Abstract
In this paper I put forward a counterexample against Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of fragility and then refute a possible response by Lewis. And I go on to argue that Lewis can overcome the counterexample by excluding fragility-mimickers from the stimulus appropriate to the concept of fragility.
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Choi, S. Dispositions And Mimickers. Philos Stud 122, 183–188 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1253-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-1253-x