

The American “You Probably Know”: On Chomsky, United States, and the Failed States*

Arup K. CHATTERJEE, *PhD Candidate,*
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, India
chatterjeearup.k@gmail.com

Abstract

Alleged by his detractors “Cold War Geopolitics” was verily a formative ground of Chomsky’s analyses, nevertheless, his work is a recycling of a set historical methodology, which has yet to be fully understood. It is characteristically convenient to perceive Chomsky’s contribution to the American Empire Project as being in succession to the American legacy of dissension to and distanciation from political and cultural hegemony. It is ironic that such a stance of subversion of hegemonic laws and the natural universal exceptionalism of America comes from the chief positivist of linguistics. In other words, reading Chomsky will be more challenging once his oeuvre is classified under modern ‘integralist’ history, furthermore even as postcolonial theory. Neither has Noam Chomsky nor his activities in the recent American Empire Project enabled policy advisers to ascertain methods to democratically sustain a “political system made up of subcultures.” While both The American Empire Project and Chomsky seek to restore the Edenic veneer to America the latter’s discipline ranges to far beyond the borders of his nation. It is this fibre of individualism and universalism that makes him only more American. Several writings by Chomsky begin by reaffirm the idyllic and unprecedented American influence of the post-War era, and ending in the wake of changing world demography of political alignments the American Gestalt history reflects in the psychic anxiety of the American Empire Project of the expanding frontiers America is faced with as an outcome of its own political misdemeanour. Failed States and the Chomskyan American Empire Project domesticates U.S. politics, infusing its blood-ridden history into the (collective) political

* The title borrowed from the heading of a letter by Eliot Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State at Washington DC. The letter was provoked by Chomsky’s first article on the Index of Censorship. It contained as follows:

You probably know about Chomsky: he is a fanatical defender of the PLO who has set new standards for intellectual dishonesty and personal vindictiveness in his writings about the Middle East. There really isn’t anyone left in the U.S.—without regard to politics—who takes Chomsky seriously in view of his astonishing record. I therefore find it inexplicable that he is given fully three pages to go on with his attack on one of the freest presses in the world (See Noam Chomsky, *Pirates and Emperors, Old and New: International Terrorism in the Real World* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 104.

unconscious of the middle class urbanite's brunch-settee ethic, with the refurbishment of American innocence in a natural teleology. It is the catalyst to ignite civil leisure with social revolution.

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It might arguably be one's own oblique impression that the only images of huge crowds of American civilians that readily attract our memory are those from during years of American crises. Mario Savio courting arrest in front of ten thousand students at Berkeley in June of 1964, and Philp Ochs singing "Oh I marched to the Battle of New Orleans / And the end of the early British War," (both from the documentary film *Berkeley in the Sixties*) are possibly the signature signs in that chain. The welcoming back of Vietnam War soldiers in front of the Empire State Building (in a scene from the film *Forrest Gump*) was yet another. In each case it was an anti-U.S. campaign. Reading *Failed States* clarifies these initial reflections not be that oblique after all.

Pondering over the labeling of Noam Chomsky's political dissidence by his critics as an "out-dated Geopolitics of the Cold War"¹ I discovered a certain issue, from during the Cold War years, of *Daedalus*.² Subtitled as "Dialogues," the issue began with the transcripts of a session on New Historical Trends from a conference held at the Boston House of the Academy. Participants to the dialogue were seventeen professors, chiefly from European and American Universities. Not long before this conference had the U.S. witnessed large-scale anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, the Berkeley and the Hippie counter-culture movements, the Black Panthers, the Civil Rights and the Feminist Movements. It will be a matter of some time before I fully draw the connection between Chomsky's *Failed States* and the said conference. Presently I shall only surmise that the alleged "Cold War Geopolitics" was verily a formative ground of Chomsky's analyses, nevertheless, his work is a recycling of a set historical methodology, which has yet to be fully understood.

It is characteristically convenient to perceive Chomsky's contribution to the American Empire Project as being in succession to the American legacy of dissension to and distancing from political and cultural hegemony. It is ironic that such a stance of subversion of hegemonic laws and the natural universal

¹ Stephen McCloskey, "Military Humanism," *Fortnight* 393 (2001): 21.

