personal, to living one's "own life and nobody else's".[58] Hacker writes:

> One cannot *follow* a rule which one does not know or understand. Hence the rules which
> determine and are constitutive of the meanings of expressions cannot be unknown,
> awaiting future discovery. Rather they are exhibited in the humdrum, common or
> garden explanations of meaning given in teaching, in correcting misuses of expressions,
> and in explaining what one meant by what one said.[59]

In other words, "grammatical description merely makes explicit what is already known by competent speakers of the language – the humdrum standards of usage according to which they proceed".[60] There are some humdrum standards of use when it comes to moral concepts. We can make use of them if called to explain why we said 'loving' instead of 'hammering' or 'erasing'. But it can be more involved to explain why we said 'loving' instead of 'liking' or 'respecting'.[61] The standards are

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[55] R. Gaita, *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999): 240.
[56] *Good and Evil*: 86.
[57] *Philosophical Investigations*: §122.
[58] *Good and Evil*: 279.
[59] "Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic Understanding".
[60] *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity*: 59.
[61] See *Ethical Encounter*: ch. 8.

less humdrum and more personal here, where the distinctions are finer.[62] The felt need for fine distinctions in the case of moral concepts is not reducible to the need to agree on borderline cases. Borderline cases can generate disagreement over the application of moral and non-moral concepts alike. For example, is this an armchair or a lounge? The point that I am making is different, and I take Campbell to remind me of it when writing, in relation to moral matters, of a "vivid sense", "a distinctly personal form of understanding" that exceeds mere "competent participation within our culture".[63] Recall also Gaita's "coming to see which of the concepts whose structure we can abstractly articulate are still available to us in living and authoritative speech."[64] Humdrum standards of use, which we might abstractly articulate, contrast with standards for living and authoritative speech.

In conclusion, Campbell helps to clarify the picture of moral concepts advanced by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers. At a general level, the picture remains unclear where a grammar meets its scaffolding of facts. Some may find this lack of clarity unproblematic and, indeed, unavoidable. However, I remain unsure of this and hope to have provided at least a useful caution, namely that care is called for when attempting to attribute something to a grammar or to a scaffolding of facts. Questions also remain as to whether what Campbell calls the inwardness of moral concepts applies in any measure to non-moral concepts and as to what might be the implications, if any, for Wittgensteinian thought.

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[62] On "fine distinctions", see *A Common Humanity*: 128 and *The Philosopher's Dog*: 179.
[63] "Inwardness and Sociability": 11.
[64] "Breach of Trust": 20. Cited in "Part of the Very Concept": 49.