

## NATURE OF THE SUBJECT THAT OWNS STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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If Descartes and the Christian theologians are accepted, then animals are qualitatively different from human beings. Animals lack consciousness. Consciousness is something that is a special virtue of human beings. A Newton and a Russell share this virtue with a fisherman and a horse-rider, but not with a fish or a horse. The rigid distinction between human beings and animals is as old as the *Old Testament*. God informs the newly created man, 'I am putting you in charge of the fish, the birds, and all the wild animals.'<sup>1</sup> May be, since man has come to own the earth, he also owns what grows and moves on the earth. Though God created both, the fish and the fisherman, he did not create fish in his own image. Animals were deprived of the image of God. As the *Old Testament* tells us, 'God created human beings, making them to be like himself.'<sup>2</sup> If God had created animals also in his own image, perhaps it would have been quite difficult for the man to treat animals in the fashion in which he liked. Perhaps there would have arisen "moral guilt" in him if he decided to torture or kill an animal. The concept of the "Image of God" can be given a Cartesian interpretation. What is meant is simply that men have consciousness, animals do not. Therefore the possibility of torturing an animal is ruled out, for torture presupposes having of pain. But animals are mere automata, they are very like machines without owning mind. The domain, not only of Ethics, but also of Bio-Ethics, is restricted to the horizon of men. Animals are excluded from both these domains. Concerning the aim of Descartes, Hookway thinks that 'his aim was to provide foundations for science and religion by refuting Scepticism.'<sup>3</sup> It is not so much the discovery of mind or

consciousness, but its restriction to human beings that has provided a secure foundation to religion. Descartes has undoubtedly helped religions more than helping science.

The *Old Testament* uses the "image of God" as the principle that demarcates human beings from animals. It is possible to imagine that God had not created man in his own image, that he created man also in the same fashion in which he created animals. In that situation men would not have been demarcated from fishes, horses, birds etc. Would that situation have favoured man or disfavoured him? Obviously, in that situation there would have been no civil society, no crimes and punishment, no sins and no kind of Commandments to guide the human life. A man would have been as free or as much in bondage as a fish or a horse. God wished man to be quite unlike a beast, therefore, he imposed his own image on him. He wished to use man to look after his creation. The very purpose of his creation would have been defeated, if the man had not been created in the image of God.

The early Indian and Greek thinking was quite unlike the early Jewish and Christian thinking on the nature of man and his relationship with such things as fishes, birds and plants. The early thinkers from both India and Greece posited "soul" as the subject of consciousness. Material bodies, by definition, were deprived of consciousness. Once the soul enters into a material body, the body becomes conscious. And as soon as the soul departs from the body, the body is dead, it has lost all consciousness. These early thinkers did not find any qualitative distinction between the bodies of human beings and the bodies of animals. If there was any distinction, it was quantitative. The complexities of a human body were missing in the body of a fish or a horse. If the "Image of God" demarcated men from fishes, birds and plants, "the principle of soul" assimilated men to fishes, birds and plants.

Concerning the place of human body, in the scheme of bodies, early Wittgenstein exhibits a view that is similar to the view of the early Indian and Greek thinkers. In his *Notebooks* Wittgenstein remarks, 'The human body.... is a part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones etc. etc.'<sup>14</sup> This realisation does not occur to us because of our philosophical prejudices. 'Whoever realises this will not want to procure a pre-eminent

place for his own body or for the human body... He will regard humans and beasts quite naively as objects which are similar and which belong together.<sup>5</sup> The *Old Testament* certainly gave a pre-eminent place for the human body by creating it in the image of God. Wittgenstein brings humans and beasts together by observing qualitative identity between them. The later Wittgenstein brought humans further closer to the beasts by distinguishing them from stones, chairs etc. He wished to see whether a stone can have a pain, so that it would be possible for us to say that a stone has a soul. He reacts... 'can we say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has the pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone?'<sup>6</sup> It is obvious, if a stone cannot have a soul, consciousness cannot be ascribed to it. It is only about humans and beasts that one can say that they have souls, and therefore, they are the proper subjects for the ascription of experiences. Consider further the following remark. 'Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. - One says to oneself How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a *sensation* to a *thing*? One might as well ascribe it to a number! - And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it.'<sup>7</sup> Wittgenstein finds a "wriggling fly" quite like a man "writhing with pain", and both are quite unlike a stone or a number.