² *Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, "Dialogues" 98, 4, Fall (1969).

exceptionalism of America comes from the chief positivist of linguistics. Whether this formulaic premise is reductive of Chomsky's stature as a policy scientist is not as significant a concern as how little this adds to an understanding of alternate trends in history as policy science. In other words, reading Chomsky will be more challenging once his oeuvre is classified under modern 'integralist' (to use Charles Tilly's phrase)³ history, furthermore even as postcolonial theory. In doing so I have kept from Chomsky the customary designation of social scientist, for I believe his writings pay only a minor fealty to social theory. In a way I am presupposing that criticizing the American Empire does not reduce Americanism, if not reinforce it. However, what passes off under the rubric of a *U. S. Foreign Policy Critique* is essentially one

*...history (in) unity. Everything that happens affects everything in some infinitesimal way... It is a kind of a Gestalt — everything is related to everything else and you cannot understand anything unless you understand everything and see the total configuration. Separating something out from the totality necessarily distorts this Gestalt.*⁴

Needless to say this *Gestalt* history ostensibly qualifies as American history. Take for instance the blurbs on the covers of *Failed States*. One illustrates Chomsky as "America's most useful citizen, while the very first blurb quotes *The New York Times* Book Review as: "It's hard to imagine any American reading this book and not seeing his country in a new and deeply troubling light." Let us here examine what Cold War research, or more specifically, what Chomskian theses on U. S. policies have enabled. Both, to our understanding, have not revealed any recurrent lifestyle patterns of peoples within the ambit of the civil, poetic or libidinal, nor have they generated resolutions toward ending of inter-state differences in adherence to International Law. Neither has the recent American Empire Project enabled policy advisers to ascertain methods to democratically sustain a "political system made up of subcultures."⁵ The Cold War is extremely significant in the global arena, even in embryo nations of Eastern Europe and Africa. However the research emanating out of it can be of no more use than evincing a sense of their being proxy-war spaces, among the likes of Guantanamo, Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Lebanon, Chile or Palestine. It is worth asking how different these common battlegrounds are from British India which was covertly made the site of The Great Game between England and Russia. As Kim learns in Rudyard Kipling's eponymous novel, "the Great Game is so large that one sees but

³ Its validity in contemporary historiography was emphasized by Lee Benson during the conference. The term is taken from Charles Tilly memorandum to the *Daedalus* conference.

⁴ Lee Benson, in *Daedalus*, 891.

⁵ *Daedalus*, 902.

a little at a time.”⁶ This is where Chomsky becomes so momentous in his indiscriminate cataloguing of America’s frontier playfields. Consider the case of Princeton mathematician John Nash, whose extraordinary career suffers due to his schizophrenia, contracted in being caught in the state’s overarching surveillance and desiring machinery.

Beginning with President Carter’s infamous denial of any moral debt to Vietnam (a site which formatively inspired Chomsky’s theses) owing to America’s “being on the losing side,”⁷ and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s condemning of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the fourth greatest social holocaust, Chomsky goes on to expose American foreign policy as a tradition of alibi politics, and false-flag to soft-target operations.⁸ He then quotes bathetically, one senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Max Boot:

*Europe has been driven by avarice and the cynical Europeans cannot comprehend the strain of idealism that animates U.S. foreign policy. After 200 years Europe still hasn’t figured what makes America tick.*⁹

Although facetious, the question that puzzles Europe, as Boot considers, is a very interesting one, within the methodology I have adopted in reading *Failed States*. Before asking whether The American Empire Project or Chomsky *are* in favour of this ticking or against it, other fundamental questions arise. For instance what does the phrase “failed states” imply? Chomsky borrows the term from contemporary political parlance. “Failed States” is a modification of “outlaw states” which was coined by John Rawls, in his description of spaces outside of the “society of democratic peoples” which do not subscribe to the “Law of Peoples,” which involves commitments “to observe treaties and undertakings, to recognize all are equal and parties to the agreements that bind them, to reject the use of force for reasons other than self defense, and to honour human rights.”¹⁰ “Failed States” now generally refers to those regimes which U.S.A. has (or seeks to) re(dis)place with puppet rulers functioning under its own aegis. However, Chomsky easily inverts the implication of the phrase to a referent, that is, the (Failed) States of America.

