Abstract
This paper presents a systematic analysis of the various steps of goal-processing and intention creation, as the final outcome of goal-driven action generation. Intention theory has to be founded on goal theory: intentions require means-end reasoning and planning, conflict resolution, coherence. The process of intention formation and intentional action execution is strictly based on specific sets of beliefs (predictions, evaluations, calculation of costs, responsibility beliefs, competence, etc.). The origin of an intention is not necessarily a “desire” (which is just a kind of goal). Intention is a two-layered goal-structure: the intended action(s) to be executed, and the intended outcome motivating that action—with two distinct kinds of “failure”. This belief-goal perspective also allows to examine two stages/types of intention, and the relations and differences between intention “in agenda” (future directed) and intention under execution (intention in action). I will argue that the will is much more than the intention driving an intentional action. I will also claim that intentions are not there just for motivating and regulating intentional actions (from the motor level to more complex behaviors), but that they play also several other important roles.
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Notes
Even a cursory glance to the chapters of any handbook of cognitive psychology will prove the point. It is hard to believe that there is nothing similar about motivational representations, their processing and their taxonomy. At most, we have a rather confuse area, assembling together motivation and emotion, as well as a quite detailed literature on decision theory. Paradoxically, goal theory has been more developed in social and organizational psychology.
Of different kinds, since it can be due to consenting, accepting, passively doing nothing, or to an active inhibition, abstaining from and/or refraining to.
Probably the inverse use of an anticipatory classifier, starting from the activated expectation and searching for the action and conditions required to fulfill it, is the origin of proper goal-driven behavior.
Here understood in terms of doxastic representations: beliefs, assumptions, etc.; what we take to be true, possibly with doubts and reservations, whether or not it is in fact true.
Not all the differences in goal types are based on the process view described here: for instance, the distinction between motivating and not motivating goals is orthogonal to this taxonomy (for a more comprehensive ontology of goal types, see Castelfranchi 2012b).
This is not necessarily true for more automatic (impulsive or habitual) responses, where there might be a true activated goal (not just an anticipatory classifier), but without so many preliminary evaluations, for example about reasons for preference, conditions for success, etc.
However, notice that for Heckausen and Gollwitzer “goals” are related only to aims that are being pursued, in contrast with the broader characterization of this notion I discussed before (Sect. 2.1); moreover, they are limited in origin to just “wishes” and “desires”. It is also unclear if—like in Aizen’s model—obligations, norms and duties can only constrain and modify decisions and intentions, but are not considered capable of “motivating” them. In contrast, normative forces can be, and often are, the origin of goals, typically those that are not pleasant at all (thus certainly not desired by the agent in any reasonable sense of the term).
For example Rao and Georgeff (1995). The creation of two distinct “primitives”, two basic independent notions/objects (“desires” vs. “intentions”), is in part due to the mistake of adopting “desires” as the basic motivational category. I have already criticized this reductive move, and introduced goals as a more general and basic teleonomic notion.
If I say "My intention is that John goes to Naples" what I mean is: "I have the intention to induce John to go to Naples, to send him there, to do something in order he…".
This is a criticism to Elster’s position against social functions, which he tries to eliminate based on the fact that our behavior already is finalistic. For a more systematic argument on this point, see Castelfranchi (2001).
Obviously, modeling voluntary acts as driven by intentions is not meant to exclude goal-oriented acts that are fully based on reactive and executive mechanisms, like anticipatory classifiers, productions rules, S-R, reflexes, and emotional impulses bypassing true deliberation; or habits and automatized behaviors originally built as intentions, like stopping at the red light when driving a car.
Some goals can be achieved gradually (very much, quite a lot, not so much, …), or partially: 80, 50, 30 %. (for example, “to be rich”, “to eat all this chicken”). Other goals on the contrary are Yes or No, all or nothing (for example, “to marry Paul”, “to take a degree”). The psychology of those goals is very different.
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Acknowledgments
I wish to acknowledge the contribution of my colleagues of the Goal-Oriented Agents Lab (GOAL) (http://www.istc.cnr.it/group/goal): several time I discussed these issues with them, receiving many relevant suggestions and feedback, often precipitated in joint papers. I wish also to thank the participants to the 1st Topoi conference (29–30 November 2012, Roma), where we had a very stimulating discussion.
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Castelfranchi, C. Intentions in the Light of Goals. Topoi 33, 103–116 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9218-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9218-3