¹ Citations of the Summa in this essay are taken from Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, 8 Vols (Latin and English), ed. Mortensen, John and Alarcón, Enrique (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012)Google Scholar.

² My overview of Thomas on the passions relies primarily on his mature teaching found in the Summa. While Thomas does treat the passions in De Veritate and other works, he is much less systematic in those instances. Mark Jordan offers an insightful analysis of the structure and genre of Thomas's account of the passions (primarily as found in the Sentences commentary, the Summa, and De Veritate) in his essay “Aquinas's Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions,” in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, Vol. 33 (1986): 71-97. While I disagree with Jordan's claim that for Thomas the moral life is wholly contemplative, I agree with his assessment, “Indeed, it may be that the shape of the Summa’s treatment of moral matters is the most eloquent – and the most pointed – argument for the teleology that makes possible a reasonable control over the passions” (97).

³ Three important monographs on Aquinas's account of the passions have been released within the last decade, roughly around the same time. As a result, none of these authors interacts with the others, and there is quite a bit of overlap among the three books. Each has a particular angle and focus, however. Cates, Diana Fritz, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009)Google Scholar is especially interested in Thomas's account with an eye toward contemporary concerns and as a contribution to a general account of the emotions. Lombardo, Nicholas E. O.P., The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011)Google Scholar writes his analysis in conversation with contemporary analytic philosophy, and his text is unique in that it contains an entire chapter on the passions of Christ's soul (which draws heavily from Gondreau; see below). Miner, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar is the most straightforwardly exegetical; it is narrowly focused on the treatise on the passions in the Summa, but it is quite thorough and contains helpful tables and figures that illuminate complex aspects of Thomas's account.

⁴ In STh I-II, q. 22, a. 3 sc, Thomas affirms the definition given by John of Damascus: “Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales passiones, passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali.” Miner observes that Thomas could have easily given an Aristotelian definition, but chose not to. He suggests that Thomas intentionally chose the Damascene's incomplete definition for pedagogical reasons: “Rather than provide a complete definition of passion at the beginning, Aquinas employs a more subtle strategy. He desires that the reader should sift through the proposals of a range of auctoritates – Aristotle, Cicero, Damascene, Nemesius, and Augustine among them – so that she might arrive at a conception that includes elements of the integral tradition,” Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 31.

⁵ STh I-II, q. 22, a. 3: “[P]assio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutation corporalis.”

⁶ STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4 ad 2: “[P]assiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, sunt bonae, et similiter quae a vero malo recedunt. E converso vero passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, sunt malae.”

⁷ Thomas cites this statement (from De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) in STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1 sc.

⁸ STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1: “Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur.” STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1 ad 1: “[I]stae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.”

⁹ White, Kevin, “The Passions of the Soul (Ia IIae, qq. 22-48),” in The Ethics of Aquinas, Ed. Pope, Stephen J. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 103Google Scholar. White's article offers perhaps the best brief overview of Thomas's account of the passions. It is especially good in highlighting Thomas's use of metaphorical language to describe the passions as movements of sensitive appetite.

¹⁰ STh I, q. 79, a. 8 ad 3. For an insightful essay on the ways in which Thomas's account of the passions provides a remedy to the problems inherent in contemporary debates about human nature, see Hütter, Reinhard, “Body Politics beyond Angelism and Animalism: The Human Passions and Their Irreducible Spiritual Dimension,” in Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 75-101Google Scholar.

¹¹ STh I-II, q. 23, a. 1.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ STh I-II, q. 23, a. 2. The passion of anger does not fall within this schema since it does not have a contrary (STh I-II, q. 23, a. 3: “Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu, sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod mitescere opponitur ei quod est irasci, quod non est oppositum contrarie, sed negative vel privative.”). Moreover, anger finds its source in the passion of daring (STh I-II, q. 25, a. 4 ad 3).

¹⁴ STh I-II, q. 23, a. 2.

¹⁵ Miner provides a helpful and very thorough analysis of the movements of the passions in Ch. 3, “The activation of passion,” in Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 58-87.

¹⁶ STh I-II, q. 23, a. 4.

¹⁷ See Gondreau, Paul, The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Chicago, IL: University of Scranton Press, 2009), 102-107Google Scholar.

¹⁸ STh I-II, q. 61, a. 2

¹⁹ STh I-II, q. 25, a. 4.

²⁰ Ibid.: “Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor.”

²¹ Ibid.: “[R]espectu boni, incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore.”

²² Alexander Brungs aptly summarizes the logic behind the principal passions: “Das, was eine Regung des sinnengebundenen Strebevermögens also zu einer grundlegenden Regung macht, ist ihr in Relation zu den anderen Affekten zielhafter, vervollständigender, mithin abschließender Charakter,” in Metaphysik der Sinnlichkeit: Das System der Passiones Animae bei Thomas von Aquin (Hallescher Verlag: Akademische Studien Vorträge, Nr. 6, 2002), 103.

