Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, Volume 5Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s). |
Contents
Introduction | 15 |
A Minimum Philosophical Vocabulary | 21 |
Agency | 53 |
A Proposed Solution | 60 |
Freedom and Indeterminism | 66 |
A Note on Deliberate Omission | 72 |
Some Further Philosophical Questions | 84 |
An Interpretation of Bishop Butlers Theses | 97 |
Does the Doctrine Help Us? | 142 |
B Mereological Essentialism | 145 |
Mereological Inessentialism | 147 |
Other Possibilities | 149 |
Principles of Mereology | 151 |
Mereological Change | 153 |
The Problem of Increase | 157 |
The Objects of Belief and Endeavour | 159 |
The Persistence of Persons through Time | 104 |
Some Alternative Conceptions page | 120 |
Propositions | 122 |
The Times and Places of States of Affairs | 124 |
Events | 126 |
Recurrence | 128 |
24 | 129 |
Events as Coming into Being and Passing Away | 130 |
De Re Explanation | 131 |
De Dicto and De Re | 133 |
Perception | 135 |
Individual Things | 136 |
Appendix A The Doctrine of Temporal Parts | 138 |
The Argument from Spatial Analogy | 140 |
Phillip Drunk and Phillip Sober | 141 |
De Re Belief and Endeavour | 165 |
Belief De Re as a Species of Belief De Dicto | 168 |
A Note on Knowing Who | 173 |
Some Interrelations Between De Dicto and De Re | 174 |
Knowledge Evidence and Reasonable Belief | 176 |
The Certain and the Evident | 178 |
The Directly Evident | 179 |
Making Evident | 180 |
Knowledge | 181 |
E Summary of Definitions | 184 |
Notes | 197 |
37 | 202 |
53 | 216 |
| 227 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accepting h accidental description affairs Appendix arranged things axiom Belief and Endeavour Boston Chapter Compare concrete events concretised consider constitutes contributes causally defined definition dicto directly evident entails epistemically preferable Ernest Sosa example exists expression fact fallacy of inferring feeling depressed Franz Brentano G. E. M. Anscombe haecceity identical individual concept individual essence individual thing intention of bringing Jones believes Keith Lehrer Leibniz locution Logic London loose and popular married the shortest mereological essentialism Metaphysics necessarily object of belief occurs P. F. Strawson P. T. Geach perceive person Phillip philosophical sense physically necessary possible world presuppose principle of mereological proposition h purpose of bringing question reasonable reference river s-part self-presenting sentence Ship of Theseus shortest woman Smith strict and philosophical substance successive table successivum sufficient causal condition suggested Suppose Sydney Shoemaker table successor tallest theory true W. V. Quine