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Optimism in unconscious, intuitive morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Cory J. Clark  and
Bo M. Winegard
Cory J. Clark
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdomcory.j.clark@durham.ac.ukhttps://www.dur.ac.uk/psychology/staff/?id=17418
Bo M. Winegard
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Marietta College, Marietta, OH 45750. bmw002@marietta.eduhttps://www.marietta.edu/person/bo-winegard
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Abstract

Moral cognition, by its very nature, stems from intuitions about what is good and bad, and these intuitions influence moral assessments outside of conscious awareness. However, because humans evolved a shared set of moral intuitions, and are compelled to justify their moral assessments as good and rational (even erroneously) to others, moral virtue and moral progress are still possible.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e150
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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