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AESTHETICS OF SURRENDER: LEVINAS AND THE DISRUPTION OF AGENCY IN MORAL EDUCATION

ABSTRACT. Education has long been charged with the task of forming and shaping subjectivity and identity. However, the prevailing view of education as a project of producing rational autonomous subjects has been challenged by postmodern and poststructuralist critiques of substantial subjectivity. In a similar vein, Emmanuel Levinas inverts the traditional conception of subjectivity, claiming that we are constituted as subjects only in responding to the other. In other words, subjectivity is derivative of an existentially prior responsibility to and for the other. His conception of ethical responsibility is thus also a radical departure from the prevailing view of what it means to be a responsible moral agent. In this paper, I use jazz improvisation as a metaphor to focus on three interrelated aspects of ethical responsibility on Levinas's account: passivity, heteronomy, and inescapability. I then point toward some ways in which reframing responsibility and subjectivity along this line might offer new possibilities for conceiving subjectivity and moral agency in education.

KEY WORDS: Emmanuel Levinas, ethical agency, heteronomy, inescapability, jazz improvisation, moral agency, passivity, responsibility

INTRODUCTION

When talking with educators about Emmanuel Levinas's ethics, the discussion inevitably comes round to the question, "So what do we do on Monday morning?" – and, indeed, one of the biggest stumbling blocks in trying to get to grips with Levinas's thought is that he offers no practical advice, no straightforward answers or prescriptions for practice. He claims no recourse to moral principle, no appeal to codes of conduct, nor is there any comfort to be had in adhering to the 'right' norms or virtues or values. Rather, the entire body of Levinas's work can be seen as an attempt to break with Western thought and with the very modes of thinking that have come to characterize ethics as we now know it. Levinas rejects the prevailing construal of subjectivity as sovereign rational autonomy and posits instead that subjectivity is constituted by ethical responsibility to and for the other. Ethics therefore precedes and has priority over ontology, marking morality not as a "branch of philosophy," but rather as "first philosophy" (Levinas, 1969, p. 304). So, in order to understand the



implications of Levinas's ethics for education, we need to suspend the pragmatic question, "What do we do on Monday morning?" long enough to ask: "If, as Levinas says, 'I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible' (1985, p. 101) – that is, if I am I only insofar as I am for-the-other, insofar as I surrender my own freedom to the more primordial call of the other – what remains of moral agency?" For only then can we begin to consider what pedagogy and moral education might look like within a Levinasian framework.

According to Usher and Edwards (1994), education is "very much the dutiful child of the Enlightenment" and "the vehicle by which the Enlightenment ideals of critical reason, humanistic individual freedom and benevolent progress are substantiated and realised" (p. 24). Education, they argue, has been "allotted a key role in the forming and shaping of subjectivity and identity, the task of making people into particular kinds of subject" – specifically self-motivated and self-directing rational subjects capable of exercising their individual agency (pp. 24–25); and learning outcomes currently prescribed by the Ministry of Education here in British Columbia certainly bear this out. At various grade levels, students are required to "propose ways to be self-reliant; . . . describe their individuality within a social group; . . . describe the characteristics of personal autonomy; . . . relate their accomplishments to their sense of personal worth, potential, and autonomy; . . . [and] relate emotional health and well-being to personal productivity and to the workplace."¹ But what would it mean to educate for moral agency if, like Levinas, we were to reject the Enlightenment ideal of the subject as a substantial or mastering center of meaning and see subjectivity as always already constituted by responsibility to and for the other?

I shall begin to take up that question here by looking at three aspects of Levinas's thought on responsibility and subjectivity, working through jazz improvisation as a metaphor. Now, there is certainly nothing new about using improvisation as a metaphor for ethical responsibility. In fact, in "The Discernment of Perception" and other essays in *Love's Knowledge* (1990), Martha Nussbaum recalls Aristotle's use of improvisation as a metaphor to describe people of practical wisdom, particularly insofar as they must "meet the new with responsiveness and imagination" and cultivate "the sort of flexibility and perceptiveness that will permit them . . . to 'improvise what is required' " (p. 71). Nussbaum also draws out the differences between a symphony player and a jazz musician, suggesting that, while the symphony player relies on external commitments and

¹ The full text version of the British Columbia Ministry of Education's Instructional Resource Packages is available online at: <http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/irp/curric/lo.html>.

continuities from the score and the conductor, the jazz player must actively forge continuity in the moment by a double responsibility to both the historical form and the unfolding requirements of the moment (pp. 94–95).