²³ See Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 213-240; Gondreau, Paul, “Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the Originality of Aquinas,” in The Thomist 71 (2007): 419-50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 148-200; Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 88-108; and Pinckaers, Servais, “Reappropriating Aquinas's Account of the Passions,” in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. Berkman, John and Titus, Craig Steven (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 273-287Google Scholar.

²⁴ STh I-II, q. 56, a. 4.

²⁵ STh I-II, q. 59, a. 5: “[S]i passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.” Brungs offers a helpful overview of Thomas's engagement with the Stoics’ understanding of the passions in Metaphysik der Sinnlichkeit, 84-102.

²⁶ STh I-II, qq. 68, 69, and 70, respectively.

²⁷ STh I-II.109-114.

²⁸ STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4.

²⁹ STh I-II, q. 56, a. 4.

³⁰ STh I-II, q. 59, a. 5. Thomas's insistence on this point is not merely based on presuppositions about morality; it also reflects his understanding of the underlying metaphysical biology of the human person, including the relationship between body and soul, intellect and appetite. Anton Pegis, in his classic essay “St. Thomas and the Unity of Man,” highlights this connection in Thomas's thought: “If all the powers of man are rooted in the soul; if, furthermore, one and the same intellectual soul has within its nature bot intellectual and sensible powers, this fact must mean, not that the soul has more powers than the intellect, but that the human intellect is not fully an intellect without sensible powers,” in Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart, ed. James A. McWilliams, S.J. (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing Co., 1955), 169.

³¹ White, “The Passions of the Soul,” 111.

³² STh I-II, q. 69, a. 2: “Cum enim aliquis incipit proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae” (emphasis mine).

³³ STh I, qq. 75-102.

³⁴ STh I, q. 97, a. 1.

³⁵ STh I, q. 97, a. 2.

³⁶ STh I, q. 95, a. 2.

³⁷ STh I, q. 95, a. 3.

³⁸ STh I, q. 94, a. 3.

³⁹ STh I, q. 95, a. 2.

⁴⁰ STh I, q. 97, a. 1: “Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset.” In this article, Thomas describes three different types of incorruptibility. The first is that of matter that is “in potentiality to one form only,” such as the heavenly bodies. The second is the “incorruptibility of glory,” which stems from the soul's (as the form of the body) beatification, as the soul's incorruptibility “redounds” to the body itself (Thomas cites an obscure passage from Augustine to support this claim). As Thomas will describe later in the Summa, this bodily incorruptibility that stems from the redounding of glory is found in Christ's post-resurrection body (STh III, q. 54, a. 2 ad 2, inter alia). The third kind is that brought about by efficient cause, and this is the relevant type of incorruptibility that describes Adam's body. See also STh I, a. 97, a. 4 on the tree of life as the cause of Adam's immortality.

⁴¹ STh I-II, q. 97, a. 2 ad 4: “[C]orpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.

⁴² I use the word “potentially” for lack of a better term. Thomas reserves the word “habitually” for the virtues (not the passions themselves), since virtues are habits, whereas passions are movements of the sensitive appetite. The point is that, had pre-fallen Adam been placed in an environment like ours, this would have “activated” the passions that had previously been hidden (See STh I, q. 95, a. 3 ad 2), and we can infer that Thomas believes this to be what did, in fact, happen when Adam was removed from the state of original justice.

⁴³ STh I, q. 95, a. 2: “Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans.”

⁴⁴ Ibid.: “In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.”

⁴⁵ STh I, q. 95, a. 1.

⁴⁶ STh I, q. 95, a. 3: “[H]omo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes.”

⁴⁷ Ibid.: “Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum.”

⁴⁸ Ibid.: “Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum.”

⁴⁹ STh I, q. 95, a. 3 ad 2: “Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem.”

⁵⁰ It is worth noting that Thomas's position on grace in the primitive state does not necessarily reflect a scholastic consensus. For example, Peter Lombard's own position on the subject was unclear, and Thomas acknowledges the existence of conflicting opinions in STh I, q. 95, a. 1 ad 4. See also De Malo, q. 5, a. 1 ad 13: “quia cum originalis iustitia primordialiter consistat in subiectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest nisi per gratiam, iustitia originalis sine gratia esse non potuit. Et ideo habenti originalem iustitiam debebatur visio divina.” Citations from De Malo are taken from The De Malo of Thomas Aquinas (Latin and English), trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁵¹ STh I, q. 95, a. 1: “Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae.”

⁵² Ibid.: “Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.” See also De Malo, q. 5, a. 1.

⁵³ STh I-II, q. 77, a. 2 sc: “Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum igitur concupiscentia sit passio quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod scit.”

⁵⁴ STh III, q. 5, a. 1: “[P]eccatum non pertinet ad humanam naturam, cuius Deus est causa; sed magis est contra naturam per seminationem Diaboli introductum.”

⁵⁵ Concupiscence here refers to the disordered concupiscence resulting from original sin, not to the passion concupiscentia. Thomas clarifies this distinction in STh I-II, q. 82, a. 3 ad 1.

