Kant on Quantitative and Qualitative Judgments

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Kant, while speaking on his 'Table of Judgments' in his Critique of Pure Reason, is concerned with classifying only the forms of judgment and not judgments. Kant says that if we attend only to the forms of judgment without considering their contents, we find that forms can be classified under the four heads of quantity, quality, relation and modality, each with three subdivisions. In this paper our primary objective is to explain Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments and examine some related objections put forward by his critics. We also intend to provide an answer to the question as to why Kant has departed from the formal logic of his period while classifying judgments, in the context of objections raised by H.W. Cassirer and P.F. Strawson.

Introduction

Although Immanuel Kant speaks of his 'Table of Judgments' in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he is concerned with classifying, not judgments, but forms of judgment. He says: "If we abstract from all content of a judgment, and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments" (Kant 1978, A_{70}/B_{95}). Kant's assertion here suggests that he is concerned with classifying the forms of judgment without regard to the content, i.e., the particular nature of the objects judged. Kant says that if we attend only to the forms without considering the content of judgments, we find that the forms can be classified under four heads, each with three subdivisions. This classification is presented in his Table of Judgments (Kant 1978, A_{70}/B_{95}, Kant 1950, p. 50). The prime objective of this paper is to (i) explain Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments and (ii) examine some objections raised by his critics regarding these judgments.

Understanding Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments necessitates an interpretation of what, according to him, is the difference between judgment and judgment form. We have presented a brief discussion of this topic in the first section under *Kant's distinction between judgments and forms of Judgment*. Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments have been discussed in this work under separate sections.

Kant's classification scheme regarding quantity and quality has been the subject of criticism from several philosophers in subsequent eras. They include AO Lovejoy (1873-1962), RM Eaton (born 1940), HW Cassirer (1903-1979) and PF Strawson (1919-2006). An attempt has been made in the present work to provide an understanding of the objections raised by these philosophers regarding Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments and study the validity of these

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objections in the light of Kant's own observations in his philosophical works. These are discussed at some length in the sections on Critique of objections to Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments.

Kant's Distinction between Judgments and Forms of Judgment

In order to understand what, according to Kant, is a judgment and a judgment form, we have to consider Kant's opinion regarding this issue. According to Kant, human knowledge springs from a combination of two distinct faculties of the mind, namely, sensibility and understanding. Sensibility is the passive faculty of receiving intuitions while understanding is the active power of knowing an object through these representations (intuitions). *These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing* (Kant 1978, A_{51}/B_{75}). We do not possess intuitive understanding or intellectual intuition. We receive intuitions passively through the senses. So, our intuitions are called sensible, and are said to be grounded on receptivity. But this is not true of a self-sufficient primordial being that possesses intuitive understanding. For such a being, the object is produced in the very act of cognition itself. Since our intuitions are given to sensibility only, our understanding cannot know by intuition. Kant believed that it is only through concepts and intuitions that we can cognize objects; there is no third possibility. So, we have to admit that our understanding is that faculty of knowledge which operates through concepts. Understanding makes concepts by its own activity. In so far as knowledge yielded by human understanding is conceptual, it is necessarily discursive. According to Kant, to know by means of concepts is to judge. Kant admits an intimate relation between concepts and judgments. They are essentially connected with each other. Kant points out that to judge is to unite our representations (intuitions and concepts). He expresses this opinion by saying that ". . . all judgments are functions of unity among our representations" (Kant 1978, A_{69}/B_{94}).

Now we will attempt to explain Kant's general nature of judgment. He is concerned here only with such judgments that have subject-concepts and predicate-concepts. The predicate concept of a judgment refers to the object mediately, i.e., by means of the subject-concept, which refers immediately to the object. Hence, we find a double mediation in a judgment. A judgment is the mediate knowledge of an object, i.e., the representation of representation of an object. It is said that the subject-concept refers immediately to the object. This immediacy, however, is only relative. Paton argues here in this context *This immediacy is of course only relative* (see footnote in Paton 1936, p. 253). The subject-concept, in so far as it is a concept, can refer to the object only by means of intuition. No concept is ever related to an object immediately. The subject-concept refers directly to the intuition, while the predicate-concept is referred to the intuition indirectly. Hence in judgment, we refer the concept to an object by means of an intuition or a concept. Judgment, therefore, since it employs concepts, is a discursive or mediate, and not an intuitive, cognition.

