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In his Aesthetic Croce makes some remarks upon the subject of sincerity:
Artists protest vainly: ‘Lasciva est nobis pagina, vita proba’. They are merely taxed (in addition) with lying and hypocrisy. How far more prudent you were, poor women of Verona, when you founded your belief that Dante had really descended to Hell upon his blackened countenance. Yours was at any rate an historical conjecture.
page 66 note 1 See Sibley, F., Philosophical Review, 1959 and 1965.Google Scholar
page 67 note 1 See Sibley, F., ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Philosophical Review, 1959.Google Scholar
page 69 note 1 Cf. Wollheim, Richard, ‘Expression’, The Human Agent, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. 1.Google Scholar
page 75 note 1 Wollheim (op. cit.) seems to suggest that all expression is essentially intentional. We can, of course, use the term ‘expression’ in this way, but to do so is to use it independently of the concept of expressiveness which I have tried to describe. In a sense I am trying to elucidate the difference between the intentional and the unintentional ‘betraying’ or ‘disclosure’ of an emotion. In many points I shall agree with what Wollheim says in his valuable article.
page 78 note 1 Insincerity here - whether in life or in art - is clearly a more complex phenomenon than the insincerity of an assertion.
page 80 note 1 My account here is indebted to some remarks that Hampshire makes in Freedom of the Individual (p. 79): ‘A spectrum of states of mind and attitudes which extends from mere feeling to belief, can be plotted; indeed it has been, at least in part, by Spinoza in his account of active and passive emotions in the Ethics. The spectrum would extend from sensations and those blind passions, which do not require an appropriate object, to active thinking, which is constituted as such by the requirement of appropriateness in its object. To characterise a mental process as a case of rational thought is to distinguish it as an activity that satisfies a norm of order and directedness …’ See also Spinoza, Ethics, Part 5, Proposition in, ‘An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it … In proportion … as we know an emotion better is it more within our control, and the less does the mind suffer from it.’
page 82 note 1 Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Freud and Religious Belief, ed. Barrett, Cyril (Oxford, 1966) p. 51.Google Scholar
page 83 note 1 Cf. Wollheim, op. cit.
page 86 note 1 Conversations with Eckermann.
page 87 note 1 Eliot, T. S., East Coker, v.Google Scholar