Having said at the outset of this paper that Levinas's entire body of work is an attempt to "unthink" Western philosophy, it might seem odd to choose the same metaphor that is used to illustrate Aristotelian responsibility in order to understand Levinas. But, in addition to receptivity and the capacity to respond in the moment, it seems to me that there are several other qualities of jazz improvisation which make it particularly suitable for our purposes here. First, in the world of jazz improvisation, being responsible means "[a]lways being on the brink of the unknown" (Steve Lacy quoted in Barrett, 2000, p. 232). And similarly, for Levinas, ethical responsibility entails going through what Derrida (2001) calls "a sort of experience of the impossible": "Each time one must invent, not without a concept but by exceeding the concept each time, without any guarantee or certainty" (p. 70). Responsibility is about surrender and openness to the other; about saying "yes" to the otherness of the other; and about suffering through anxious situations not of our own making, but to which we are nonetheless called to respond. I will take up each of these aspects – passivity, heteronomy, and inescapability – in turn; and then, in the second half of the paper, I will look more specifically at some of the ways in which Levinas's reframing of ethical responsibility as the precondition for subjectivity might offer a new way of conceiving moral agency in education.²

Before we begin, however, a word of caution: Although Levinas was fond of saying that his philosophy could be summed up in the simple words, "*Après vous, Monsieur,*" that is, by everyday acts of kindness and hospitality, to reduce his ethics to an appeal for civility and politeness is to grossly misread it. As Colin Davis (1996) notes, "[t]he stakes for Levinas are never higher than when his text appears most unassuming" (p. 79). In reading Levinas, we must remain ever vigilant of the tendency to slide back into traditional ways of thinking. Levinas's use of ordinary words in extraordinary ways is one of the reasons his work is so difficult to comprehend. And while his use of 'the face' is perhaps the most enigmatic example, 'responsibility' poses similar challenges. Levinas divests these words of their common meaning and we are left with "the tension between what we think we understand and the repeated insistence that we have still not yet got the point" (p. 132).

² Two other aspects of Levinas's conception of ethical responsibility which, due to constraints of space, I will not elaborate here are his insistence on asymmetry and unconditional (or infinite) responsibility for the other.

ETHICAL 'AGENCY' ON A LEVINASIAN ACCOUNT

The crucial feature of Levinas's ethics is his claim that responsibility is constitutive of subjectivity and not the other way round. By contrast, in the prevailing conception, moral responsibility is considered an attribute of the already-constituted subject – an aspect, perhaps, of one's ethical identity. But, for Levinas (1981), the self is not a "being endowed with certain qualities called moral which it would bear as a substance bears attributes, or which it would take on as accidents in its becoming" (p. 117). Rather, responsibility for the other is the very nature of subjectivity itself. Levinas inverts the traditional "no other-than-self without a self" to "no self without another who summons it to responsibility" (Ricoeur in Kemp, 1996, p. 46); subjectivity emerges at the site of response. To be a 'self' is therefore to be a subject in the accusative: it is not a matter of 'I think' (I want, I will, I can), but *me voici* (Levinas, 1981, p. 142); and he explains this by way of Moses's response to the appeal of the absolute Other: "God called to him out of the bush, 'Moses, Moses!' and he said, 'Here I am'" (Exodus 3:4).³ Contrary to what would be assumed from the standpoint of moral agency as sovereign rational autonomy, for Levinas, it is only when I come to see that the meaning of my being is in being 'hostage' for the other that I can at last realize what 'I' am (in the nominative) (Miller, 1995, pp. 55–56; Levinas, 1981, p. 117). But what does this mean for notions of moral agency?