⁶ Rudyard Kipling, *Kim* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1987), 217.

⁷ Noam Chomsky, “Visions of Righteousness,” *Cultural Critique* 3, American Representations of Vietnam (1986): 11.

⁸ An argument further qualified by David Ray Griffin in his essay “9/11” earlier delivered as a lecture was on March 30, 2006, at Grand Lake Theater in Oakland for Progressive Democrats of the East Bay.

⁹ Noam Chomsky, *Failed States* (New York: Owl Books, Henry & Holt Co. 2007), 35.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 39.

While the Act III of Nuremberg Tribunal required the execution of German foreign ministers for the preemptive attacks on Germany, U.S. blueprints of staged self-immolations, such as the plan to perform a marine explosion of U.S. warships near Nicaragua, by president Kennedy's adviser, as an alibi to initiate attack from its bases in Honduras, pass palpably unnoticed. Further, having enforced with its allies a no-fly-zone over northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish population from Saddam Hussein, U.S.A. supplied jets and attack helicopters to target the same population. The list goes on to include extradition refusals by United States and hiring of the very convicts of international crimes (Luis Posada and Emmanuel Constant), arbitrary pardons granted to international criminals (Orlando Bosch exempted by Bush II), detention of Haitian refugees and Cuban prisoners in Egypt and Guantanamo instead of cellars of New York or Sweden, U.S. sponsored violence in Lebanon, East Timor and Chile, and Bill Clinton's breach of U.S. pact with Mikhail Gorbachev in extending NATO to former members of Warsaw pact, east of reunited Germany, thereby compelling East-Europe to nuclear abolition. Chomsky is quick to discern farce in talks of a "New World Order," which presupposes the existence of an "Old World Order,"¹¹ which began with the end of World War II. The latter ended with America emerging as world superpower "without a historical precedent," in possession of over fifty per cent of the world's wealth. Reiterating Walter Lippman, Chomsky notes that everything that moderates violence in defence of the elite and consenting to state authority leads to newer techniques of "manufacture of consent." In the face of state policies turning indefensible proper indoctrination of the metropolitan inhabitants is left to the "historical engineering" of American historians and media. Although the U.S. News media is usually antagonistic to U.S. foreign policy "institutional filters operate to ensure that the criticisms made generally stay with" a desired insular reach of political elites and academicians who "buttress" American cultural elitism.¹² Arif Dirlik marks the *Harvard Business Review* as the foremost

¹¹ Chomsky continues, "Political and economic elites were well aware of these facts, and, not surprisingly, set about to organize a world system favorable to their interests-although they also recognized, quite explicitly, that more noble rhetoric would be useful for propaganda purposes." Noam Chomsky, "After the Cold War: U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *Cultural Critique*, 19, *The Economies of War* (1991): 16.

¹² Eric Herring and Piers Robinson, "Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chomsky on the Study of the News Media and US Foreign Policy," *Review of International Studies* 29 (2003): 533. Also see Chomsky's "Scholarship and Ideology: American Historians as «Experts in Legitimation»," *Social Scientist* 1, 7 (1973): 21.

advocates of transnationalism and multiculturalism in the United States.¹³ What his discipline does not record is the paranoia of Third World nationalism¹⁴ behind the façade of a celebration of transculturalism in First World academia. Reported as a benign history and Newspeak is America's peace process in Palestine which Chomsky likens to Hitler's peace pursuits of 1939.¹⁵ He begins his 1972 talk (delivered at Jawaharlal Nehru University) "Scholarship and Ideology: American Historians as «Experts in Legitimation»" with an episode of the President of American Historical Association urging the audience to abandon "«dispassionate behaviourism» and «the liberal neutral attitude» in research and to accept their «social responsibilities» as historians."¹⁶ Here I must make a disclaimer, regarding the *Daedalus* historians mentioned earlier, that whether they belonged to the complicit orthodoxy from which America sought historical revisionism is a matter of little consequence in my paper. The methodologies handed down from that conference alone are of significance to us. Let us go back, hence, to the concept of *Gestalt* history which I had tacitly suspected Mr. Chomsky to be consolidating through his writings. What possibilities can the reproduction of a vast database from post-World War II U.S. politics suggest to a Third World civilian or (as the covers address) the American citizen?