If the body of a beast is qualitatively like the body of a human being then there is no reason to prohibit a soul from entering into the body of a beast. The body of a beast is as good a house for the soul as is the body of a human being. Plato cites cases where souls preferred the bodies of beasts over the bodies of human beings. In the myth of Er, Book X of the *Republic*, Er narrates, 'he saw the soul, which had once been that of Orpheus, choosing the life of a swan... And he saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life a nightangle. He saw also a swan changing its nature, and selecting the life of a man, and its example was followed by other animals.'<sup>8</sup> Thus fishes may prefer in their next birth to become fishermen, horses to become horse-riders and the hunted to become hunters. And the fishermen, horse-riders and hunters may follow the opposite course. The myth has many lessons to teach. The most important lesson is that we should not restrict the ascription of consciousness only to human beings. For the reason that

the animals are as good claimants for the ascription of consciousness as are the human beings. We unhesitatingly ascribe consciousness to Orpheus and Thamyras. But we should do the same to the swan and the nightangle. For the reason that the soul of Orpheus now resides in the swan, and that of Thamyras in the nightangle. We ascribe consciousness to the souls, and not to the bodies, be they the bodies of orpheus and Thamyras or those of the swan and the nightangle.

Not only Plato's views on the relation between soul and the body, but also his theory of ideas and the theory of knowledge, had their source in Pythagoras. As Russell points out, 'When Plato is mentioned one thinks at once of the theory of ideas. It is set out by Socrates in several dialogues... Its origins are Pythagorean.'<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Plato's view that knowing is remembering (recollecting) is directly based on the transmigration of the soul. As Russell points out on this issue, 'As for the notion of remembering or amnesia, it is based on the view that the soul goes through a series of alternate embodied and disembodied states, a view that has obvious links with the theory of transmigration as held by Pythagoras. The disembodied soul is as if asleep, and that is why, when it is in a waking and embodied state, what it has learned in a previous existence must be awakened too.'<sup>10</sup> Plato's acceptance of the transmigration has been interpreted by Russell in his own way. According to Russell a soul is conscious, or consciousness could be ascribed to it, only when it is embodied. So body plays the dominant role for a soul to become conscious. Perhaps Russell means to say that a soul cannot see if there are no eyes, it cannot hear if there are no eardrums, it cannot smell if there is no nose, and so on. Consciousness has a necessary connection with the existence of a body. But how would a disembodied soul be rewarded or punished? What is the meaning of reward if one does not enjoy it? So also what is the meaning of punishment if one does not suffer it? Interpreting the myth of Er, Flew comments, 'At the end of one life souls are dispatched for reward or punishment as the case may be. But these rewards and punishment come to an end, and afterwards the souls have to start new lives in new bodies, and so on, indefinitely.'<sup>11</sup> If Flew is right then the disembodied souls too have to be conscious.

If one studies the views of Plato and Pythagoras one would feel that the East was in contact with the West long before Alexander's invasion

of India. There is a good amount of similarity between the views of Pythagoras and Plato and the ancient Hindu thinkers on some fundamental philosophico-religious issues. Even socio-political issues are not ruled out. The Pythagorean Platonic three-fold division of society coincides with the Vedic four-fold division of society. Since Pythagoras and Plato do not consider slaves as humans belonging to human society, which stops them to reach the four-fold division, they stop at three-fold division. Referring to the Pythagorean division of society, Russell remarks, 'We have a division of men into three ways of life. Just as there are three kinds of men who come to attend the Olympic games, so there are three kinds of men in society. At the lowest level, there are those who come to buy and sell : next we have those who take part in the contest, and finally we have the spectators who come to see, the theoreticians in the literal sense. These last correspond to the philosophers. The philosophic way of life is the only one which holds out some hope for transcending the fortuities of existence, it provides an escape from the wheel of birth. For, according to the Pythagoreans, the soul is subject to a sequence of transmigrations.'<sup>12</sup>

The question of slavery would naturally attract attention in this context. Those who came to 'buy and sell' were certainly not slaves, though they belonged to the lowest segment of society. They were business men of some sort. Perhaps the slaves were not allowed to attend the Olympic games, in either of the three capacities, therefore, they were not considered by the Pythagoreans as human beings performing any sort of social function. If this is true then the Greeks were more extremists than the Hindus who allowed Śudras to occupy their position in the Varṇa-hierarchy.

