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Eliminating Selves and Persons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 February 2021

MONIMA CHADHA
MONIMA CHADHA*
Affiliation:
Monash University
*
Monima.chadha@monash.edu
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Abstract

The Buddhist no-self and no-person revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure that is motivated by the normative goal of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering. The revised structure, in turn, entails a major reconsideration of our ordinary everyday person-related concerns and practices and interpersonal attitudes, such as moral responsibility, praise and blame, compensation, and social treatment. This essay explores the extent to which we must alter and perhaps discard some of our practical commitments in light of the Buddhist revisionism. I do not argue here that we should change our ordinary practices, concerns, and attitudes, or that the Buddhist metaphysics does succeed in presenting a better structure. Rather, I offer it as an alternative structure that should be considered seriously.

Keywords

Buddhismrevisionary metaphysicspersonsperson-related practices
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , Fall 2021 , pp. 273 - 294
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association

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Footnotes

This article is the seventh in a special series of commissioned articles on non-Western philosophies. The sixth article ‘The Philosophy of Accidentality’, by Manuel Vargas, appeared in Volume 6, Issue 4, pp. 391–409.

For valuable feedback and helpful conversations, I thank Shaun Nichols and Nirmalangshu Mukherji. I am also grateful to Helen Beebee, Miranda Fricker, and David Shoemaker for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. This work is supported by Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (DP200103557).

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