On the face of it, Chomsky's scheme appears as a *denunciation* of antique foundational myths of capitalism and imperialism, which have acquired postmodern dimensions of internationalism, humanist interventionism, military humanism and globalization in U.S. policies. Such a documenting according to postcolonial historian Gyan Prakash, is "disposable fiction" for postcolonial history cannot afford to repeat "the (very) history we seek to displace."¹⁷ During my assessment of *Failed States* I had been reading Homi Bhabha's essay *Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817*, that led me to an interesting problem. Chomsky's *denunciation* of U.S. Governance that I have spoken of could be complicated into a deferral of *enunciation* within a "(neo) colonial articulation... and a dis-play of *différance*."¹⁸

¹³ Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," in *Contemporary Postcolonial Theory*, ed. Padmini Mongiaed, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 314.

¹⁴ Chomsky, "After the Cold War," 28.

¹⁵ Noam Chomsky, "Thought Control in the US: The Media and the «Peace Process»" *MERIP Middle East Report*, 143, *Nuclear Shadow over the Middle East* (1986): 25.

¹⁶ Chomsky, "Scholarship and Ideology," 20.

¹⁷ Gyan Prakash, "Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography," *Social Text*, 31/32, *Third World and Post-Colonial Issues* (1992): 13.

¹⁸ Homi K. Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree outside Delhi, May 1817," *Critical Inquiry* 12, 1, *Race* (1985): 150.

Such an articulation is obviously different from the classical Hegelian master / slave dialectic. However it is very possibly, apropos the socio-cultural consequences and responses that Chomsky's political writings elicit, a double inscription of imperial authority, be it "hallowed" or "hollowed." Chomsky can be read, although in a meretricious way, to be not just in dialogue with American self-consolidation but also in correspondence with it, that is, not merely antagonistic but agonistic to U.S. policy. The high ambivalence of this principle will be clearer on conflating the following hypotheses:

whenever any writing both marks and goes back over its mark with an undecidable stroke ... [this] double mark escapes the pertinence or authority of truth: it does not overturn it but rather inscribes it within its play as one of its functions or parts. This displacement does not take place, has not taken place once as an event. It does not occupy a simple place. It does not take place in writing. This dis-location (is what) writes/is written¹⁹

after two hijacked jets slammed into New York's Twin Towers on September 11 2001. Chomsky wrote that although the Al Qaeda assaults on America were atrocities they were not on the same scale of Bill Clinton's bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory at the height of the Lewinsky scandal... What is certain is that on Planet Chomsky the Iranian Mullahs would have the bomb; East Timor would still be under Indonesian rule; the Taliban would be imposing the most insane form of Sharia law on Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein and his extended criminal family would be in charge of Iraq and the clear truths about the genocides in Cambodia and China would be blurred and twisted.²⁰

One may derive here that U.S. power politics and Chomsky's censure of it are not separate discourses; they do not constitute two worldviews but are essentially comprised by one unfinished (and deferred) event. Although this is the direction I had myself taken, I now hold it as a populist recourse, arrived at through circuitous deconstruction, thus meretricious, as observed before.

What Bhabha and Derrida were trying to expose was the ambivalence of colonial history codified and modified by the invader's interpolations of new myths, in non-metropolitan tracts of history. Chomsky, on the other hand makes a series of uncivil disclosures to the metropolitan reader; a representment of the Kurtzian horror within the drawing rooms of the Intended average citizen of America. With this realization Tilly and Benson's notions seemed all the more crucial now. By and large I had to suspend my prior suspicions. Chomsky's complicity in U.S. affairs is only partially and subliminally true. Partially, because Chomsky, not alone but under the canon of The American Empire Project,

¹⁹ Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: Continuum, 1981), 190.

