
Louis Chartrand, Université du Québec à Montréal


Only Friends, despite the rumors Philosophy of mind's Consciousness & Intentionality

Wedge Philosophy...


Traditional philosophy of mind has been operating under the assumption of a mild form of ontological dualism.



Philosophy of mind has largely been drawing a picture of the mind as a sort of exception to normal laws of physics.



Yet, the mind must be realized by physical stuff.



The capacity of a mental state to have content is analysed in this light

(Brentanien) Intentionality

Faculty of the mind which enables something, like a mental state, to be about something else.

(Minimal) Consciousness


That which feels; the subject of phenomenal experience. In relation to intentional content: that to which it is presented.

There is a sense that they must be studied together

Searle (1991): consciousness is implicit in intentionality. It is the relatum to which intentionality relates its object.

Intentionality Naturalized

Symbol Grounding



For a mental state to be about something else, it must be grounded in the world with sensorimotor interactions.

A machine could not produce intentionality if it did not have sensorimotor faculties.

Evolutionary Robotics

Furnish models of cognitive systems which seem to lack implementation of a proper symbolic representational system, in the traditional sense of the word, yet present intelligent behaviour

Anti-representationalism

Systems can be described using representational or non-representational descriptions, but the latter involves postulating extra entities (nomological danglers)

Reinterpreting Content

"Minimal" Representations

Response to anti-representationalism Non-traditional type of representation to account for successes of evolutionary robotics

→ Components of a system which embody information about something, and which are responsible for behaviour towards this object.

Not discrete and identifiable thing

Boundary agnostic **Representation**

Information-poor *Not strongly instructional* on its application

Non-decouplable Dependant on context and

Naturalized Intentionality

Actively involved

in action & perception

The concept of intentionality implied in minimal representations:

- A disposition, a coupling or a set of processes, but not a relation
- Violates particularism of the mind
- Made to be applied to machines

A priori connection with consciousness is broken

Cognitive processes involves

processes that span accross

dynamical systems theory.

localized at all)

Transcranial Ontology in Cognitive Science

Some cognitive functions are best explained

using holistic terms and frameworks, such as

In the holistic systems described by such

into the environment (when they can be

frameworks, the smallest units may extend

brain, body and world.

Understanding content and representation involves more than just the mind.

Recruitement

Principle of Ecological Assembly

To perform their functions at the lowest energy cost possible, organisms recruit resources from the environment

→ Applies to cognition in particular

"The canny cognizer tends to recruit, on the spot, whatever mix of problem-solving Recruits resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of effort." (Clark, 2008, 13) Ecosystem Body Mind Give proper function


Ecology and Proper Function

An organism's faculties are to be understood in relation with the organism itself, its ecosystem and its evolutionary history (Millikan 1984)

- Something's proper function is defined by its contribution to them
- Thus an organism's faculties depend on external environment in order to function

Boundaries

If a boundary is relevant for a form of description, it by no means guarantees it is relevant for another form of description.



From Wimsatt (2007). Philosophy for Limited Being, p. 1999

Embodied / Extended Mind

Mental processes, if they do not extend into body and environment, rely heavily on them.

Consciousness Trivialized

Consciousness in Embodied Science

Consciousness Discontinuity



Minimal consciousness is an either/or concept: either you are subject of phenomenal experience (even minimally) or you aren't.

Fuzzy categories of embodied cognition make it harder to accomodate consciousness

Stance and Reality



One might think consciousness should transcend the descriptive stance used to account for phenomena

→ However, current cognitive ontological categories are different whether one adopts a dynamical or an information-processing descriptive stance

Emergence, 2008, sculpture by Sayaka Kajita G

Emergence

Consciousness as emerging from interactions between mind, body and

 \rightarrow It may explain, to a certain degree, content and quality of experience

But consciousness entailed by physical interactions?

→ Extra hypothesis: plays no role in explaining content of experience

 \Rightarrow Therefore it is *ad hoc*

(Similar things can be said of many enterprises to explain consciousness)

Disclaimer

ightened when the bottom fell out of her wateroans don't make any sense, and I don't feel what's going on?" "Well you see," Roshi replied, "for most

ends to reinforce our undesirable dependency on

people, and especially for most educated people ike you and I, what we perceive and experience is heavily mediated, through language and concepts that are deeply ingrained in our ways of thinking and feeling. Our objective here is to induce in ourselves and in each And the student was enlightened

> - David Chess, "Broken Koans and Other Zen Debris" http://www.davidchess.com/words/BrokenKoans.html