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Female Representation on Corporate Boards in Europe: The Interplay of Organizational Social Consciousness and Institutions

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Abstract

We examine the role of alignment between organizational social consciousness and the informal and formal institutions of a country in increasing female representation on boards. Using fixed-effects and Hausman Taylor regression methodology for endogenous covariate with panel data for the years 2006–2020, we find that the greater the alignment between organizational social consciousness and certain formal (i.e., a gender quota) and informal (i.e., high gender equality) institutions, the more progress there is toward gender representation on corporate boards in Europe. We also find that more socially conscious firms make the most progress, often going beyond the minimum regulatory targets. By showing the complementarity of these factors, we address the enduring question of how the interplay of formal and informal institutions directly affects corporate behavior, thus contributing to the institutional, public policy/regulatory, and corporate governance literatures. We note the need for policymakers to go beyond mere codification of rules via quotas and simultaneously work toward raising national and organizational social consciousness levels on issues of gender equality.

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Notes

  1. Some research has referred to these categories as soft and hard quotas (Mensi-Klarbach & Seierstad, 2020; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016) while others have further delineated them into reporting requirements, targets, and quotas (Sojo et al., 2016).

  2. Since the term CSR has been used as both a firm action to further some social good (Vinet & Zhedanov, 2011) and as an external pressure (Mitra et al., 2021) on the firm, OSC is a more encompassing and relevant construct for our inquiry.

  3. Our sample consists of Austria (117), Belgium (195), France (785), Germany (663), Italy (249), the Netherlands (309), Norway (115), Portugal (91), Spain (297), United Kingdom (2206) and United States (4,546) for a total of 9,573 observations.

  4. Note that results with random-effects models are almost identical, which further substantiates robustness of our findings.

  5. On the basis of their Monte Carlo simulation experiments, econometricians have found this technique to be particularly effective at deriving robust estimates when several explanatory variables may be endogenously correlated with each other (Baltagi et al., 2002).

  6. Note also that in our Hausman Taylor regression estimates, we explicitly included industry and country effects to account for their unobserved effect on firms’ institutional environment, strategies, and performance (Chacar et al., 2010; Chan et al., 2008; McGahan & Victer, 2010; Sakakibara & Yamawaki, 2008). We used 14-industry classification (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Waddock & Graves, 1997) to control for this purpose as the standard three-digit SIC classification (e.g., Datta et al., 1991) resulted in too many different industries.

  7. Results available on request.

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Correspondence to Cynthia E. Clark.

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Appendices

Annex 1: Elements of Quota Design for Publicly Listed Firms

 

Quota target (%)

Bill passed

Target date

Sanction level

Norway

40

2003

2008

Sanctions: Denied registration as businesses or even dissolved

Spain

40

2007

2015

No sanctions. Positive reinforcement: preference in public contracts

Iceland

40

2010

2013

No sanctions & no incentives

France

40

2011

2017

Sanction: Invalidation of the appointment (“empty chair sanction”)

Italy

33

2011

2017

Sanctions: first a warning, if still not complying, monetary sanctions. If still not complying, the elected bodies will be considered not valid and removed

Belgium

33

2011

2017

Sanctions: Invalidation of the appointment (“empty chair sanction”) and temporary loss of benefits for board member

The Netherlands

30

2014

2023

No sanctions & no incentives

Germany

30

2015

2016

Sanctions: Invalidation of the appointment (“empty chair sanction”)

Portugal

33

2017

2018

Sanctions: Invalidity of the company’s decision appointment of the irregular boards and, if the irregularity persists, the application of administrative fines

Austria

30

2017

2018

Sanctions: Invalidation of the appointment (“empty chair sanction”)

  1. Source Based on Gabaldon et al. (2017)

Annex 2: Variables and Data Sources

Variable name

Data source

Definition

Female representation of board (FRB)

BoardEx

Proportion of female directors

Organizational social consciousness (OSC)

Asset4 ESG

Social score computed by trained Asset4 analysts

Regulatory spectrum (REG)

Authors’ elaboration

Punitive Quota (PQ) = 3, Self-regulatory Quota (SRQ) = 2, Guidance = 1, No Quota (NQ) = 0

Gender gap index (GGI)

WEF

Global Gender Gap Index ratings from the World Economic Forum

Firm size

Thomson Reuters Datastream, complemented by Compustat for missing observations

Natural log of number of employees

EBIT to total assets

Earnings Before Interest Taxes to total assets

Retained earnings to total assets

Retained earnings to total assets

Working capital to total assets

Working capital to total assets

Current to fixed assets

Current to fixed assets

Capital expenditure intensity

Capital expenditure to total assets

Board size

BoardEx, complemented by Datastream for missing observations

Total number of directors on the board

Proportion of independent directors

Proportion of independent directors

CEO-Chair duality

Dummy variable = 1 if CEO is also the chair of the board

Female CEO

Dummy variable = 1 if CEO is female

Annex 3: GGI Over Time

figure a

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Clark, C.E., Arora, P. & Gabaldon, P. Female Representation on Corporate Boards in Europe: The Interplay of Organizational Social Consciousness and Institutions. J Bus Ethics 180, 165–186 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04898-x

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