A Hindu would be attracted towards the Pythagorean interest in 'escaping from the wheel of birth' and the means to be adopted for such an escape. To obtain liberation from the wheel of birth, according to Hinduism, is to obtain Mokṣa. The path of knowledge, in Hinduism, has been one of the most favoured means for obtaining Mokṣa, corresponding to the Pythagorean 'philosophic way of life.' There is reference to three means for obtaining liberation, knowledges (gyan), action (karma) and devotion (bhakti). The Vedantins claim that action and devotion in themselves would never lead to liberation. Action and devotion are simply means for producing knowledge, and it is ultimately knowledge that would liberate a

man from the wheel of birth and death.

Contemplation about the meeting point between the Pythagorean thinking and the Indian thinking is relevant. Egypt seems to be such a point. There is convincing evidence that India had sea-trade with Egypt even before the Greeks started emerging as the sea-traders or the Intellectual victors. It is said about both Pythagoras and Plato that they visited Egypt. Pythagoras left his native town in the island of Samos, and before settling down in Croton which is situated in the mainland, he visited Egypt. The story is repeated in the case of Plato. He travelled to many places after the execution of Socrates in 399 B.C., and before his setting down in Athens in 387 B.C. Like Pythagoras, Plato is supposed to have visited Egypt during this period. The other Greek philosophers of that age, the Milesians, namely, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, who never visited Egypt, developed views quite unlike the views of Pythagoras.

Pythagoras is supposed to have obtained his source-material on Mathematics from Egypt. But the source of his metaphysics could not be Egypt. Egypt, which gave so much importance to the bodies, which buried its dead in the Pyramids, could not have led the Pythagoreans to believe in the independence of the soul from the body. The transmigration of souls or the division of society into rigid classes are peculiarly Indian concepts. Egypt may perhaps be the place from where the Indian thinking migrated to Greece. Intellectual achievements of a people are also a form of goods which the traders carry from one place to the other. Concerning the contact of the Greeks with the East during the days of its sea-trading activity, Russell remarks, 'From the middle of the eighth to the middle of the sixth century B.C. the shores of Sicily, Southern Italy, and the Black Sea became dotted with Greek cities. With the rise of colonies trade developed, and the Greeks came into the renewed contact with the East.'<sup>14</sup> The eastern influence on the Greek thought which originated at the time of Pythagoras increased during, and after, Alexander's invasion of the East. After his visit to India with Alexander, Pyrrho became the founder of scepticism, which became the most powerful school of Western thought.

The other foreign influence which the Greek sea-trading period observed was the emergence of a new funeral custom, the custom of cremation. Referring to this period Russell points out, 'Bodies are cremated,

not buried as we know they were in the Mycenaean times.<sup>1</sup> And the custom of cremating the bodies lingered on till the days of Plato, if not afterwards. This is proved by the fact that Crito asks Socrates about the fashion in which his body should be treated after his death. Referring to the request of Crito, Socrates remarks, 'He thinks that I am the thing which he will be seeing as a corpse in a short time, and he asks how to bury me. And all that I have been saying at great length just now about how when I drink the poison I shall no longer remain with you but shall go away to the joys of the blessed.' ... 'I shall not remain when I die but shall up and begone, in order that Crito may bear it more easily, and, when he sees my body either being burnt or being buried, not to be distressed on my account as if I were suffering something terrible.' ... 'You must keep your spirits up, and say that you bury my body and bury it as you think fit, and as seems to you most proper.'<sup>15</sup> Socrates thinks that the soul is independent of the body, therefore, it hardly matters whether the body is burnt or buried once the soul departs from the body. Socrates allows "custom of the day" to be followed in treating his dead body. There were certainly two customs, and not one, otherwise Crito would have never asked Socrates about the custom to be followed, whether to burn the body or to bury it.