Within a conception of subjectivity as responsibility to and for the other, the authentic meaning of one's existence is not the realization of the *conatus essendi*. In other words, my own self-unfolding cannot be the final goal of my life. But Levinas's insistence on radical other-centredness – on being for-the-other – is neither an argument for self-annihilation nor a forfeiture of subjectivity. Rather, insofar as it still makes sense to speak of subjectivity after Levinas, what might be called 'moral agency,' I suggest, is what follows from the subtle shift from *me voici* to responsibility 'accepted'. But 'accepted' here ought to be written under erasure. As Levinas makes clear time and again, responsibility is not a matter of choice or commitment or free will; one is always already consigned to infinite responsibility for the other. However, if one sees 'agency' as the second half of the two-part recognition (a) that subjectivity is irreducibly tied to subjection, and (b) that no one can take my place in the task of

³ The translation of *me voici* to "Here I am" is somewhat misleading. While *me voici* is in the accusative case in French, that pivotal point does not come through in the translation to English. The 'I' in "Here I am" ought, therefore, to be read more like the subjectivity of 'me'.

expiation for others (i.e., that the responsibility is mine alone to bear), then the term ‘agency’, I suggest, still holds.

RESPONSIBILITY AND IMPROVISATION

Arguably, the most important aspect of Levinas’s account of ethical responsibility is the notion of passivity, which is also essential to jazz improvisation. At first blush, however, passive responsibility might sound like a paradox. Even if one discards the economy of rights and responsibilities for a different conception of responsibility – say, the ability to respond – it remains the active side of morality. As Blanchot (1995) says, ‘responsible’ is a term which is typically reserved for the “mature, lucid, conscientious man [sic], who acts with circumspection, who takes into account all elements of a given situation, calculates and decides. . . . the successful man of action” (p. 25).

Blanchot’s description highlights the standard distinction in moral theory between activity and passivity, between what I make happen by my actions and what I allow to happen by my inaction. A simple example is Jonathan Bennett’s (1995) account of “Push/Stayback” wherein, in the case of “Push,” an originally stationary car rolls off a cliff because the agent gives it a push to start it rolling. In “Stayback,” however, the vehicle is already rolling toward the cliff edge, but the agent does nothing to stop it, even though he could (perhaps by placing a rock in front of one of the tires) (p. 106). The agent’s intervening action is the crucial factor; in exercising his agency, there is a different outcome from what would have happened in the so-called ‘natural’ course of events. However, this traditional distinction between action and passion is not what is being invoked here. As Levinas (1981) says, “Substitution is not an act; it is a passivity inconvertible into an act, the hither side of the act-passivity alternative” (p. 117).

In jazz improvisation, passivity takes the form of what Frank Barrett (2000) calls an “aesthetic of surrender” – a letting go or suspending of deliberation and conscious striving (p. 236). Returning for a moment to Nussbaum’s (1990) account of Aristotelian responsibility, passivity is described there as the “willingness to . . . take up a posture of agency that is porous and susceptible of influence” (p. 180). Levinas (1981) uses similar language, speaking of passivity as being affected, touched, and sensitive to (to the point of being potentially wounded by) the other (pp. 48–50). However, he uses these terms in a radically different way. On Aristotle’s account, passivity derives from a prior constellation of free will, choice, and consent or denial. The agent chooses or consents to passivity, which

presupposes that she can also refuse it. In other words, passivity is seen to concern the actions of an already-conscious, substantial or mastering center of meaning. For Levinas, on the other hand, passivity cannot be chosen; it precedes any possibility of choice: “This passivity is more passive still than any receptivity, in which for philosophers the supreme model of the passivity of the subject resides” (1981, p. 48). For Levinas, our very subjectivity – that is, our very constitution as individual ‘I’s – is a function of an existentially prior responsibility: one becomes an ‘I’ by being subject *to* the other.

In concrete terms, for Aristotle, ethics is primarily about maximizing virtue. The Aristotelian agent acts responsibly toward the other because it is the ‘right’ or virtuous thing to do; it is a means of furthering one’s self-identity as an ethical agent. The virtuous act thus returns finally to the actor. Levinas’s insistence on the primacy of the other, however, means that subjectivity can never be for-itself prior to being for-the-other; and it is this sustained privileging of the other, I suggest, that leads to a more robust expression of ethical responsibility than is possible on a traditional account.