Precisely speaking, one can say that when we entertain a judgment, we unify representations. In the judgment, namely, 'All bodies are divisible' the predicate-concept 'divisibility' is applied to the concept of body, and the concept of body is referred to some intuitions which we have received passively. Hence, the predicate-concept, which is a higher idea in the sense that it has a wider denotation, comprises under it the subject-concept and others, i.e., the intuitions of divisible objects which fall under the concept of body. In this way many possible cognitions are gathered into one. This unifying function is not only present in the above judgment but is present in all judgments without exception.

The example of the judgment which Kant has given is a particular kind of judgment, in which the predicate-concept is considered to be higher than the subject-concept; but this is not always the case. For example, in the judgment 'All men are rational animals', the predicate concept, which comprises the subject-concept, cannot be regarded as higher than the subject-concept. Paton says, in defence of Kant: "It must, however, be remembered that Kant is not writing a treatise on formal logic, and his theory may be sound even if his example is inadequate and is described in a way which does not fit the general case" (Paton 1936, p. 254). Kant's main point is that all judgments, in so far as they are made in the knowledge situation, unify our representations - intuitions and concepts. This is true not only of categorical, but also of other kinds of judgments. Kant uses categorical judgment for an example only for the sake of simplicity. It must also be emphasised that in uniting intuitions and concepts in judgments, we are not merely playing with ideas; we also unite different individual objects to which intuitions immediately relate.

We have seen that a judgment essentially is an act of uniting our representations. According to Kant, the different ways in which judgments unite our representations, independently of their special nature, are the different forms of judgment. Different judgments, however, unite our representations differently. These different ways of judging are called, by Kant, the functions of unity in judgments and are nothing but forms of judgment. These different ways of uniting our representations are determined partly by their special nature involved and partly by the special nature of the understanding itself. The ways in which ideas are united in judgments, in so far as these ways are determined by the nature of the understanding, are the forms of judgment.

The distinction between the form and the content of a judgment is vital to Kant's argument; and yet he does not take the trouble of explaining and analysing the distinction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The passage (Kant 1978, A_{70}/B_{95}) cited at the beginning of this text suggests that he regards the distinction as absolute. As far as lack of any explanation from Kant is concerned, we are inclined to say that this is a mere assumption on his part that there is an absolute distinction between the form and the content of a judgment.

A relevant and important question in this context is whether we can conceive of human beings in whose language judgments are expressed in forms other than, or more or fewer than, those recognised in Kant's Table. We may, however, make two comments here. First, the question here is, at least in one respect, as to what we can conceive. But then the forms in which we do the job of conceiving are

exactly the forms with which Kant is concerned. Secondly, even if there be human beings who possibly think or judge in forms apparently peculiar to themselves, the question that arises next is whether their thoughts or judgments are translatable into our language. If not translatable, we shall not be able to hold intelligible discourses with them, and then a serious doubt will arise as to whether they are to be called human beings at all. If, however, their thoughts and judgments be translatable into our language or languages, then the forms of our judgments must also be valid for them.

Kant's Quantitative Judgments

Kant recognises, with some modification from the formal logic of his time, the division of the forms of judgments according to quantity, quality, relation and modality. Judgments under each of these heads are further sub-divided into three classes. Under the head quantity, judgments are sub-divided into Universal, Particular and Singular; under quality, the divisions are Affirmative, Negative and Infinite; under relation the judgments are divided into Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive; and under the head modality, judgments are divided into Problematic, Assertoric and Apodeictic. In this paper our contention is to explain Kant's quantitative and qualitative judgments and examine some related objections from his contemporaries.