Socrates overlooks the fact that the cremation of bodies involves certain metaphysical presuppositions which the burial of bodies does not. The cremation presupposes a cyclic order of the universe, and the corresponding belief in the transmigration of soul. The custom of burial presupposes the preservation of bodies. But why should the body be preserved? In preserving the body, the man associated with the body is also preserved. When a man dies he does not depart from his body to any other destinations, he continues to live in his dead body. This view is best exhibited by the Egyptians. Russell writes, 'In Egypt religion was much concerned with life after death. The Pyramids are funeral monuments.'<sup>16</sup> But what sort of "life after death" is this? Why were the material treasures buried along with the dead body? Neither the souls can eat nor can they wear ornaments, it is only bodies that make use of the material possessions. The life after death which the Egyptians might have contemplated, is not the life of the soul surviving the death of the body, but the life of the body itself surviving its death at an earlier time. The survival of the body, which

is vaguely conceived at the Egyptian level, is clearly conceived afterwards in the christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the body.

Though not explicitly, the Western scholars implicitly recognise the influence of Indian thinking on the thinking of Pythagoras. Describing the nature of the Pythagorean school and its founder director, Flew writes, 'Pythagoras, however, was as much or more the *guru* of a religious *ashram* as the head of a research institute, his school constituted a sort of order, the Pythagorean Brotherhood.'<sup>17</sup> It is quite natural on the part of the Greek citizens to be suspicious about the activities of this *Guru* and his *Ashram*. The *Guru* was involved in preaching ideas and ideals which were quite foreign to the Greek soil. His *Ashram* might have appeared to the Greek citizens as some sort of foreign agency involved in washing the brain of the innocent citizens. The *Ashram's* life at Croton lasted hardly for twenty years when the people revolted against it, and Pythagoras was driven out of Croton. About the closure of the Pythagorean school at Croton, Russell writes, 'Why Pythagoras and his school had been expelled from Croton in 510 B.C. we shall probably never know'<sup>18</sup> Russell seems to think that there were grounds other than the ground of the unusual ideas preached by Pythagoras. Preaching of unusual foreign ideas should be considered as a good ground against the existence of Pythagoras and his school in Croton.

Pythagoras was perhaps the contemporary of Buddha. Buddha was born around 566 B.C., and Pythagoras according to Russell was expelled from Croton in 510 B.C. Rebirth and transmigration had such a widespread acceptance in India, that even the Buddhists accepted them, in spite of the fact that they rejected the continuity of both, the soul and the body. It is not only on the metaphysical ground that rebirth was accepted, the moral ground also required it. Each wrong action of man involves a given quantity of suffering. There is considerable quantity of suffering that a man accumulates in his lifetime, over and above the suffering that he inherits from his past life. A man has to undergo that much suffering which he has accumulated, whatever number of births he requires. Incidentally, mercy-killing is ruled out with this theoretical approach. If you kill someone to stop his suffering, you are forcing him to suffer more in his coming birth. There is no way to escape the punishment that the Law of Karma has



allotted for your misdeeds.

Though the philosophers continued puzzling themselves over the distinction between the soul and the body from the time of Pythagoras to the time of Wittgenstein, the impact of this distinction decreased from the time of Descartes. Because of the Cartesian influence, the soul-body distinction was replaced by the mind-body distinction. The major reason for removing "soul" and replacing it by "mind" was that the former concept led to undermine the human body. Once the human body was assimilated to the body of a fish or a horse, special importance to the human body was given up. Then Pythagoras and Plato gave more importance to the disembodied existence than to the embodied existence. Embodied existence appeared to them as the degradation of the soul. The soul is spiritual. In entering into a body, soul has de-spiritualised itself, it has degraded itself. We have already seen how Socrates remarked that after drinking the poison he will go away "to the joys of the blessed." Blessed are those who live in the disembodied world, the world of souls. The high respect that the Pythagoreans gave to the "soul" led to its fall. The introduction of "mind" was the introduction of a less important entity, correlated with another less important entity, the body. The issues of consciousness are now being discussed under the title of Mental Philosophy or the Philosophy of Mind. The Wittgensteinians prefer to call it Philosophical Psychology.