Closely related to Levinas’s conception of passivity is the notion of heteronomy – specifically the Hebraic idea that to be free is to be bound. However, this construal makes no sense within a conception of freedom as autonomy. Heteronomy is typically thought to be the very antithesis of moral agency. But the freedom of the one whose very selfhood lies in the act of answering the call of the other is precisely the freedom of the Levinasian ‘agent’. In other words, while traditional conceptions of ethics emphasize rational autonomy as the hallmark of moral agency, Levinas insists on ‘essential’ or ‘fundamental’ heteronomy – on the idea that selfhood is at its most fundamental level a reply, a saying “yes” to the appeal and contestation of the other.

However, saying “yes” to the other in the sense that Levinas uses it ought not to be confused with the kind of affirmation that Nel Noddings, for example, calls for in her ethics of care – that is, as “an act of affirming and encouraging the best in others” (1992, p. 25). Rather, what Levinas is after is something much more radical. For Levinas, saying “yes” to the other is a double affirmation wherein the “yes” comes prior to any consent on the part of the subject and re-emerges in the ethical actions that come after. Saying “yes,” for Levinas (1981), is an act of “supreme passivity” and “an abandon of the sovereign and active subjectivity” (p. 47). It means seeing subjectivity as answerability to the “pre-original” exposure and critique of the other; and it is a double affirmation in that traces and echoes

of the “pre-original yes” are to be found in every act of hospitality and service that follows.

I see something similar at work in the “musical save” of jazz improvisation. When another player makes an error, a good improviser takes up the wrong note in such a way as to say “yes” to the other. Herbie Hancock recalls that when Miles Davis heard him play a wrong chord, Davis simply played his solo around the wrong notes, making them sound correct, intentional, and sensible (in Barrett, 2000, p. 239). And Paul Berliner (1994) tells the story of a renowned pianist who recounted “the relief he felt during a performance when he missed several keys he intended to hit, and Charlie Parker exclaimed, ‘I hear you . . .’” (p. 382). What both Davis and Parker exemplify in these moments, I suggest, is the fundamentally heteronomous nature of subjectivity. Their actions bear witness to a recognition that being a jazz improviser is itself derivative of an existentially prior responsibility to and for the other. One is constituted *as a jazz player* at the site of response, in saying to the other, “Here I am.”

The salient point here is that the ‘I’ does not become aware of the necessity to respond as if it were a decision to be made; rather “the ‘I’ is, by its *very position*, responsibility through and through” (Levinas, 1996b, p. 17). As Levinas says in an interview with Richard Kearney, “as soon as I acknowledge that it is ‘I’ who am responsible, I accept that my freedom is anteceded by an obligation to the other. Ethics redefines subjectivity as this heteronomous responsibility, in contrast to autonomous freedom” (Levinas & Kearney, 1986, p. 27).

Heteronomy is thus also connected to Levinas’s insistence that we are responsible even for that which we do not will or intend:

In putting out my hand to approach a chair, I have creased the sleeve of my jacket. I have scratched the floor, I have dropped the ash from my cigarette. In doing what I wanted to do, I have done so many things I did not want. The act has not been pure, for I have left some traces. In wiping out these traces, I have left others . . . like the prey that flees the noise of the hunter across a field covered in snow, thereby leaving the very traces that will be its ruin. We are thus responsible beyond our intentions (1996a, p. 4).

Like the jazz musician who takes up the mistake of his fellow player, Levinas’s conception of responsibility extending beyond our intentions recognizes that erasures and changes are impossible. Responsibility recognizes that I always, inevitably – and regardless of my intentions – leave traces of suffering. Being responsible to and for the other implies a certain humiliation and injury of my narcissism and egocentrism; but, on Levinas’s view, such suffering is essential to human subjectivity. To be an ‘I’ means not being able to escape responsibility:

The responsibility for the other can not [sic] have begun in my commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a 'prior to every memory,' and 'ulterior to every accomplishment,' from the non-present par excellence, the non-original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence (1981, p. 10).

For Levinas, ethics is first philosophy; ethics is prior to and has priority over ontology. And it is from this inescapable position of existential/ethical debt to the other that all else derives. Only when responsibility is seen to precede subjectivity can it make sense to say that, "It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity" (Levinas, 1981, p. 117). Conversely, the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" has meaning only if ontology is presumed to have priority over ethics – if one takes the *conatus essendi* as necessary and inevitable and holds to the view that the self is concerned primarily with itself and for itself. Inescapable responsibility, on the other hand, empties the 'I' of its imperialism and confirms the 'I' as responsibility through and through.