Three kinds of quantitative judgments, as already noted are universal, particular, and singular; examples of these are 'All S is P' (All men are mortal')', 'Some S is P' ('Some men are mortal'), and 'This S is P' or 'a is P' ('Socrates is mortal'), respectively.

Kant here explicitly departs from the classification of formal logic. Besides universal and particular judgments, formal logicians recognised no other kind of quantitative judgment. In formal logic, singular and universal judgments are equated. In syllogistic employments, singular judgments are treated like universal ones. For example, consider the syllogism-

All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

- here both the premises are treated as 'A' propositions[1]. Since the subject-concept of a singular judgment includes a single object, the predicate cannot relate to part only of that object which is referred to by the subject-concept and be excluded from the rest. The single object which is referred to by the subject concept of singular judgment is taken in its entirety. So, the predicate is valid of the entire

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[1]The four standard forms of categorical propositions are universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative and particular negative, represented by the letters A, E, I and O respectively. A universal affirmative proposition is schematically written as 'All S is P' where S and P represent the subject and the predicate term, respectively. The proposition affirms that all members of S are said to be members of P also.

subject-concept having an extension to the whole to which the predicate is applied. But Kant considers singular judgments to be coordinate class (a class that is equal in status but different in nature) and offers a reason for this special treatment. Thus, he says: "If, on the other hand, we compare a singular with a universal judgment, merely as knowledge, in respect of quantity, the singular stands to the universal as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different from the universal" (Kant 1978, A_{71}/B_{96}). Some critics like Lovejoy here find fault with Kant. Kant distinguishes a singular from a universal judgment by considering the quantity of knowledge conveyed by them. He points out that the quantity of knowledge conveyed by a universal judgment cannot be the same as that conveyed by a singular judgment, the former holding good of a whole class, the latter only of an individual. Now, the distinction in respect of quantity of knowledge seems to be a distinction in respect of the content of knowledge afforded by intuition. If it be true that the distinction between a singular and a universal judgment has been drawn by considering the material content of judgments, then, of course, Kant's assertion here comes into conflict with his demand that forms of judgment alone must be taken in to account.

A little examination, however, shows that the contradiction is apparent, not real. The distinction between a singular and a universal judgment has been drawn by Kant entirely on the formal level. While distinguishing the singular from the universal judgment with respect to the amount of knowledge conveyed by them, he does not refer to any concrete instances of the subject-concepts concerned. According to him, the forms of judgment are enough to reveal the distinction. It can be said that by considering the symbolic expressions of these judgments, which suggest merely the forms, the distinction can be brought out clearly. Let us take the following symbolic expressions-

> All S is P, and
> a is p

to represent a universal and a singular judgment, respectively. The symbolic expression of the universal judgment itself suggests that the universally qualified 'S' which stands for the subject-concept represents a general term. And it is obvious that this general term does not stand for a definite individual, but rather for all of a class. Form this it follows that the judgment is not about a definite individual, but about a class. On the other hand, from the symbolic expression of the singular judgment it is evident that the symbol 'a' which stands for the subject-concept is used here as a singular term. This shows that the judgment is about an individual. Hence the distinction between the two judgments is evident from the mere symbolic expressions. This suggests that the difference in only the forms of judgment will indicate the difference in judgments. To convey this difference, reference to the material content is not necessary.

Kant's Qualitative Judgment

The kinds of qualitative judgments on the Kantian list are affirmative, negative, and infinite: e.g., 'S is P,' 'S is not P' and 'S is non-P'.

Kant perhaps is the first to recognise infinite judgments as a distinct class and classifies them along with affirmative and negative judgments under the same criterion of quality. Formal logicians, however, adhere to the familiar affirmative – negative dichotomy. For they are concerned only with the nature of the copula and not with that of the predicate.

