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OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND THE EGALITARIAN ETHOS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2013

Paula Casal
Paula Casal*
Affiliation:
ICREA–Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spainpaula.casal@upf.edu
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Abstract

G. A. Cohen proposes to eradicate inequality without loss of efficiency or freedom by relying on an egalitarian ethos requiring us to undertake socially useful occupations we would rather not take, and work hard at them, without requesting differential incentive payments. Since the ethos is not legally enforced, Cohen denies it threatens our occupational freedom. Drawing on the work of Joseph Raz, the paper argues that Cohen's proposal threatens our occupational autonomy even if it leaves our legal freedom intact. It also proposes a revised ethos which respects occupational autonomy.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 3 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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