But what does all this mean for education?

RESPONSIBILITY AND EDUCATION

By calling into question our commonsense notions of subjectivity and ethics, Levinas also calls into question the prevailing construal of education as a project of producing rational autonomous subjects. So, in terms of moral education, if we are to take his ideas seriously at all, we must radically rethink what it means to educate for moral agency. This puts us, as Bauman (1993) says, "back at square one" (p. 31); for if we adopt Levinas's conception, the modernist ideal of a rule-governed morality (wherein one knows what to do and when) must give way to a completely different understanding of what it means to be a moral agent. Levinas's sustained prioritization of the other means that we can no longer hold to individual virtue as an educational ideal: if there are no rules to circumscribe my responsibility toward the other, there is no possibility of reassurance that I am ever, in fact, sufficiently moral. One can never be "good enough." In Bauman's words, echoing Sartre, "Being moral means being abandoned to my own freedom" (p. 60). And, as Blanchot (1995) writes, "[O]nce declared responsible . . . I can no longer appeal to any ethics, any experience, any practice whatever – save that of some counter-living, which is to say an un-practice . . ." (p. 26).

In the preceding pages, I touched on the roles of passivity, heteronomy, and inescapability in Levinas's ethics, and I shall now briefly revisit each of

these concepts in turn. First, passivity. In jazz improvisation, the cultivation of passivity (or an aesthetic of surrender) is seen as the cultivation of a certain kind of spontaneity. But spontaneity does not mean that anything goes. As Wynton Marsalis says, “Jazz is not just, ‘Well, man, this is what I feel like playing.’ It is a very structured thing that comes down from a tradition and requires a lot of thought and study” (quoted in Berliner, 1994, p. 63). Musicians engage in rigorous study and practice in order to build up their memory of repertoires; then, at the moment of performance, they must suspend deliberation and abandon the known in order to embrace risk and vulnerability.

In terms of ethical responsibility, however, one’s repertoire would clearly not be a storehouse of ethical ‘knowledge’, for ethics always exceeds what can be thematized or known. Rather, repertoire would have more to do with the capacity for vulnerability and exposure to the other, to the pains and pleasures of a human life. As Peperzak (1997) says, “The appeal to responsibility is heard by someone who already has been immersed in an ocean of lust and pains” (p. 68); and in Levinas’s (1981) words, “Pain penetrates into the very heart of the for-oneself that beats in enjoyment” (p. 56). One’s repertoire is thus not so much one’s own as it is for-the-other: “To give, to be-for-another, despite oneself,” is to surrender the for-oneself and to “take the bread out of one’s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one’s own fasting” (Levinas, 1981, p. 56).

Acquiring the capacity for surrender and spontaneity is no easy task. Young jazz musicians are often put in near impossible situations in jam sessions with other more competent players. Miles Davis recalls the terror he felt when he replaced Dizzy Gillespie in Charlie Parker’s band in the 1940s and Parker would deliberately play difficult tunes at a very rapid pace, beyond Davis’s facility with the instrument: “‘Sometimes I just couldn’t play what Dizzy played. He played so fast I just wanted to quit every night’” (in Barrett, 2000, p. 235). Instability and anxiety, as well as the fear of failure, often result in a temptation to rely on well-learned stock phrases and responses. But such is not the nature of jazz improvisation. And neither is it the world of classroom practice. As Bauman (1993) says, there are no hard-and-fast rules which can spare us the messiness of human reality, the agony of uncertainty, or the “bitter after-taste . . . which comes unsolicited in the wake of decisions taken and fulfilled. . . . At the end of the road modern society has traversed in its pursuit of a Law-like, universally binding code of ethical rules, stands the modern individual bombarded by conflicting moral demands, options and cravings, with responsibility for actions landing back on her shoulders” (pp. 31–32). Each time a responsibility has to be taken, Derrida (2001) reminds us, we

must go through “a sort of experience of the impossible”: “Each time one must invent, not without a concept but by exceeding the concept each time, without any guarantee or certainty” (p. 70). For the beginning teacher, then, as for the young jazz musician, cultivating passivity means remaining open and vulnerable to the other; and it means surrendering all that one knows at the moment of “performance” in order to truly be for-the-other.

