Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-75dct Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-04T07:40:03.614Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Commentary on Susan Meld Shell's ‘Kant on Just War and “Unjust Enemies”: Reflections on a “Pleonasm“’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2011

Georg Cavallar
Georg Cavallar
Affiliation:
Vienna University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In her essay (in Kantian Review 10 (2005), 82–111), Shell wants to demonstrate that 1. Kant's theory of the right of nations ‘can furnish us with some much needed practical help and guidance’, and 2. ‘Kant is less averse to the use of force, including resort to pre-emptive war… than he is often taken to be’ (p. 82). The first claim is unconvincing. The second one is in need of clarification. Shell turns Kant into a kind of realist and just-war theorist, into a liberal who is prejudiced against illiberal regimes. In the end, her Kant is closer to Locke, Vattel and other early liberal international lawyers than to himself. Almost all that is unique in Kant's theory of the right of nations gets lost. In this, Shell follows a general trend among some Kant interpreters: the interpretation is only loosely based on Kant; it claims to follow his ‘spirit’ and offers creative ‘Kantian perspectives’. Amidst interpretational creativity, Kant's texts more or less disappear in the mist.

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 11 , March 2006 , pp. 117 - 124
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Kant, Immanuel, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Berlin, Akademie der Wissenschaften zu (Berlin, Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1900–.).Google Scholar The English translation I have used is: Kant, Immanuel, Practical Philosophy, trans, and ed. Gregor, Mary J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).Google Scholar The numbers in brackets refer to the Akadentieausgabe (volume: page; sometimes the line from which the quotation is taken is also indicated).

2 Cf. Geismann, Georg, ‘Kants Weg zum Frieden. Spätlese von Seels ‘Neulesung’ des Definitivartikels zum Völkerrecht’, in: Oberer, Hariolf, ed., Kant, Analysen — Probleme — Kritik, vol. 111 (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1997), pp. 333–62, p. 337. Geismann (p. 350) summarizes: ‘Das Ergebnis der … Uberlegungen Kants ist… nicht etwa, dass es nur einen Volkerbund geben dürfe, sondern vielmehr, dass es (nach Rechtsgrundsätzen) wenigstens einen Völkerbund… geben müsse.’ See alsoGoogle ScholarCavallar, Georg, Die europäische Union (Wien: Lit, 2006), pp. 12–34.Google Scholar

3 , Geismann, ‘Kants Weg’, p. 345Google Scholar.

4 A recent publication that shows at some length and in a very convincing way why the use of force (Gewalt) is strictly forbidden is: Cheneval, Francis, Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung (Basel: Schwabe, 2002), pp. 582–610.Google Scholar Shell repeats her claim on p. 102. The footnote does not support it with a passage.

5 See, for instance, Brandt, Reinhard, ‘Das Problem der Erlaubnisgesetze im Spätwerk Kants’, in Höffe, Otfried, ed., Imtnanuel Kant. Zum ewigen Frieden. Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1995), pp. 69–86, andGoogle ScholarEllis, Elisabeth, Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (Yale: Yale University Press, 2005), ch. 4Google Scholar.

6 See Orend, Brian, ‘Kant's Just War Theory’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 37 (1999), 323–53, here 350–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Hobbes, Thomas, On the Citizen [1641], ed. and trans. Tuck, Richard and Silverthorne, Michael (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. II, §11, p. 37.Google Scholar

8 ‘Kantian perspectives on democratic peace: alternatives to Doyle’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), 229–48, here 243–7.Google Scholar

9 Again, I would have appreciated a lively debate with my arguments in Kant and the Theory, pp. 107f., 112.

10 See the illuminating remarks by Byrd, Sharon, ‘The state as a “moral person”’, in Robinson, Hoke (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995, vol. 1, 1, pp. 171–89Google Scholar.

11 See the debates in Archiv des Völkerrechts, 41 (2003), issue 3, andGoogle ScholarAmerican Journal of International Law, 97 (2003), issue 3Google Scholar.

12 Sapiro, Miriam, ‘Iraq: the shifting sands of preemptive self-defense’, American Journal of International Law, 97 (2003), 599–606, at 599.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Luban, David, ‘Preventive war’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32 (2004), 207–48,CrossRefGoogle ScholarKritsiotis, Dino, ‘Arguments of mass confusion’, European Journal of International Law, 15 (2004), 233–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 See especially Kersting, Wolfgang, ‘Kant ist nicht Bushs Hofphilosoph’, Die Welt, 11 February 2004.Google Scholar Michael Moore's criticism of the Bush administration, in his propaganda movie Fahrenheit 9/11, misses the point. He does not address the crucial legal issues (international law, the UN), but relies on speculation (‘Bush is only interested in oil, money and power’) and pathos (the Lila Lipscomb episode).