Unlike transcendental logic, general formal logic "abstracts from all content of the predicate (even though it be negative); it enquires only whether the predicate is ascribed to the subject or opposed to it" (Kant 1978, A_{72}/B_{97}). The judgment of the form 'S is P' is treated in formal logic as affirmative, and the judgment of the form 'S is not P' as negative. This logic does not consider judgments of the form 'S is non-P' as a distinct class. It regards them as affirmative.

Kant holds that a judgment expressed by a sentence with an affirmative copula and a negative predicate involves a different kind of mental act from one expressed by either an affirmative or a negative copula and a positive predicate. He calls such judgment, e.g. 'The soul is non-mortal', infinite. An infinite judgment, so far as the logical form is concerned, is affirmative. It 'is one which is negative in force but affirmative in form', (Bennet 1966, p. 80) as Jonathan Bennett puts it. It is not, however, both affirmative and negative. It is a distinct kind of judgment, in that it affirms by denying, and so far, limits. We affirm something by saying that the soul is non-mortal. We place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. The judgment implies the division of all subjects of discourse into two classes, mortal and non- mortal, and asserts that the soul is one of the infinite number of beings which remain when we take away from the sphere of possible beings 'all that is mortal'. The exclusion of all that is mortal from the infinite sphere of possible beings makes that sphere limited. The soul is placed in the remaining part of the original extent of all that is possible. Hence the judgment is, with respect to its content, neither affirmative nor negative, but limitative only. Kant, therefore, contends that infinite judgments must be added to the transcendental Table of Judgments. He further says that, notwithstanding the mentioned exclusion, the extension still remains infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the whole sphere without the concept of the soul, being thereby, in the least augmented, or determined in an affirmative way. As the content of the predicate of this judgment includes an infinite number of things that are non-mortal, the judgment is infinite.

Critique of Objections to Kant's Classification of Judgments

We would now consider some of the critique of objections to Kant's classification of judgments. Let us first consider the objections to Kant's classification of judgments with regard to quantity.

a) Critique of Objections to Quantitative Judgments

Eaton's Objection

RM Eaton objects that Kant has failed to notice that universal judgments, which he recognised as a species of quantitative judgments, are really hypothetical (Dryer 1966, pp. 132–133). To every universal judgment there corresponds a hypothetical judgment to which it is equivalent. The universal judgment of the form 'Every A is B' is equivalent to a hypothetical judgment of the form 'For every x, if x is A then x is B'. The implication of this criticism is that as universal judgments are equivalent to hypothetical judgments, Kant has no right to regard universal judgments as constituting a separate class under the head of quantitative judgments.

Reply to the Objection

Dryer here attempts to defend Kant (Dryer 1966, pp. 132–133). He claims that from the fact that a universal categorical judgment is equivalent to a hypothetical judgment, it does not follow that there is no difference between the two. In case of every affirmative judgment of the form 'Every A is B' we obtain by obversion the equivalent negative judgment of the form 'No A is non-B'. Yet this does not indicate that there is no difference between affirmative and negative judgments. What is expressed by the affirmative judgment is completely different from that expressed by the negative judgment. Similarly, the equivalence between universal and hypothetical judgments does not eliminate the difference between the two. By a universal categorical predicative judgment, a predicate is ascribed to the totality of the subject, whereas in a hypothetical judgment what is thought by one judgment is considered to be a consequence of another. Alternatively, we can also say that in the categorical judgement there is a subsumption of one concept under another irrespective of whether anything happens to be an A. In the hypothetical judgement, if the hypothesis is not true, nothing is said: that is, if nothing is A, then the condition is not fulfilled and therefore nothing follows, i.e., we know nothing if that is the case. So, the first is purely conceptual knowledge irrespective of what exists while the second is knowledge about existing things under a certain assumption.