²⁰ Henry McDonald, "The Chomsky File," *Fortnight* 441 (2006): 14.

becomes institutionalized into a guild of writers. A major alteration of Chomsky owing to this is an apparent homogenization of his inconsistencies.²¹ For example, even until 1980s he disputed claims of over a million deaths under an atrocious Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and approved instead of the vindictive evacuation of Phnom Penh during 1975, for he believed it kept the refugees away from 1976 rice crop failure. Chomsky remained opposed to military intervention against Khmer Rouge's autocracy in Cambodia, as he was to the military interventions in East Timor which had been subject to a death toll of 75000 plus in 1975 at the hands of Indonesians sponsored by Ford Administration. What I am arguing is that in being part of The American Empire Project Chomsky is not bereft of the paradoxes that besot its very nomenclature. Does the Project at all intend to do away with the appellation of Empire, or in doing so seek to broadcast its insignia? Or to euphemize or expurgate? Let us see how Project defines itself.

*The American Empire Project is a response to the changes that have occurred in America's strategic thinking as well as in its military and economic posture. Empire, long considered an offense against America's democratic heritage, now threatens to define relationship between our country and the rest of the world.*²²

The Project aspires to be the locus of dissents raging from within America and thus is a framework internal to the U.S. Clearly, it is inward looking, and does not make any pretence of internationalism. One may even make a case of the Project though visibly a *post* of a non-existent Empire is also a *post* to the same idea of Empire. Chomsky's concern, I believe, lies elsewhere. As regards the subliminal (again involuntary) complicity, it can be easily seen how the U.S. media can utilize Chomsky both favourably and unfavourably to neutralize the sweeping clash of civilization theories of Samuel Huntington.

Before the collapse of Soviet Russia Huntington explained its threat to the U.S. by endorsing intervention or other military action "in such a way as to create the misimpression that it is the Soviet Union you are fighting."²³ By the mid-1990s he conjectured the impending "Clash of Civilizations" primarily between Christian and Islamic orders. Chomsky comes nearly as a saving grace with his alternate viewpoint, and cold rationalistic reliance on facts, which lead to his thesis: radicalization of Islam owes more to America than to Osama bin Laden. American

²¹ The representative US anger against Chomsky is poignant in "Noam Chomsky during last month's visit to the Irish Republic was reported to have said that Iran would be «crazy» if it didn't try and acquire nuclear weapons. To which those still on the side of the Enlightenment might reply: the western world would be equally «crazy» to listen to Chomsky and to let the Mullahs in Tehran obtain the Bomb" (*Ibidem*).

²² Chomsky, *Failed States*, 314.

²³ *Ibidem*, 103.

exceptionalism is the obverse behind which lurk its dangerous ambitions of forging democracy from "outside" in states it perceives as failed. Is it not rather relieving for U.S. about the way its politics is perceived by its citizenry and the Third World intellectuals that "the Great Satan in Chomsky's eyes remains his native country"?²⁴ The "dispassionate behaviourism" that American history has lacked abounds in Chomsky's political writings. It was yet a final re-assessment he needed. Frequently, Chomsky tempts the reader to think that his catalogues of U.S. offense are a source of a childlike delight to him, especially when his expression grow as effortless as

*In December 2002, Jack Straw, then foreign minister, released a dossier of Saddam's crimes. It was drawn almost entirely from the period of firm U.S.-U.K. support, a fact overlooked with the usual display of moral integrity.*²⁵

Surprisingly, this is the most serious and innocent aspect of Mr. Chomsky. He begins one of his essays on U.S. policies quite wittily detaching himself from all "isms" except truism. As a matter of fact all of Chomsky's linguistic and political writings originate from a simple yet elegant root of the ability to "generate sentences from a grammar" and articulate awareness that is intrinsic to humans. According to him the radical theory is a "misnomer."²⁶ Chomsky revisions it as a truism which does not mean extremism but an action that returns one to the "roots of human experience."²⁷ This in the American experience stands for the myth of the fecund garden and its idealized "frontier farmers" toiling in "blissful labour."²⁸ This is what is also witnessed in the construction of the People's Park (the communal Eden of 1968) during the Civil Rights Movement.

While both *The American Empire Project* and Chomsky seek to restore the Edenic veneer to America the latter's discipline ranges to far beyond the borders of his nation. It is this fibre of individualism and universalism that makes him only more American. The founding of America was preceded by the foundering of the Indian civilization. It is this collective national guilt that vents itself in bifurcated streams of George W. Bush's cowboyism²⁹ in frontier landscapes of western genre

²⁴ McDonald, "The Chomsky File," 14.

