Abstract
Various attempts have been made recently to bring Husserl into the contemporary analytic discussion on sensory illusion and hallucination. On the one hand, this has resulted in a renewed interest in what one might call a ‘phenomenology of sense-deception.’ On the other hand, it has generated contrasting—if not utterly incompatible—readings of Husserl’s own account of sense perception. The present study critically evaluates the contemporary discourse on illusion and hallucination, reassesses its proximity to Husserl’s reflection on sensory perception, and highlights the philosophical limits and structural deficiencies of the current debate in light of some of Husserl’s insights. The analysis first provides a synopsis of the argumentative structures, aims, and assumptions informing the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. This assessment is then critically elaborated through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology in its historical and theoretical distance from the recent debate. Contrary to certain readings of Husserl, the reconstruction of some cardinal phenomenological themes provides all the elements necessary to dislocate his own account from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism dispute, by means of both a ‘global’ and a ‘local’ analysis, and both exegetically and theoretically. Most importantly, a ‘return’ to Husserl shows the philosophical untenability of the whole controversy as not only leaving untouched the core problem of perception but also altering some of its essential traits. This critique of the image of experience portrayed in the contemporary discussion is conducted through a phenomenological clarification of perception as a distinct ‘structure of rules’ of consciousness and, more specifically, by means of a descriptive analysis centered on the core notion of horizonal-intentionality.
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Notes
This interest has also reached some of Husserl’s students. For instance, see Laasik’s analysis of Herbert Leyendecker’s phenomenology of perception (2019).
See Martin 2009, p. 93. For a comprehensive view on disjunctivism, see Haddock & Macpherson 2008, pp. 1–24 and Byrne & Logue 2009, pp. VII-XXIX. Introduced into the philosophical panorama by the writings of Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), reworked by Snowdon (1981, 1990), McDowell (1998), Campbell (2002), Martin (1997, 2006, 2009), and, more recently, defended by Brewer (2008), just to mention few publications, disjunctivism cannot be reduced to a single position or a definite set of arguments. Accordingly, the assessment conducted in this section relies on the defining disjunctive formula that pertains to any version of disjunctivism.
In order to avoid any ambiguity, henceforth I will use the adjective ‘genuine’ in relation to perceptual acts and not as synonymous with ‘veridical.’
There are disjunctivist accounts that oppose perception to both illusion and hallucination. Instead, different versions of disjunctivism ascribe a common mental core to veridical and illusory cases while opposing these genuinely perceptual experiences to hallucination (see, for instance, Langsam 1997). Others contend that the concept of veridicality is more comprehensive than the one of perception and embraces both perception and illusion while excluding hallucination. In this case, however, illusions are veridical experiences that do not fall into the category of perception (see Johnston 2006). Within the variety of disjunctivist approaches, one can also distinguish between positive, negative, moderate, and eliminativist accounts of hallucination. However, all these differences are irrelevant given the broad scope of my criticism and do not alter the dichotomy between conjunctivism and disjunctivism that structures the whole debate.
Although some considerations about sense-deception were used to reach some specific conclusions about perception, the problem of illusion and hallucination was neither the entry nor the defining question concerning the nature of perception.
That said, only if one investigates the fundamental principles that give meaning to the problem, the questions of the essence of perception and the existence of its object can lead to a genuine critical-philosophical analysis.
It might be true that conjunctivism and, to a certain extent, also disjunctivism deal with some sorts of skeptical challenges (see Overgaard 2011). However, as Sect. II.1 will also make clear, neither theory poses any critical problems—such as the sense of objective validity itself, for instance—nor faces the skeptical question in its radical, transcendental sense, but it rather remains ensnared in the ‘enigma of knowledge’ as formulated in the natural attitude.
For a detailed analysis of Husserl’s concept of attitude (Einstellung), see Majolino forthcoming 2020a.
This holds true also for conjunctivist and disjunctivist phenomenological accounts of perception as demonstrated in Sects. II and III.
A more substantial and detailed formulation of these criticisms is provided in Sects. II.3 and III.2.
In the case of negative disjunctivism, even a positive account of what hallucinatory cases are is missing.
At times, Overgaard (2018, pp. 43–44) seems to be in favor of a disjunctivist reading of Husserl. However, one should duly report that, as Overgaard acknowledges, his disjunctivist reading “is merely a very rough sketch of a speculative line of thought” (p. 44) that the author hopes to develop further.
For the methodological distinction between global and local approach in comparing philosophical traditions, see Majolino 2017, p. 165.
The reader can find an outstanding analysis of Husserl’s overall philosophical project in Majolino 2012 and 2017.
As will become clear, this formulation of the ‘enigma of knowledge’ (Rätsel der Erkenntnis) that operates in the natural thinking (im natürlichen Denken) is, in fact, shown to false and misleading, and therewith dissolved in the phenomenological attitude.
Albeit in a different context, Zahavi characterizes phenomenology as “a rejection of metaphysical realism” (2010, p. 85). For the relation between disjunctivism and naïve realism, see also Sects. I.2 and II.2.
All the translations from primary sources in which the reference to the English translation is not indicated are my own.
