Abstract
There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ (Moran), and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which both self-knowledge and knowledge of others are matters of inference and interpretation. In the case of self-knowledge I focus on the so-called ‘transparency method’ and on the extent to which use of this method delivers inferential self-knowledge. In the case of knowledge of others’ thoughts, I discuss the role of perception as a source of such knowledge and argue that even so-called ’perceptual’ knowledge of other minds is inferential. I contend that the difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others is a difference in the kinds of evidence on which they are typically based.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Like most proponents of ASYMMETRY I’m going to assume for present purposes that ‘non-inferential’ and ‘not based on evidence’ come to the same thing, though it’s not clear that this assumption is correct.
Richard Moran is someone who defends ASYMMETRY on a wide scope reading. See Moran (2001).
See Ryle (1949).
My discussion in this paragraph and the next is heavily indebted to Pryor (2005).
Pryor (2005).
For further discussion of Lawlor’s example see Cassam (2014, pp. 143–145).
See Cassam (2014, Chapter 3), for an explanation and defence of this distinction.
See Cassam (2014, p. 29).
In Cassam (2014, Chapter 3), I suggest several other criteria for distinguishing substantial from trivial self-knowledge.
Frustratingly, Evans doesn’t say (See Evans 1982). The philosophical importance of answering this question has been stressed by Richard Moran.
According to Matthew Boyle, ‘only a madman could draw such an inference’ (2011, p. 227).
It’s not clear why Byrne thinks that inference from a premise entails belief in that premise. People who teach logic classes are constantly running inferences from premises they don’t believe.
This is essentially Boyle’s objection to Byrne’s proposal. According to Boyle, Byrne must either represent the subject as drawing a mad inference or else ‘must admit that the real basis for judging herself to believe P is not the sheer fact that P, but her tacit knowledge that she believes P’ (2011, p. 231). But then we are no further forward in explanatory terms.
The peculiarity of Moran’s insistence that his version of the transparency method makes self-knowledge come out as ‘immediate’ and therefore non-inferential is also noted by Alex Byrne. See Byrne (2011, p. 208), Footnote 10.
For further discussion and references see Cassam (2014, Chapter 10).
Further examples are given in Cassam (2014, Chapter 11), which contains several other arguments for inferentialism.
Moran argues that inferential self-knowledge is aberrant in the sense that it is alienated. But since he is a proponent of TM, and TM itself only delivers inferential knowledge this can’t be right. I see no connection between arriving at self-knowledge by inference and being alienated with respect to mental states that are known about in this way. For example, Katherine’s knowledge of her own desire for another child is inferential but that desire might still be one she fully identifies with and regards as an expression of who she is at this point in her life. See Cassam (2014, pp. 156–158).
The implication of this argument is that my knowledge of your belief is inferential both psychologically and epistemologically.
This is Harman’s proposal and example. See Harman (1973, p. 174). Harman’s discussion assumes a ‘no false lemmas’ condition on knowledge.
Here I again follow Harman. See his (1973, p. 177–178).
If I infer that it looks to me as if there is a candle before me because there is a candle before me where does my justification for believing that it looks to me as if there is a candle before me come from? Not from another belief presumably, but I also don’t perceive that it looks to me as if there is a candle before me. My justification in this case is neither inferential nor perceptual.
For more about this see Cassam (2014, Chapter 13).
References
Boghossian, P. (1998). Content and self-knowledge. In P. Ludlow & N. Martin (Eds.), Externalism and self-knowledge (pp. 149–173). Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Boyle, M. (2011). Transparent Self-Knowledge. The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 85, 223–241.
Byrne, A. (2011). Transparency, belief, intention. The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 85, 201–221.
Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cassam, Q. (2007). The possibility of knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cassam, Q. (2014). Self-knowledge for humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (2001). ‘Knowing one’s own mind. In D. Davidson (Ed.), Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. (1969). Seeing and knowing. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Dretske, F. (1973). Perception and other minds. Noûs, 7, 34–44.
Evans, G. (1982). The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gomes, A. (2009). Other minds and perceived identity. Dialectica, 63, 219–230.
Harman, G. (1965). The inference to the best explanation. The Philosophical Review, 74, 88–95.
Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lawlor, K. (2009). Knowing what one wants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79, 47–75.
McDowell, J. (1998). On the reality of the past. In J. McDowell (Ed.), Meaning, knowledge and reality (pp. 295–313). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McNeill, W. E. S. (2012). On seeing that someone is angry. European Journal of Philosophy, 20, 575–597.
Moran, R. (2001). Authority and estrangement. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moran, R. (2003). Responses to O’Brien and Shoemaker. European Journal of Philosophy, 11, 402–419.
Pryor, J. (2005). There is immediate justification. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 181–202). Oxford: Blackwell.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson.
Schwitzgebel, E. (2012). Self-Ignorance. In J. Liu & J. Perry (Eds.), Consciousness and the self (pp. 184–197). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, J. (2010). Seeing other people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 731–748.
Wikforss, A. (2004). Direct knowledge and other minds. Theoria, 70, 271–293.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cassam, Q. What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge. Synthese 194, 723–741 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0772-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0772-7