²⁵ Noam Chomsky, "Invasion as Marketing Problem: The Iraq War and Contempt for Democracy," *Mississippi Review* 32, 3 (2004): 89.

²⁶ Robert F. Barsky, *Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1998), 96.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ Gaylord C. LeRoy, "American Innocence Reconsidered," *The Massachusetts Review* 4, 4 (1963): 625.

²⁹ See Robert Kagan's dismissive reference to Europeans as being from Venus and Americans from Mars, in *Failed States*. He adds, "The soft Europeans believe in old fashioned notions like criminal

and Noam Chomsky's re-cognition of the inescapable fall(s) of orphaned Adam(s) in quest of phalluses for its widowed motherland.

The paranoia of Third World nationalism in the case of one translates as a shivering delight in fostering the same in another. Present America exists in an interstice between these two articulations of anxiety.

The anxiety of displacement that troubles national rootedness transforms ethnicity or cultural difference into an ethical relation that serves as a subtle corrective to valiant attempts to achieve representativeness and moral equivalence in the matter of minorities.³⁰

This representativeness of Chomsky in voicing the rights of the silenced failed states in the middle and far-east takes the form of even hastening the Adamic fall thereby approximating resurrection. There is a definite tension in his Afterword to *Failed States* in examining Third World developments such as Iran turning into an anti-West Asian Energy Security Grid, the Venezuela funded large Cuban medical assistance to Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake, when the U.S. displayed relative coolness, and elsewhere where he notes the growing technological sophistry of Asia weaponry and industry in a century which is maturing into an Asian Century.³¹ Undoubtedly, therefore, the American history has assumed global proportions. The question now is: what was the beginning of this history?; when was Eden? For American Civil War historians this Eden was certainly the American Declaration of Human Rights of 1776; for Cold War researchers it was the end of World War II. And this is where Tilly and Benson come in.

One of the main things that has happened methodologically since World War II has been the application of the simple notion that important collective effects can appear in the accumulated experience of considerable numbers of people who themselves do not experience those collective effects as events.³²

Several writings by Chomsky begin by reaffirm the idyllic and unprecedented American influence of the post-War era, and ending in the wake of changing world demography of political alignments the American Gestalt history reflects in the psychic anxiety of the American Empire Project of the expanding frontiers America is faced with as an outcome of its own political misdemeanour.

justice and law. The tough Americas just go ahead and get the job done, as in cowboy movies" (42).

³⁰ Homi K. Bhabha, "On the Irremovable Strangeness of Being Different," *PMLA*, 113, 1, *Ethnicity* (1998): 34.

³¹ Chomsky here supplies theories of Indian political scientist Aijaz Ahmad, and quotes reports from *The Hindu* and *The Frontline*. See in *Failed States*, 256-60.

³² Charles Tilly, in *Daedalus*, 960.

This when felt against the raw chords of an "archaic stability of ontology,"³³ the memory of cultural displacement and cultural difference induces an "archaic cathexis of longing... a defensive reaction to the felt loss (or displacement of) the (othered) object."³⁴ Out of this anxiety is born the quintessential American writer, historian, philosopher, and Chomsky who, as Leslie Fiedler says, is the recorder "of the encounter of the dream of innocence and the fact of guilt, in the only part of the world where the reality of that conflict can still be recognized."³⁵

Failed States and the Chomskyan American Empire Project domesticate U.S. politics, infusing its blood-ridden history into the (collective) political unconscious of the middle class urbanite's brunch-settee ethic, with the refurbishment of American innocence in a natural teleology. It is the catalyst to ignite civil leisure with social revolution. Chomsky looks far outward his nation's boundaries, stretching the frontiers of dissent and freedom of expression in reply to the U.S. hunt for new frontiers of domination. In this integralism he is more American than the American Project itself. Perhaps this is the real answer to Boot's question as to what keeps America ticking.

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³³ Bhabha, "On the Irremovable Strangeness," 35.

³⁴ Sigmund Freud, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, trans. Alix Strachey (New York: Norton, 1989), 66.

³⁵ Fiedler qtd. in LeRoy, "American Innocence Reconsidered," 626.

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