For the seasoned teacher, however, as for the seasoned musician, there is another, perhaps more subtle, challenge. Having mastered the tendency to rely on prescribed responses, one now has to guard against becoming attached to the idea of oneself as improviser. Saxophonist Harold Ousley recounts his own experience with this dilemma:

Everything is passing by very fast when you're playing, and you've got to play something. I remember a time when I wouldn't want to play anything that I had heard before. I always wanted to play new and different things. But that attitude used to hang me up because I would refuse to play certain familiar phrases that came to me, and it would make me late in playing something else (quoted in Berliner, 1994, p. 206).

In other words, as educators, we must guard against becoming so committed to a particular conception of responsible and responsive pedagogy that we misread situations which may in fact call for nothing other than a well-rehearsed response.

The second aspect I touched on was Levinas's notion of fundamental heteronomy, illustrated by way of the musical save. By their actions in response to the mistakes of other players, Charlie Parker and Miles Davis acknowledged that one's very constitution as a jazz improviser is derivative of a “pre-essential” encounter with the other – that responsibility precedes the ‘essence’ of subjectivity.

In the pedagogical relationship, then, heteronomy means that both ‘teacher’ and ‘student’ are realized at the site of response, in saying “yes” to the otherness of the other. Being constituted in relation to otherness means that the freedom of the other precedes my own, but for Levinas, this does not limit my freedom. Heteronomy means that freedom is not to be found in autonomy or independence but rather in responsibility – in a sustained ethical posture of “Here I am.” And while such a notion is admittedly utopian, Levinas says that there is nothing preventing it from investing “our everyday actions of generosity and goodwill towards the other: even the smallest and most commonplace gestures, such as saying ‘after you’ as we sit at the dinner table or walk through a door” (in Levinas & Kearney, 1986, p. 32). Heteronomy means investing our freedom in the freedom and rights of the other (Levinas, 1993, p. 125).

Lastly, we considered Levinas's conception of responsibility as inescapable. In stark contrast to a rule-based morality which would tell me

where my duty starts and where it ends, and that would allow me to say at some point that I had done what had to be done (Bauman, 1993, p. 60), Levinas's ethics is far more demanding. Subjectivity as being-for-the-other interrupts and forbids the spontaneous drives of the individual ego – even the drive for moral excellence insofar as it is seen as an individual pursuit. Ethical responsibility is not the temporary suspension of self-regarding projects in order to be of service to the other; it is a position of existential debt wherein the other's very existence puts obligations on me which I will never be able to fulfill but from which I am also never released.

At the end of the modern era, education is still charged in large measure with the job of forming and shaping identity. However, to speak of moral agency after Levinas means that we must suspend some of our most dearly held assumptions about subjectivity and about ethics itself. Whereas philosophy demarcates particular responsibilities for particular situations, Levinas's ethics offers no such comfort or certainty. In Blanchot's (1995) words:

If responsibility is rooted where there is no foundation, where no root can lodge itself, and if thus it tears clean through all bases and cannot be assumed by any individual being, how then, how otherwise than as response to the impossible, and through a relation which forbids me to posit myself at all (if not as always posited in advance, or presupposed, and this delivers me to the utterly passive), will we sustain the enigma of what is announced in the term 'responsibility,' the term which the language of ordinary morality uses in the most facile way possible by putting it into the service of order? (p. 26)

From the smallest gesture of saying, "After you," as we pass through a door, to the gift of oneself, of "tak[ing] the bread out of one's own mouth to nourish the hunger of another with one's own fasting" (Levinas, 1981, p. 56), moral agency on a Levinasian account requires a suspension of almost everything that term has come to mean – intentionality, autonomy, and sovereign active subjectivity. To speak of moral agency after Levinas thus requires nothing less than a new ethical language. It requires a language without appeal to virtues or principles or codes of conduct, a language with room for the always excessive incoming of the other. It requires a language wherein agency is seen as a particular kind of surrender, and where to say "I" is to say "Here I am." Similarly, to speak of educating for moral agency after Levinas means that we must abandon the language of autonomous freedom for a language of heteronomous responsibility. It means that we must abandon the known in order to embrace risk and vulnerability, and invest our freedom in the freedom and rights of the other. For, as Levinas says, "I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible" (1985, p. 101).

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