1 I rely here on Kaplan, David ‘Afterthoughts,’ in Almog, JosephPerry, John and Wettstein, Howard eds., Themes from Kaplan (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989), 565–614, at 569Google Scholar, where Kaplan quotes from a letter written by Kripke in clarification of earlier formulations. For these, see: Kripke, Saul A.Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1980)Google Scholar and ‘Identity and Necessity,’ in Munitz, Milton K. ed., Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press 1971), 135-64.Google Scholar

2 The conditions are independent: ‘the actor Paul Newman’ satisfies the second but not the first, and ‘the x such that x = Paul Newman if he exists and x = 9 otherwise’ satisfies the first but not the second.

3 The schema is a modification of one given by Kripke. See Naming and Necessity, 25 n 3.

4 For an explanation of the phrase, and of the associated view, see Neale, StephenDescriptions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990), Chapter 2.Google Scholar

5 See Naming and Necessity, 7-8. Kripke does allow that a terminology “according to which uses of phonetically the same sounds to name distinct objects count as distinct names … may have a great deal to recommend it for theoretical purposes,” even though it “certainly does not agree with the most common usage.“

6 Salmon, NathanReference and Essence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1981), 34Google Scholar

7 Compare Salmon, Reference and Essence, 35Google Scholar, where it is said that “singular terms formed from the variable-binding definite descriptions operator … can denote something with respect to a given possible world only if that thing exists in the given possible world.“

8 See Smith, A.D. ‘Semantical Considerations on Rigid Designation,’ Mind 96 (1987) 83–92, at 86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Thus Kaplan, David ‘Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice,’ in Hintikka, J.Moravcsik, J. and Suppes, P. eds., Approaches to Natural Language (Dordrecht: Reidel 1973), 490–518, at 503.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 See Naming and Necessity, 78-9.

11 A System of Logic, I, ii, 5

12 140

13 See The Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1903; 2nd edn., London: Allen and Unwin 1937), esp. Appendix A; and The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, IV, Foundations of Logic: 1903-05, edited by Urquhart, Alasdair with the assistance of Lewis, Albert C. (London and New York: Routledge 1994), Part III.Google Scholar

14 See her ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages,’ Synthese 13 (1961) 303-30, reprinted in Modalities (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993), 5-23.

15 ‘How to Russell a Frege-Church,’ Journal of Philosophy 78 (1975) 716-29. Reprinted in Loux, Michael J. ed., The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1979) 210-24Google Scholar. The passage is at 217 of Loux.

16 In ‘On Denoting,’ Mind 14 (1905) 479-93, Russell gave up the doctrine that proper names are purely designative, but continued to hold that there are singular propositions. Even after his abandonment of propositions, which occurred not much later, true singular propositions in effect remained in his ontology, in the guise of certain ‘facts,’ or ‘complexes.’

17 It might be said that the words ‘piece of chalk’ serve merely to aid in the identification of the object of reference and hence that the proposition asserted requires for its truth only that the object of reference, whether or not it is a piece of chalk, be white. I am inclined to disagree, on the ground that what is said cannot correctly be said to be unqualifiedly true unless the object referred to is a piece of chalk. But I doubt that much hangs on the point.

18 Compare Whitehead, A.N.The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1920), Chapter II.Google Scholar

19 The form of expression discussed here is sufficiently hard to avoid that even enemies of singular propositions sometimes fall into its use. Frege, hardly a friend of singular propositions, lapses on a couple of occasions. Thus: “It is not necessary that the person who feels cold should himself give utterance to the thought that he feels cold. Another person can do this by using a name to designate the one who feels cold.” (Posthumous Writings, trans. Long, Peter and White, Roger with the assistance of Hargreaves, Raymond [Oxford: Blackwell 1979], 134-5Google Scholar. My emphasis.) And: “Now everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else. So, when Dr. Lauven has the thought that he was wounded ….” (McGuinness, B. ed., Collected Papers, trans. Black, M.et al. [Oxford: Blackwell 1984], 359. My emphasis.)Google Scholar

20 Russell did not use ‘propositional function’ consistently, even within the confines of a single book. I follow the use described at 508-10 of The Principles of Mathematics, though of course there are others in that book.

21 I think it is fair to attribute this view to Moore. See his Lewy, Casimir ed., Lectures on Philosophy, (London: Allen & Unwin 1966), 129-31Google Scholar.

22 On this point I have benefited from discussions with Aviv Hoffman, though he is firmly opposed to the position toward which I am inclined.

23 Compare Moore, G.E.Lewy, Casimir ed., Commonplace Book (London: Allen and Unwin 1962), 262.Google Scholar