Lovejoy's Objection

Lovejoy has objected that if we adhere to the Kantian sense of quantity, we find that his tripartite division of quantitative judgment is arbitrary (Lovejoy 1967, pp. 273–275). Kant's notion of quantity is completely different from that of formal logic. In formal logic the quantity of a proposition is determined with reference to the specific relation of subject and predicate. A judgment in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole denotation indicated by the subject is called universal, e.g., 'All men are mortal'. Again, a judgment in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of an indefinite part of the subject is called particular, e.g.,

'Some men are wise'. So, in formal logic there can only be the usual twofold classification. Kant, however, by quantity signifies the amount of knowledge conveyed by the judgment. For Kant, judgments with regard to quantity are to be distinguished according to how many things they tell us about. This shows that Kant has passed over from the logical to the strictly mathematical sense of quantity. Lovejoy claims that Kant provides a triple classification without realising this transition. Further Lovejoy suggests that taking this sense of 'quantity' we cannot justify Kant's tripartite classification of quantitative judgments. In other words, no decisive reason can be put forward for justifying the fact that there are only three kinds of quantitative judgments, neither more or less. A twofold classification here, in Lovejoy's view, might very well be accepted as judgments referring to one, and judgments referring to more than one object.

Besides the singular and universal judgments, Kant has admitted a separate class of judgments, namely, particular judgments. For a particular judgment of the from 'Some S is P' tells us something about a number of objects more than one, and less than the indefinite whole number of objects constituting the extension of the class Lovejoy claims that "there is no assignable reason for stopping with the mention of any particular number of degrees of plurality" (Lovejoy 1967, p. 274). So, we can accept another distinct class of judgment of the form 'Most S's are P's' which tells us something about a number of objects more than one, and more than half of the indefinite whole number of objects included within the class S, as belonging to the class P. Similarly, we may recognise a distinct class for judgments of the type 'Two thirds of S is P'. Hence, Kant's tripartite division of quantitative judgments is, in his view, arbitrary. He remarks that Kant arbitrarily adheres to the triple division "partly because he is wedded to the triad, and partly because he has already before his mind the purely mathematical categories (which have no bearing upon the logical quantity of propositions) of unity, plurality, and totality)" (Lovejoy 1967, p. 274).

Reply to the Objection

Lovejoy's criticism that Kant's subdivision of quantitative judgments is based not on logical, but on mathematical consideration of quantity, is not justified. In the following passage cited from Kant's Logic, we find that he has furnished logical considerations for the subdivision:

> "As to quantity, judgments are either universal, particular, or singular, according as the subject in the judgment is either completely included in or completely excluded from the predicate concept, or is only partly included in or partly excluded from it. In the universal judgment the sphere of one concept is completely enclosed within the sphere of the other; in the particular judgment part of the former is enclosed in the sphere of another; in the singular judgment, finally, a concept that has no sphere at all is enclosed, merely as a part, in the sphere of another" (Kant 1974, p. 107).

That Kant is not influenced by extra-logical considerations in his subdivision in question is evidenced from the fact that he does not recognise in his Table the distinction between 'comparatively general propositions' and 'universal

propositions'- a distinction that rests on a ground which, he says, 'does not concern logic' (Kant 1974, p. 108).

Accordingly, Lovejoy's claim that if we accept Kant's sense of quantity, judgments of the form 'Most S's are P's' must constitute a separate class of judgment is untenable. There is no need to suppose a distinct class of judgments corresponding to every number in the series from one to infinity. Judgments of the form 'Most S's are P's' and the judgment containing any numerical concept can be grouped under the particular judgment. The judgement 'Most S's are P's' or 'Two thirds of S is P' is equivalent to 'Some S is P.'

b) Critique of an Objection to Qualitative Judgments

The objections to Kant's classification of judgments under quality are mainly concentrated upon what Kant calls 'infinite judgment'.