See Majolino forthcoming 2020b.
See Majolino 2017, p. 206.
See also Romano 2012, p. 435.
See Hua I, p. 19.
Let me also emphasize that extensive descriptive analyses of sense perception present in the Dingvorlesung of 1907 are already conducted within the transcendental-phenomenological attitude. Indeed, the materials collected in the Husserliana XVI and published under the title Ding und Raum is part of the larger lecture course entitled Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und der Kritik der Vernunft. The first five lectures of this course are currently published in Husserliana II under the heading Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen.
I am indebted to Claudio Majolino for this formulation.
On this point, allow me to refer to my study: Cimino 2020. See also Sects. II.3 and III.1.
For instance, see Hua IV, p. 45/48.
As will become clear in the present and following sections, any conjunctivist or disjunctivist phenomenological account in fact produces a false understanding of the essence of perception and the concrete unfolding of its individual cases as conceived of by Husserl.
An anonymous reviewer pointed out that one could read Husserl as implying that there are other standpoints from which hallucinations are not genuine perceptions. In addition, Husserl may be interpreted as employing the word ‘perception’ (Wahrnehmung) ambiguously to designate ‘experience’ in general and not what we ordinarily call outer perception. However, this reading should be clearly rejected. First, the quoted passage is taken from a section, entitled by the editors ‘Erste Unterscheidungen in der phänomenologischen Analyse der Wahrnehmung,’ that begins as follows: “In our examination of perceptions we do not take as a starting point the designations of philosophers and psychologists. These designations are acquired almost altogether from completely different points of view and interests than those that may be decisive for us” (Hua XXXVIII, p. 8; emphasis added). Instead, Husserl’s examination rests on “the principle of a purely phenomenological analysis” (Ibid.; emphases added). It is only conducted from the purely descriptive standpoint of phenomenology from which perception can be duly investigated and thoroughly clarified. Second, Husserl could not be more explicit in asserting that “we take as a starting point examples and, first of all, examples of outer perceptions. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc. are words of everyday language, by means of which we give expression to our perceptions and which we order as particular cases under the encompassing title perception” (Ibid., emphasis added). Unequivocally, Husserl’s eidetic claim is that illusion and hallucination belong to the class-species perception. His phenomenological account of illusion and hallucination is therefore incompatible with any disjunctivist position.
To be fair, Hopp proposes his original version of disjunctivism, which is only informed by Husserl’s analyses. In addition, here Overgaard’s position is only tentative (see note 12).
Although these textual references are sufficient to dismiss any disjunctivist reading of Husserl, the following sections will also provide theoretical arguments against such misinterpretation.
See Sect. III.2.
Smith (2008) rightly recognizes the centrality of the horizon in evaluating Husserl’s affiliation to conjunctivism and disjunctivism. However, a correct understanding of the horizon shows the untenability of Smith’s disjunctivist reading.
See Sect. II.1.
However, it is important to stress that the self-constitution of inner time-consciousness does not presuppose a horizonal structure. Rather, as will become clear, the horizon of every lived-experience is constituted in inner time-consciousness.
This neither prevents the possibility nor delegitimizes the import of Husserl’s eidetic intentional analyses.
See Majolino 2016, p. 172.
See Sect. II.1.
See Cimino 2020.
See Cimino 2019, pp. 32–36.
It is important to stress that the scope of the present study is limited to sense perception as the original mode of actually experiencing acts. An analysis of illusion and hallucination as generated in other forms of intuitive consciousness (e.g., perceptual fantasy) will be the object of further investigations.
See Cimino 2019.
As I will later discuss, for Husserl, illusion and hallucination are not intrinsically retrospective phenomena, and not only past spans of experience can be phenomenologically qualified as illusory or hallucinatory. See also Overgaard 2018, p. 42; and Cimino 2019, pp. 40–41, 45–47. Nevertheless, as I argue, there is a distinctive sense in which, phenomenologically considered, illusion and hallucination are ‘unmasked’ lived-experiences.
See Staiti 2015, p. 138.
That said, for Husserl, even possibility is ultimately conceivable only in relation to an actual consciousness.
See also McKenna 1982.
See Cimino 2019, pp. 40–41, 45–47.
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Acknowledgements
This article was presented at the Journée d’études: Phenomenon: Open Questions organized at the University of Lille (UMR-CNRS 8163 STL) (December 2018) as part of the research project Phenomenon: Cartography of a Fundamental Concept (PHC-PESSOA, Lille/Lisbon). I am much indebted to the organizers and all the participants for their questions, in particular, to Aurélien Djian. The analysis also contains sections presented and discussed at the 50th Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle organized in Lisbon (May 2019). I cannot overstress the influence played by Andrea Staiti in our several discussions as well as the importance of Julia Jansen’s remarks. My deepest gratitude also goes to Claudio Majolino for all of his insightful suggestions and helpful comments throughout the elaboration and revision of these ideas.
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Cimino, A. Husserl’s philosophical estrangement from the conjunctivism-disjunctivism debate. Phenom Cogn Sci 20, 743–779 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09683-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09683-1