Summary
In an illuminating article A. Kamlah considers philosophy of science as an activity leading step by step from neutral descriptions to rational prescriptions. What his remarks do not offer us is a way of dealing with the troublesome ambiguities we find in the analyses provided by those philosophers of science who refuse to say whether they legislate how scientists should behave or describe how they do. In this context I want to draw attention to a helpful distinction H. A. Simon has made.
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Bibliographie
A. Kamlah, Wie arbeitet die analytische Wissenschaftstheorie?, ZaWT XI/1980, S. 23–44.
Vgl. dazu die Analyse der Kuhn-Kontroverse bei E. Ströker, Wissenschaftsgeschichte als Herausforderung, Frankfurt 1976, passim.
Vgl. zum Folgenden H. A. Simon, Models of Discovery and Other Topics in the Methods of Science, Dordrecht 1977, S. 328ff.
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Charpa, U. Eine Anmerkung zu Andreas Kamlahs Darstellung der ‘normativ-analytischen’ Wissenschaftstheorie. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12, 135–137 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01811309
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01811309