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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Since the appearance, nearly twenty years ago, of the first volume of Husserl”s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, philosophers have been watching the development of a movement in Germany that has claimed attention through its opposition on the one side to the still powerful Kantian tradition, on the other to the trend of thought arising under the influence of biological science, aptly named by Meinong Psychologismus. The subtlety and originality of this new line of speculation and the exactness of its method have attracted to it some of the most powerful intellects of the country, whose contributions would repay a more detailed study than they have yet received from English or American scholars.
page 414 note 1 Included in a collection of essays and addresses entiled Vom Umsturz der Werte, vol. i, third edition, Leipzig, 1923. See pp. 49–50.Google Scholar
page 415 note 1 Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Third Edition, Halle, 1927. Preface to the First Edition, p. i.Google Scholar
page 416 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 43–78.
page 416 note 2 Op. cit., p. 43.
page 417 note 1 It must be confessed that the poverty of language is a source of some confusion here, both in the original German and in any attempt to translate it. The medium of a priori experience is always referred to by Scheler as intuition (Anschauung), or insight (Einsicht), terms which are both associated rather with the perception of a truth than with the emotional apprehension of a good. Had a different word been available, to describe the mode of givenness of the “emotional a priori,” the rationalist prejudice of which he complains might have been more easily overcome.
page 418 note 1 For a further discussion of these distinctions, see Oakeley, Hilda D.: The Philosophy of Personality, London, 1928, pp. 97–8Google Scholar; Bixler, Julius Seelye: Religious Realism, edited by Macintosh, D. C., New York, 1931, Essay III, PP.71–6.Google Scholar
page 418 note 2 Der Formalismus in der Ethik, pp. 260 ff.
page 419 note 1 Op. cit., Part II, § IV.
page 419 note 2 Viz. the existence of a positive value is itself a positive value; the existence of a negative value is itself a negative value; the non-existence of a positive value is a negative value; value cannot be positive and negative at the same time, etc.
page 420 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 245–8.
page 421 note 1 Op. cit., p. 4.
page 421 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 20–1.
page 422 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 23–4.
page 422 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 248–60.
page 422 note 3 Op. cit., pp. 260–340.
page 423 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 262 ff. For a detailed treatment of the latter, cf. Meinong, A.: Über Emotionale Präsentation, Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, phil. hist. Klasse, Bd. CLXXXIII, 1917.Google Scholar It is not certain, however, that Scheler is indebted to this for his own account.
page 423 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 269–72.
page 424 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 300–1.
page 424 note 2 Op. cit., p. 306.
page 425 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 274–8.
page 425 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 175–82. See also the discussion of subjectivity in Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, referred to in Part II of this article.
page 426 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 282–3, quoted by MissOakeley, H. D.: A Philosophy of Personality, p. 105.Google Scholar
page 426 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 293–4.
page 426 note 3 Op. cit., p. 298, referred to by Bixler, J. S., Religious Realism, pp. 83–4.Google Scholar
page 426 note 4 Op. cit., pp. 307–8.
page 427 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 320–7.
page 427 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 214 ff. See especially pp. 219–21.
page 428 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 329–40.
page 429 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 508–14.
page 429 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 334–8.
page 429 note 3 Op. cit., pp. 311–18.
page 430 note 1 Op. cit., p. 317.
