Abstract
Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that the natural sciences can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not about their categorical properties, and, moreover, that our qualia are constituted by categorical properties. Recently, Stoljar (Philos Phenomenol Res 62:253–281, 2001a), Stoljar (Philos Perspect 15:393–413, 2001b), Strawson (Real materialism: and other essays, Oxford, New York, 2008), Montero (J Conscious Stud 17:70–83, 2010), Montero (in: Alter and Nagasawa (eds) Consciousness in the physical world: perspectives on Russellian monism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015), Alter and Nagasawa (J Conscious Stud 19:67–95, 2012), and Chalmers (in: Alter and Nagasawa (eds) Consciousness in the physical world: perspectives on Russellian monism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015) have attempted to develop this doctrine into a version of physicalism. Russellian monism faces the so-called combination problem, according to which it is difficult to see how categorical properties could collectively constitute qualia. In this paper, I suggest that there is an insufficiently discussed aspect of the combination problem which I call the difference-maker problem. Taking the difference-maker problem into account, I argue that the combination problem—whether or not it can be solved—results in a dilemma for the project of developing Russellian physicalism. That is, Russellian monism is either physicalistically unacceptable or it is implausible; hence, Russellian monism and physicalism are incompatible.
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Notes
Some philosophers use the term ‘intrinsic properties’ here instead. But this terminological difference does not affect the substance of Russellian monism nor the argument I will put forward.
Note that I am saying that existing conceptions of physicalism and the physical can be divided into the two families according to their strategies, not that any idea that shares one of the two strategies automatically counts as a conception of physicalism. A related distinction is found in Stoljar (2001a, b), in which he distinguishes between a ‘theory-based conception’ and an ‘object-based conception’. The two families of conceptions I identify are, however, much more inclusive than the two conceptions Stoljar identifies.
This is a variant of Copp’s (2012, p. 28) term, ‘the disciplinary characterisation’.
Of course, a quale cannot literally be purple. By a purple quale, I mean a quale of sensing purple.
For a different but related problem, see Chalmers (2017). Chalmers classifies several versions of the combination problem, one of which is the palette problem, namely the problem of how our wide variety of qualia can be generated using relatively few constituents. While the difference-maker problem is related to the palette problem and may even be considered a version of it, the two problems are not identical. The palette problem, just like the combination problem, is wide-ranging and does not particularly concern differences in underlying material composition, even though a comprehensive solution to the palette problem should consist of a solution to the difference-maker problem. For example, Roelofs (2014) discusses the palette problem of, say, how a blue quale and a red quale can be ‘mixed’ into a purple quale. This kind of palette problem is not directly relevant to our discussion here.
There are at least two ways to understand the idea of the Leibnizian gap. Levine's (1983, 2001) concerns an epistemic, explanatory gap between qualia and the physical, whereas Chalmers's (1996, 2010) concerns a metaphysical, constitutional gap between the two. According to the idea of the epistemic, explanatory gap, we cannot possibly know how structures and dynamics can constitute qualia; according to the idea of the metaphysical, constitutional gap, structures and dynamics cannot possibly constitute qualia. These ideas are closely related and may support each other—for example, Chalmers uses the former to support the latter—but they are nonetheless different. In what follows, I will focus on the idea of a metaphysical, constitutional gap, since this is the gap that really counts against classical physicalism.
It is debatable whether there are some common, universally shared phenomenal features, such as some phenomenal subjectivity or ‘for-me-ness’, among the variety of ‘what-is-it-likeness’ (see, e.g. Block 1995; Kriegel 2007; but see Liang 2015; Chadha 2018). However, my argument still proceeds as long as there are some distinctive phenomenal features to be found in each kind of quale.
Alter and Nagasawa (2012) offer a similar argument for the conclusion that Russellian emergentism is not theoretically virtuous. However, their argument should not be taken to be identical to mine: it is one thing to say that Russellian emergentism is physicalistically unacceptable and another to say that it is not theoretically virtuous.
For a related discussion, see Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007).
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Acknowledgements
I presented this paper at Nanjing University, National Chung Cheng University, National Tsing Hua University, the 2nd Joint Workshop of NTU-Kyoto at National Taiwan University, Artificial Intelligence Beyond Now at Nagoya University of Foreign Studies, and Workshop on Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind at Huaqiao University. I would like to thank the participants for helpful discussions. For further comments, I am grateful to Eran Asoulin, Tim Bayne, David Braddon-Mitchell, Belinda Calderone, Duen-min Deng, Michael Duncan, Nihel Jhou, Kok-Yong Lee, James Norton, Graham Oppy, Ryoji Sato, Simon Varey, Christian Wenzel, Wai-hung Wong, and an anonymous reviewer. I am also grateful to Caleb Liang and Jeu-Jeng Yuann for their helpful administrative support to this research project. Special thanks are due to Belinda Rickard.
Funding
Funding was provided by Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan (Grant Number MOST108-2410-H-002-241-MY3).
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Chan, LC. Russellian physicalism and its dilemma. Philos Stud 178, 2043–2062 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01522-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01522-y