Natural sources of normativity
Section snippets
Introduction: normativity and naturalism
Normativity is paradigmatically a matter of right and wrong, good and bad. Philosophical work on normativity seeks to understand the nature of normative claims, the nature of justification for such claims, and the fundamental sources of normativity. One common view is that there is nothing in the natural world, accessible by scientific means, which grounds normative claims. The most influential arguments to this effect are due to Hume and G. E. Moore: Hume argued that no normative conclusion
Normativity: some basic distinctions
Before proceeding further it will help to sketch out the nature of normativity in a little more detail. This cannot be done in an uncontroversial way, but the following distinctions capture at least approximately some of the major forms of normativity that have been discussed (see e.g. Darwall, 2001, Glüer and Wikforss, 2009, Schroeder, 2008). The initial description given above associates normativity with evaluation and prescription, but some have identified a kind of normativity referred to
Etiological theories of normative function
Since the mind is often thought to be entirely or at least substantially functional in nature, theories of normative function are an obvious starting point for developing naturalist accounts of the normativity of cognitive phenomena. The teleosemantic program takes this route, attempting to ground the normativity of mental representation in biological function (Millikan, 1984, Papineau, 1984). Causal theories of representation, such as that of Dretske (1981), attempt to explain to explain
Autonomous systems and normative function
Proponents of the etiological account of normative function have been drawn to it in part because they are skeptical of system theories of function. Cummins (1975) is thought to have provided the canonical account of system-based analysis of function, and on his account functional analysis is interest relative, in the sense that more or less anything can be given a systems functional analysis and ascribed function on that basis. Just as we can analyze the propensity of hearts to pump blood, we
Design and purpose
One reason why the autonomous systems account may seem less normative than the etiological account is because it does not appeal to design. Intuitions about design are a major buttress for the etiological account, and in particular the intuition that intricate functional structure of biological systems is a lot like the functional structure of artifacts. One of the key sources of normativity for artifacts (and their parts) is the intentions of the designer. An artifact is constructed so that
Reasons and persons
At this point it will help to revisit the question of what normativity is. On one view normativity is connected to reasons. Thus, ‘[a]spects of the world are normative in as much as they or their existence constitute reasons for persons, i.e. grounds which make certain beliefs, moods, emotions, intentions or actions appropriate or inappropriate’ (Raz, 1999, p. 354). This way of framing normativity is helpful because it highlights three key issues: (i) the perspectives for which things matter
Applying the autonomous systems theory
Applying the autonomous systems theory of normative function to several examples will help make its structure clearer, and hopefully show its usefulness.
Conclusion: natural sources of normativity
Naturalist approaches to function, cognition and agency may have hobbled themselves unnecessarily by restricting themselves to ‘descriptive’ normativity. The putative normativity is thin at best, and without an account of valuational normativity we are left with an incomplete understanding of key phenomena like regulation and adaptive plasticity. Conversely, approaches that ground normativity in high-level features of human agency, such as personhood or purposes, also leave us with an
Acknowledgements
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by the Australian Research Council grant ‘From Neuron to Self: Human Nature and the New Cognitive Sciences’. The ideas presented here build on earlier collaborative work conducted with Cliff Hooker and Mark Bickhard.
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