The Cartesian "mind", however, continues to have the hangover of the Pythagorean "soul". The former differs from the latter only in two respects: one, the former does not have rebirth or transmigration. Secondly, it does not enter into an animal body. In all other respects they are the same. Therefore, Descartes does not mind on occasions to equate the mind with the soul. He is a thinking substance simply because he happens to be a soul. Consider his remark from the *Discourse on Method*, 'I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing, so that this "me" that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter, and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is.'<sup>19</sup> Embodied existence of a mind is contingent, it could very well exist as a disembodied being, without any change in its

essential nature. It thinks while in the body, and it would continue thinking while outside the body. According to Russell, the "disembodied soul is as if asleep". One may feel that while one is sleeping, one is not thinking. This seems to be true while one is having a dreamless sleep. Perhaps, it would have been safer for the position of Descartes if he had defined "mind" in terms of "the potentiality to think". The man who is asleep has potentiality to think, and this potentiality is actualised when he wakes up. The possibility of disembodied existence of mind shows that the mind need not be *in* the body to control it. It may exist *outside* the body, and may function like a remote control, controlling the body from any distance. The ghost need not be *in* the machine as Ryle thought.

Consider now Strawson's views on the disembodied subjects of consciousness. Strawson too, like Russell, does not find any incoherence in the idea of disembodied existence. But he has come to a different conclusion from the conclusion of Russell. According to Russell, as we have already seen, as soon as a soul becomes disembodied it goes to sleep, it loses consciousness. But Strawson's disembodied persons are always engaged in thinking. Referring to a disembodied person Strawson says, '.... in order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as *disembodied*, as a *former* person.'<sup>20</sup> Thus Strawson's disembodied person is an active thinker, continuously involved in thinking, therefore avoids Locke's objection to Descartes. Strawson's disembodied person has no drowsy nod that would lead him to non-existence. Descartes would prefer Strawson's position over that of Russell. Where there is mind, there is also thinking, otherwise how could thinking function as the essence of mind!

According to Strawson 'The strictly disembodied individual is strictly solitary, and it must remain for him indeed an utterly empty, though not meaningless speculation, as to whether there are any other members of his class.'<sup>21</sup> All this follows from the fact that he has lost his body. He is not in a position to identify others, for he has lost his hands to touch them, he has lost his eyes to see them, he has lost his vocal chords to talk to them. There is no way in which his body could be in touch with the bodies of others. Though he could speculate that there are other disembodied persons, this speculation however would be empty in the sense that there

is a logical barrier which does not allow one disembodied person to peep into the mind of another disembodied person. The disembodied persons of Pythagoras and Plato are wholly unlike the disembodied persons of Russell and Strawson. Neither Russell nor Strawson allows any social gatherings of the disembodied persons. They are forced to live isolated lives. Is not their existence miserable?

Strawson has certainly not presented any threat to the position of the Pythagorean souls. These souls happen to be in direct contact with one another, simply because the barriers of bodies have been abolished. They are not in "communication" with one another, they are in "communion" with one another. The former concept presupposes the use of written or spoken words. But the existence of a human body is essential whether the language is written or spoken. The abolition of the body would lead to the abolition of the present communication net-work. Not the "communication net-work" but the "communion net-work" starts functioning. With embodied existence, the consciousness that is associated with the soul, remains crippled. The soul becomes highly sensitive and conscious once the curtain of the body is withdrawn. Withdrawal of the body, according to Strawson, would lead a soul to live a solipsistic life. Strawson is unable to see that the bodily withdrawal would lead the souls to come in direct contact with one another. It is the body that leads a soul to live a solipsistic life. Each soul remains imprisoned in its own body. Bodies do not allow souls to have direct contact with one another. Disembodied existence removes all those barriers which were created by the embodied existence.

Strawson knows about the identity crisis that would emerge once the bodies are withdrawn. If there are only minds, how would one mind be distinguished from the other mind? Hume's worry has its resurrection in Strawson. Therefore, Strawson follows Hume's solution. Hume introduces "memory" to explain personal identity. All those experiences that are remembered by "me" are my experiences. But what is "me" or "My" doing here? I am already identified before my memories are identified, before some memory-experiences are described as mine. Strawson says concerning a disembodied person that since he has 'no personal life of his own to lead, he must live much in the memories of the personal life he did lead.'<sup>22</sup> Once a disembodied person becomes isolated from his friends and

foes, be they embodied or disembodied, he has no other option but to live in the memories of those experiences which he had when he was embodied. Disembodied existence can be described as the resurrection of the mind. What has arisen after the bodily death of a person is his mind. Resurrection of the mind is as different from the resurrection of the body as is mind different from the body. Strawson is as a matter of fact arguing against the resurrection of the mind. It is obvious that he favours the resurrection of the body. But he favours the resurrection of the body in a very subtle way. He pleads in favour of the resurrection of the mind, but quite weakly.