Lovejoy's Objection

Lovejoy has argued in detail that Kant has failed to distinguish infinite judgments from affirmative and negative ones according to a consistent principle. Lovejoy draws our attention to the reason why Kant calls a judgment such as 'The soul is non-mortal' infinite (Lovejoy 1961, p. 276). Kant says*:*

> "…[In] the proposition, 'The soul is non-mortal', . . . I locate the soul in the unlimited sphere of non-mortal being. Since the mortal constitutes one part of the whole extension of possible beings, and the non-mortal the other, nothing more is said by my proposition than the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain over when I take away all that is mortal. The infinite sphere of all that is possible is thereby only so far limited that the mortal is excluded from it, and that the soul is located in the remaining part of its extension. But, even allowing for such exclusion, this extension still remains infinite, and several more parts of it may be taken away without the concept of the soul being thereby in the least increased, or determined in an affirmative manner" (Kant 1978, $A_{72\text{-}73}$/$B_{97\text{-}98}$).

Now, Lovejoy contends that this reason does not adequately set off infinite judgments from affirmative and negative ones. If the predicate of an infinite judgment does not limit the subject class even after the predicate is added, then the same might be said of affirmative and negative judgments also. The subject class of these latter kinds of judgments remain infinite even after the predicates are added.

Reply to the Objection

Lovejoy, however, fails to see that Kant's main point with regard to what he calls 'infinite judgments' is not that they are infinite, but that they are limitative. This is clear not only from the fact that Kant derives the category of limitation from such judgments, but also from his following words:

"These judgments, though infinite in respect of their logical extension, are. . ., in respect of the content of their knowledge, limitative only and cannot therefore be passed over in a transcendental table of all moments of thought in judgments, since the function of the understanding thereby expressed may perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure a-priori knowledge" (Kant 1978, A$_{73\text{-}98}$).

The reason why Kant might have chosen the title 'infinite' for the kind of judgments in question may be sought in tradition. The traditional reason is that the predicate term of such a judgment is an 'infinite term', where 'infinity' means indeterminacy. Joseph says: "the technical term in Latin is nomen infinitum, whence the English phrase 'infinite term' is derived: but infinite means in this context indeterminate; . . ." (Joseph 1967, p. 42).

As soon as we realise that in saying 'The soul is non- mortal', nothing determinate is said either affirmatively or negatively, it becomes clear that the kind of judgment in question is neither affirmative nor negative.

Some General Objections to Kant's Classification of Judgments

There are some serious general objections to Kant's classification of judgments of which account must be taken. By examining these objections Kant's purpose for the classification of judgments in question will become clear.

Cassirer's and Strawson's Objections

It is often supposed that Kant has, in his classification in question, taken for granted the finality of the formal logic prevalent in his time, and that the subsequent developments in formal logic go to show that his claims as regards his own Table are exaggerated. H. W. Cassirer says: ". . . the formal logic on which Kant takes his stand is now everywhere discredited, so that no philosopher today could accept the list of judgment forms he puts forward as anything like complete; . . .." (Cassirer 1978, p. 58). P.F. Strawson urges the following objection against Kant: "Given a certain indispensable minimum equipment of notions, the logician can, if he chooses, distinguish indefinitely many forms of proposition, all belonging to formal logic" (Strawson 1966, p. 79).

Reply to the Objections

Kant does not uncritically take over the classification of judgments offered by the formal logicians of his time. Nor does he assume the completeness of the then current classification. For, as we have seen, he has himself added some new forms of judgments to the traditional list, e.g., singular judgments and infinite judgments. The question arises: why and how does he make the new additions?

The reason for his new incorporations into his Table of Judgments can be found in his concern with transcendental logic. He has time and again said that the new judgment-forms recognised by him have distinctive contribution to knowledge. Dryer picks up this point as a crucial one and opines that Kant has

classified judgments (i.e., judgment-forms) not so much from the point of view of formal logic as from that of transcendental logic (Dryer 1966, p. 134).

These two kinds of logic are guided by different purposes in the classifications of judgments. It is argued that formal logic is concerned with distinguishing only those formal differences among judgments which affect the valid relations of one judgment to another. However, transcendental logic is concerned with the relation of judgments to objects, with how objects must be conceived in order to be capable of being known, and therefore with what distinctive contribution to knowledge is made by each sort of judgment.

