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Contents of Experience

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Abstract

In this paper I aim to situate the Naiyayika theory of perception in contemporary philosophy of mind. Following the ancients, I suggest we reconsider the taxonomy and the assumed interactions between kinds of perceptual content. This reclassification will lead us to reconsider some aspects of the Cartesian conception of mind that continue to influence the work of contemporary theorists. I focus attention on different accounts of sensory perception favoured by ancient Indian Naiyayika philosophers and Descartes as a starting point for reconsidering contemporary accounts of perceptual content.I show that Descartes' account of sensory perception provides the impetus for a causal-explanatory account of conceptual content in terms of its non-conceptual counterpart. Though contemporary philosophers claim to have cast off their Cartesian heritage, my discussion reveals that some of its tenets continue to influence the work of contemporary philosophers. I offer reasons for rejecting yet another Cartesian influence and recommend that we follow the Nyaya taxonomy of perceptual states.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Peacocke (1992b).

  2. See recent articles by Peacocke (1998, 2001a).

  3. A similar position is defend by several recent theorists in philosophy of mind and perception including Frank Jackson (2003). See his ‘Representationalism and the Content of Experiences’, Representation in Mind: new approaches to mental representation, eds, H. Clapin, P. Slezack and P. Staines Wesport: Praeger forthcoming

  4. Chakrabarti (2000), A. p.6.

  5. It may be noted that this suggests that an indeterminate awareness is an instrumental cause of some but not all determinate perceptions, i.e., only those in which the qualifier is fed not from memory but an indeterminate awareness. See, Phillips (2001). Phillips appeals to Gangesa’s definition of perception and clarifies that it is stricter than Chakrabarti’s rendering of it. For Phillips, properly translated the definition reads, ‘cognition that does not have a cognition as its chief instrumental cause [karana or trigger]’ (Phillips, S. p. 107.) It is not important for us to worry about the details of the debate or to decide who is right in this debate for our purposes here, but my views on this matter will become clear in the course of the discussion.

  6. See his paper entitled ‘Non-Particular Individuals’, in The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson (Eds. P.K. Sen and R.R. Verma, Indian Council of Philosophical Research: New Delhi:, 1995). Arindam Chakrabarti uses the term ‘individuals’ to encompass both particulars and universal instances. The use of term ‘individuals’ and ‘non-particular individuals’ follows Chakrabarti (1995). Chakrabarti’s use of direct perception signifies indeterminate awareness. Though he does not use the latter expression, he does make a distinction between direct perception and qualificatory perception. The latter term signifies determinate awareness.

  7. For the purposes of this discussion, I follow the Naiyayikas, who regard the mind as distinct from the self or conscious agency. The mind, or ‘inner sense’ as they call it, is an instrument employed by conscious agent (self) for cognizing external and internal sensory stimulations

  8. I concede that we cannot make sense of indeterminate awareness of bare particulars, because we cannot cash out what it is for such a cognitive state to qualify as an intentional state. The argument for this claim is discussed in my paper: ‘Perceptual Cognition: a Nyaya-Kantian approach,’ Philosophy East and West 51 (2001), pp. 197–209

  9. Someone may object that we can use the same strategy to establish what it would mean to regard an indeterminate awareness of a particular as an intentional awareness. I think this depends on what we mean by a ‘particular’. My argument in ‘Perceptual Cognition’ was intended to target the Buddhist notion of real particulars (svalaksana). The Naiyayika notion of particular is that of a substance qualified by universals and relations. I think my argument can be extended to show that we cannot explain what it is to be intentionally aware of substances in indeterminate cognition. I think we may be able to account for intentional awareness of particulars conceived of as bundles of qualities (including relations and universals). But this depends on prior cognition of qualities, the rest is construction. My suspicion is that such construction must be mediated by determinate awareness of propositional forms

  10. Many influential Indian philosophers have argued for this, including Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti. See his, ‘Some Comparisons Between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyaya Logic’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 36, No. 4. Jun., 1976, pp. 554–563

  11. Descartes (1967), Principles of Philosophy, in CSM I p. 195

  12. Descartes (1997), ‘Third Set of Replies’, in CSM II, p. 127

  13. Descartes (1997), CSM II, p. 30

  14. Descartes (1997), ‘Sixth Set of Replies’, in CSM II, p. 295

  15. Descartes (1997), CSM I, p. 284; emphasis added

  16. Descartes, in CSM I, pp. 284–285; emphases added

  17. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in CSM I §195

  18. Descartes, Third Meditation in CSM II, p. 28.

  19. Descartes, Sixth Meditation in CSM II, p. 60.

  20. Descartes, Sixth Meditation in CSM II, p. 59.

  21. Descartes (1997), Sixth Meditation in CSM II, p. 60–61.

  22. Many empirical studies on primates and other animals show that except the great apes who are very closely related to humans, most animals including monkeys lack the concept of self. Gallup (1970) did a comparative study on monkeys and apes. The apes succeeded in passing the mirror test after three weeks or so but the monkeys did not succeed at all. See Gallup (1970).

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  1. Faculty of Arts, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, Monash University, P.O. Box 11A, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia

    Monima Chadha

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Chadha, M. Contents of Experience. SOPHIA 48, 237–251 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0095-6

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