Memory may at the initial stages confer the status of an individual to a disembodied person. But this is a fact that human memories become weak as one grows old, the images which occur to one's mind fade away. Sometimes memories totally desert a person, and a person starts living a vegetative life. 'In proportion as the memories fade', according to Strawson, 'to that degree his concept of himself as an individual becomes attenuated.'<sup>23</sup> So Strawson correlates the fading of memory with the fading of the individuality of a disembodied person. The conclusive step of Strawson's argument is very interesting. After rejecting the "disembodied survival" or "the resurrection of the mind" he praises the orthodox for their wisdom in insisting on the resurrection of the body. May be Strawson thinks that the bodies do not decay. Only the minds decay. Consider the final remarks of Strawson, 'At the limit of attenuation there is, *from the point of view of his survival as an individual*, no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation. Disembodied survival, on such terms as these, may well seem unattractive. No doubt it is for this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on the resurrection of the body.'<sup>24</sup> Strawson takes for granted that the disembodied memories would behave in the same fashion as the embodied memories. But neither the disembodied mind behaves in the same fashion as an embodied mind nor the disembodied memories behave in the same fashion as the embodied memories. The aging of body leads to the weakening of the brain-traces or brain-impressions which are causally responsible for the generation of memory experiences. Weak brain traces would lead to the blurring of memory-experiences. The memory problems of the old people are well known. But once memories acquire independence from the brain of the aging body, how would they decay?

Then for the impaired memories we can take the help of Divine Grace. Those who believe in the Resurrection of the body require such a help. The Divine Grace cures the mutilated bodies. Why should it not cure the mutilated memories? Mental disorders are no less significant than the physical disorders. Sometimes prayer is advised as the last medical dose.

The belief in the resurrection of the body is the foundational belief of Christianity. The foundational beliefs are those that require no justification. The demand for justification in their case is absurd. Each religion has its own foundational beliefs. Christianity is one of the several religions. There are other faiths and other religions. The belief in the resurrection of the mind is common to many faiths, particularly of the ancient people. In modern times this belief has attracted the attention of philosophers more than the attention of religious people. The issue of personal identity has led philosophers to this belief. These philosophers are busy in performing all kinds of thought-experiments. They wish to see, for example, whether it is possible for a mind to switch over from one body to the other. Whether it is possible for several bodies to share the same mind, and so on. These thought experiments are quite interesting, but lie beyond the scope of this paper. I have discussed them elsewhere.<sup>25</sup>

#### NOTES

This is the revised version of a paper presented in the ICPR seminar of 'Language, Mind and the Evolution of Consciousness', July 2000, Butler Palace, Lucknow.

1. *Old Testament*, American Bible Society, 1976, Genesis I, p. 4.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Christopher Hookway, *Scepticism*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 42.
4. Wittgenstein, *Notebooks*, p. 82.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Philosophical Investigations*, trs. G.E.M. Anscombe, 281.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Plato, *Republic*, Book X, 620. Plato's view on this issue has been discussed

fully in my recent book, *Wittgenstein : New Perspectives*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2002, chapter I.

9. Russell, *Wisdom of the West*, London, 1959, p. 60.
10. *Ibid.* p. 69.
11. Flew, *Western Philosophy*, London, 1971, p. 127
12. *Wisdom of the West*, p. 21
13. *Ibdi.* p. 12.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Plato, *Phaedo*, 115 C-E.
16. *Wisdom of the West*, p. 11.
17. *Western Philosophy*, p. 376 Italics on 'guru' and 'ashram' are mine.
18. *Wisdom of the West*, p. 38.
19. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, Vol. I., Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 101.
20. Strawson, *Individuals*, Methuen, London, Paperback, 1959, p. 116
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116
22. *Ibid.*, p. 116
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. I have discussed these thought-experiments in my book *Identity and Thought Experiments*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1977.