Abstract
Recent theories of agency (sees to it that) of Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff are examined, particularly in the context of an early proposal of the author.
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Nuel D. Belnap,Backwards and forwards in the modal logic of agency, University of Pittsburgh, 3 June 1990.Philosophy and phenomenological research, forthcoming. Belnap presented an earlier version of this paper under the title “The backwards and forwards of the modal logic of agency” at a Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in March 1989.
Nuel D. Belnap,Before refraining: concepts for agency. University of Pittsburgh, 21 September 1989.Erkenntnis, forthcoming.
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Elements of this paper formed the contents of lectures I gave in New Zealand and Australia in 1989. I would like again to thank Graham Oddie at Massey University, in Palmerston North, Jack Copeland at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, John Bacon at the University of Sydney, and Graham Priest at the University of Queensland for their kindness and the gracious receptions they and their colleagues gave me. My thanks go to Graham Oddie and Krister Segerberg, who organized a workshop on “Events, Processes, Actions” at Lake Taupo, New Zealand, in November 1989, and invited me to participate with a preliminary version of this paper. In June 1990, I presented a fuller specimen at the annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, in Wakulla Springs, Florida. Bob Beard at Florida State University organized that splendid gathering, and I am grateful to him for the opportunity to speak at it.
For the past several years, Nuel Belnap has sent me copies and updates of his and Michael Perloff's papers. I would like to record my gratitude to him for this and also, especially, for extended comments on the penultimate draft of the present paper. With a few exceptions, I have not tried to take these into account here; I hope that discussions of points on which we disagree will find their way into print in due course.
I would also like to acknowledge and thank a referee for a number of helpful suggestions.
My largest debt is to Krister Segerberg, who as professor and head of the philosophy department at the University of Auckland invited me to spend a sabbatical autumn (antipodal spring) with him in 1989. It was he who suggested — and then insisted — that I contribute to his seminar on modal logic and agency a session or two on Belnap and Perloff's theories, and then he encouraged me to write this paper. I would like to express my deep gratitude as well to Krister and Anita Segerberg for their hospitality and companionship during my stay in New Zealand.
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Chellas, B.F. Time and modality in the logic of agency. Stud Logica 51, 485–517 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01028972
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01028972