Various judgment-forms, or even various alternative systems of judgment-forms may serve the purposes of formal logic. But owing to his commitment to transcendental logic,

> "Kant classifies judgments for a specific purpose. He does so for a purpose which formal logic does not have. He does not claim that the classification which he gives is that which formal logic should adopt. He does not maintain that there is only one correct way in which formal logic should classify judgments. Kant classifies judgments in accord with the distinctive contribution to knowledge which is made by each, whatever its subject or predicate. He undertakes this classification in order to find all the basic concepts which enable knowledge to be obtained by each sort of judgment" (Dryer 1966, pp. 134–135).

Conclusion

The present paper concerns Kant's classification of judgments with regard to quantity and quality as presented in his work *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant reckoned that judgments can be classified under four heads, each with three subdivisions, by attending only to their forms, without considering the content. He has distinguished between a judgment and a judgment form. According to him a judgment is a mediate knowledge of an object i.e., the representation of representation of an object. He is concerned here with such judgments that have a subject-concept and a predicate-concept. The predicate-concept of a judgment refers to the object mediately i.e., by means of the subject-concept which refers immediately to object by means of intuition. Hence, we find double mediation in a judgment. A judgment, since it employs concepts, is discursive or mediate and not intuitive cognition.

Kant says that when we entertain a judgment, we unify ideas. He points out that the different ways in which judgments unite our ideas, independently of the special nature of ideas, are the different forms of judgment. He recognises with some modification from the formal logic of his time, the division of the forms of the judgments according to quantity, quality, relation and modality. Judgments under each head are further subdivided into three classes.

Kant's classification regarding quantitative and qualitative judgments is explained in this work. The views of his critics regarding these judgments are examined in some detail. In the case of quantitative judgments, Kant departs explicitly from the classification admitted by formal logic and recognises singular

judgment as a coordinate class. Eaton and Lovejoy have raised objections against Kant's observations regarding quantitative judgment. While Eaton has said that Kant has no right to regard universal judgments as constituting a separate class under quantitative judgments, Lovejoy has referred to Kant's tripartite division of quantitative judgments as arbitrary since his subdivision is based only on mathematical consideration of quantity and not on logical considerations. However, the criticisms do not appear to be well-founded. Dryer has defended Kant against Eaton's criticism by noting that the equivalence of the universal categorical judgment and a hypothetical judgment does not suggest a lack of a difference between the two. As for the criticism made by Lovejoy, we find that Kant himself has furnished logical considerations for the subdivision in one of the passages in *Logic*.

Kant's tripartite division of judgment with regard to quality are affirmative, negative and infinite. He again departs from formal logicians who admitted only affirmative and negative judgments as they are concerned only with the nature of the copula and not with that of the predicate. Kant perhaps is the first philosopher to recognise the infinite judgment as a distinct class. He points out that a judgment expressed by a sentence with an affirmative copula and a negative predicate involves a different kind of mental act from one expressed by either an affirmative or a negative copula and a positive predicate. Objections with regard to Kant's tripartite division of qualitative judgments are mainly concentrated upon what he calls 'infinite judgment'. Lovejoy has objected to Kant's argument for accepting infinite judgment as a coordinate class. He argued that Kant failed to distinguish infinite judgments from affirmative and negative ones following a consistent principle. It nevertheless appears to us that Lovejoy failed to see that Kant's main point with regard to what he calls 'infinite judgments' is not that they are infinite, but that they are limitative. The reason behind Kant's choice of the title 'infinite' may be sought in tradition which is that the predicate term of such a judgment is an 'infinite term', where 'infinity' means indeterminacy.

The present work also attempts to provide an understanding of why Kant does not accept the classification of judgments offered by the formal logicians of his time in the context of the objections raised by Cassirer and Strawson.

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