Abstract
A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.
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Notes
Fara (2008) proposes an analysis of abilities to act in terms of dispositions of this sort. While I think the proposal has some shortcomings (see Clarke forthcoming), it does seem that in the case at hand, I had such a disposition.
Note that neither Fara nor I hold that an ability to A is a disposition to A. We both recognize that one can be able to do a certain thing (e.g., smash all the windows in one’s house) and yet have no disposition to do it. What is arguably the case is that if one is able to A in circumstances C, then one has a disposition to A in C if one tries.
The objection was raised by a referee, who also offered a reply. In the imagined case, one has the following opposed second-order dispositions: to like the thing, and to dislike the thing. Which (if either) of these second-order dispositions is manifested depends on which (if either) of one’s liking of the thing’s shape or one’s disliking of its color is stronger than the other. I accept the offer, though I think the appeal to second-order dispositions isn’t required in order to make my case here.
If in some cases a disposition can be possessed alongside an intrinsic masking or finking feature, while in others the disposition is lost if something resembling a mask or fink is made intrinsic, what explains the difference? Let’s say that in cases of the first sort the disposition is bold. What explains such boldness?
Sometimes an object possesses a certain disposition in virtue of the fact that some proper part, portion, or subsystem of that object has that very disposition. For example, a nuclear reactor lacking any safety mechanism might be disposed to meltdown in virtue of the fact that its nuclear pile has that disposition. In other cases, an object has a disposition that no proper part, portion, or subsystem of it has (even if the object has that disposition because some of its parts have other dispositions). Perhaps many psychological dispositions are of this sort. Let’s say that the first sort of disposition (but not the second) is reflected. Might it be that boldness is explained by reflection? (A hypothesis along these lines was suggested by a referee.)
It does not seem so; the two features aren’t correlated. One’s attraction to a certain object might be bold and not reflected, while lactose intolerance, though apparently not reflected, appears not to be bold (at least with respect to one’s own internal lactase production). And while the reflected disposition of the nuclear reactor (lacking the safety feature) lacks boldness, there might be cases of reflected dispositions that are bold. A green chameleon is green because its skin is green. But perhaps Johnston’s (1992, p. 231) shy and prescient chameleon has, while not being viewed, a finkish disposition to look green when viewed.
If there is a general explanation of boldness, I don’t know what it is. (Having complained here of hasty generalization, I’m reluctant to commit the error myself.) We’ve made some progress, though, if we’ve recognized that the question merits attention.
Choi says that “it is clear to us that an object is fragile only if it would break under ordinary circumstances” (2005, p. 501). No nomic duplicate of Willy would answer affirmatively if asked whether p under normal circumstances (Choi makes a similar judgment about a similar example).
Clarke (2008) provides a more extended response to Choi’s argument. Concerning the example here, one need not worry that believing that p isn’t always entirely a matter of one’s current intrinsic features, for it is stipulated that the man in the original version of this case has the belief in question.
Strictly, Fara’s claim concerns truth conditions for disposition ascriptions of the form “N is disposed to M when C,” where ‘N’ is replaced by a noun phrase, ‘M’ by a verb phrase, and ‘C’ by a sentence. What I say here seems to me applicable to ascriptions of this type.
Allowing for permanent masks or finks, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, would present a problem for the analysis of disposition ascriptions that Fara (2005) advances. It seems to me that the problem must be dealt with.
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Acknowledgements
I’m grateful to Michael Fara, John Heil, and an anonymous referee for this journal for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Clarke, R. Opposing powers. Philos Stud 149, 153–160 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9332-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9332-7