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DOI :10.26650/arcp2019-5106   IUP :10.26650/arcp2019-5106    Full Text (PDF)

The Logic of Normative Justification

Gregory Carneiro

What really makes the concepts of obligation or permission so important for practical philosophy? What if we could find a better concept, one that, despite the simplicity, could show itself as intuitive and rich as possible? Could justifications be used in common language and practice as a sign of ethical judgment and as a strong motive for action? In most scenarios, for example, it really doesn’t matter if a given action is obliged, permitted or forbidden, one may perform the action as long as a justification for doing it is present. In this sense, the notion of justification seems to be more basic and powerful than other concepts used in the philosophical discourse. The existence of formal systems based on the epistemological side of justification, created by Artemov, led us primarily to think that justification could make the formal discourse much more accurate for ethics than the ones using deontological concepts. In the semantical and syntactical aspects, almost all of Artemov’s systems directly proved to be fruitful for ethical purposes. We also developed combinations between the standard deontic logic and logics of justification, resulting in what whe called the Logics of Normative Justification. These systems were able to change the object of the justification formulas and shed some light in ethics as a whole, normative and metaethics. Metaethics were a forgotten subject in formal ethics. We were also able to deal with some known problems in deontic logic, like the famous Ross’s paradox and the expressiveness of prima facie and all-things-considered obligations.

Keywords: Deontic logic, modality, justification, ethics, metaethics

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APA

Carneiro, G. (2019). The Logic of Normative Justification. Archives of Philosophy, 0(51), 79-115. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106


AMA

Carneiro G. The Logic of Normative Justification. Archives of Philosophy. 2019;0(51):79-115. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106


ABNT

Carneiro, G. The Logic of Normative Justification. Archives of Philosophy, [Publisher Location], v. 0, n. 51, p. 79-115, 2019.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Carneiro, Gregory,. 2019. “The Logic of Normative Justification.” Archives of Philosophy 0, no. 51: 79-115. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106


Chicago: Humanities Style

Carneiro, Gregory,. “The Logic of Normative Justification.” Archives of Philosophy 0, no. 51 (Apr. 2024): 79-115. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106


Harvard: Australian Style

Carneiro, G 2019, 'The Logic of Normative Justification', Archives of Philosophy, vol. 0, no. 51, pp. 79-115, viewed 20 Apr. 2024, https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Carneiro, G. (2019) ‘The Logic of Normative Justification’, Archives of Philosophy, 0(51), pp. 79-115. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106 (20 Apr. 2024).


MLA

Carneiro, Gregory,. “The Logic of Normative Justification.” Archives of Philosophy, vol. 0, no. 51, 2019, pp. 79-115. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106


Vancouver

Carneiro G. The Logic of Normative Justification. Archives of Philosophy [Internet]. 20 Apr. 2024 [cited 20 Apr. 2024];0(51):79-115. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106 doi: 10.26650/arcp2019-5106


ISNAD

Carneiro, Gregory. “The Logic of Normative Justification”. Archives of Philosophy 0/51 (Apr. 2024): 79-115. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5106



TIMELINE


Submitted28.10.2019
Accepted03.01.2019

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