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I have benefited from comments from Mark Richard, Brian Ulicny, Robert Stainton, Sylvain Bromberger, Robert Stalnaker and several anonymous referees. I am also indebted to Mark Crimmins, John Perry, Kent Bach and Ed Zalta who allowed me to participate in an “Author Meets Critics” session concerningTalk About Beliefs which took place April 1 at the 1995 Pacific Division meeting of the APA. I presented a version of this paper at that session.
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Clapp, L. How to be direct and innocent: A criticism of Crimmins and Perry's theory of attitude ascriptions. Linguist Philos 18, 529–565 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00985366
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00985366