Journal of the History of Philosophy

262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (p. 201). Elsewhere, however, we learn: "Demonstration is responsible for the conclusions about God which natural philosophers have been able to prove about God by accurate induction" (p. 219). The meaning of "induction" here (and p. 223) is not clear. Professor Colish also believes that for Aquinas analogy "is essentially a far de parler" and not a metaphysical doctrine (p. 209). In her judgment, "analogy should be regarded as a kind of probable argument, by means of which Thomas deduces conclusions from articles of faith according to the norm of theological appropriateness, and whose resemblance to God can be judged only by believers" (p. 220). Unfortunately, she never gives a thorough and clear presentation of the problem of God's attributes and predicating names of God. Moses Maimonides, for example, is never mentioned. But what is more surprising is that in a book of this sort the name of the Pseudo-Dionysius is mentioned only on one page (p. 169); his ideas are never set forth nor is his influence on Thomas properly emphasized. The "linguistic epistemology" also reappears in Dante, who treated poetry as "an epistemic method" (p. 226). Colish is careful to situate "Dante's poetic epistemology " (p. 226), in its historical circumstances. However, it is difficult to see how most of what is discussed in this diffuse and rambling chapter is really necessary to understand an epistemology or theory of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word. Incidentally, the dispute among modern scholars as to supposed Thomist, Averroist or even Scotist leanings in Dante, generated in great part by his placing Siger in paradise along with Thomas, is quickly solved with the suggestion that the assortment of philosophers and theologians in the Heaven of the Sun is "a token of the idea that, in heaven, all earthly conflicts and enmities cease" (p. 327). The detailed and thoughtful doctrinal analyses of important scholars like Nardi and Van Steenberghen are thus casually brushed aside. It is difficult to see that Professor Colish has demonstrated her remarkable thesis that there is a common "linguistic epistemology" to be found in the four thinkers studied in this volume. Given the vagueness of her terminology, it is even difficult, after having studied the book carefully, to have a clear understanding of what her thesis is. EDWARD P. MAHONEY Duke University Leibniz on Human Freedom. By George Henry Radcliffe Parkinson. Studia Leibnitiana. Sonderheft 2. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1970. Pp. 67. DM 16) Leibniz's philosophical concern with human freedom centers around four questions. These are: (1) "Can man be free if God and/or some other intelligent being knows what his actions are to be?" (2) "Can man be free if God preordains what his actions are to be?" (3) "Can man be free if his actions are causally determined?" and (4) "Can man be free if the propositions which assert what his actions are to be are all analytic?" In Leibniz on Human Freedom Parkinson restricts himself to an examination of Leibniz's answers to the first three of these questions. This restriction results in both a strength and a weakness in Parkinson's presentation. The strength is that the discussion takes on a more contemporary tone since most recent discussions of human freedom have focused on the problems raised by questions (1)-(3). Since one purpose of Parkinson's essay is to evaluate Leibniz's position in terms of recent work, Parkinson is successful in this respect (see, for example, pp. 37, 40-42). The weakness BOOK REVIEWS 263 of Parkinson's restriction is that he thereby ignores what is for Leibniz the most important question, namely, question (4), and he treats all too briefly the crucial distinction between hypothetical and logical necessity (pp. 7-8), which is concomitant with Leibniz's discussion of question (4) (see: Discourse on Metaphysics, see. 13). As we shall see if the distinction between hypothetical and logical necessity is unclear or unwarranted, then most of Leibniz's answers of all of the above questions are of doubtful value. Leibniz offers more than one answer to the problem of divine foreknowledge, but the answer to which he is most inclined...