⁵⁶ Ad Rom. 7:23, lect. 4 (§ 588): “Haec autem lex originaliter quidem consistit in appetite sensitivo, sed diffusive invenitur in omnibus membris, quae deserviunt concupiscentiae ad pecandum.” Citations of Thomas's Romans commentary are from Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans (Latin and English), trans. Larcher, F. R. O.P., ed. Mortensen, J. and Alarcón, E. (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012)Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.: “Lex autem peccati captivat hominem dupliciter. Uno modo hominem peccatorem per consensum et operationem; alio modo hominem sub gratia constitutum quantum ad concupiscentiae motum.”

⁵⁹ STh III, q. 15, a. 2.

⁶⁰ STh III, q. 1, a. 1: “Unde ad rationem summi boni pertinet quod summo modo se creaturae communicet. Quod quidem maxime fit per hoc quod naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una persona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima et carne, sicut dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin. Unde manifestum est quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari.”

⁶¹ STh III, q. 1, a. 2.

⁶² Ibid.: “quantum ad plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et hoc collatum est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone de Nativ. domini, factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus.”

⁶³ See STh III, q. 2, a. 6.

⁶⁴ ScG IV, c. 41: “Sed humana natura in Christo assumpta est ut instrumentaliter operetur ea quae sunt operationes propriae solius Dei, sicut est mundare peccata, illuminare mentes per gratiam, et introducere in perfectionem vitae aeternae. Comparatur igitur humana natura Christi ad Deum sicut instrumentum proprium et coniunctum, ut manus ad animam.” Citations of the ScG are from Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV: Salvation, trans. O'Neil, Charles J. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975)Google Scholar. The Latin text is from the Leonine edition, which can be found at: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org.

⁶⁵ Adams, Marilyn McCord, What Sort of Human Nature?: Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1999), 9Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Thomas provides these three reasons in both STh III, q. 14, a. 1 and III, q. 15, a. 1.

⁶⁷ “Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, misit Deus filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati. Sed conditio carnis peccati est quod habeat necessitatem moriendi, et sustinendi alias huiusmodi passiones. Ergo talis necessitas sustinendi hos defectus fuit in carne Christi.”

⁶⁸ STh III, q. 14, a. 3.

⁶⁹ Cited in STh III, q. 14, a. 4 obj. 1: “[Q]uod est inassumptibile, est incurabile.”

⁷⁰ STh III, q. 14, a. 4 ad 1: “Et ideo, dum Christus curavit passibilitatem et corruptibilitatem corporis nostri per hoc quod eam assumpsit, ex consequenti omnes alios defectus curavit.”

⁷¹ Thomas establishes this claim earlier in STh III, q. 9, a. 2.

⁷² STh III, q. 14, a. 1 ad 2: “[H]aec naturalis habitudo in Christo subiacebat voluntati divinitatis ipsius, ex qua factum est ut beatitudo remaneret in anima et non derivaretur ad corpus, sed caro pateretur quae conveniunt naturae passibili.”

⁷³ Thomas's view on this matter was not unique for his time. Many scholastics (including Thomas's teacher, Albert) maintained that Christ enjoyed the beatific vision throughout his earthly life. Contrary to modern expectations, what was more controversial in Thomas's own day (and even in the patristic period) was the view that Christ had a passible human soul. Following a trajectory initiated by Hilary of Portiers, the patristic and medieval theologians were concerned about the implications of the view that Christ possessed animal passions. Madigan, Kevin, in his monograph, The Passions of Christ in High-Medieval Thought: An Essay on Christological Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar offers a useful survey of medieval thought on this topic, but its polemical aims render it less helpful than it might be otherwise. It also suffers from failing to engage with Gondreau's important work (see below), as Madigan himself concedes in the introduction. On Christ's beatific vision, see also Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ's Soul, 441-52.

⁷⁴ As Gondreau notes, “Because most studies on human affectivity in the thought of Thomas Aquinas have ignored the role of passion in Christ's humanity, the notion of passion as defect has all but eluded the attention of Thomist scholars. Yet, the concept of defect represents a whole other side to passibility that is no less fundamental to the issue, and without it one fails to grasp the essence of Thomas’ take on Christ's human affectivity, as it demarcates the proper context in which one examines Christ's passions,” The Passions of Christ's Soul, 220.

⁷⁵ De Veritate, q. 26, aa. 8-10.

⁷⁶ Jordan, “Aquinas's Construction,” 85.

⁷⁷ According to Jean-Pierre Torrell, Thomas wrote De Veritate sometime around 1256-1259, placing it roughly thirteen to sixteen years before the Tertia Pars. Torrell, Jean-Pierre, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1: The Person and His Work, trans. Royal, Robert (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 328Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ STh III, q. 15, a. 4. Recall Thomas's similar phrasing regarding Adam's passions in STh I, q. 95, a. 2.

⁷⁹ STh III, q. 15, a. 5.

⁸⁰ See STh I, q. 91, a. 3.

⁸¹ Gondreau notes, “[T]he physical action or appetitive movement of a passion always entails a bodily modification, as the passions are exercised by means of a bodily organ,” The Passions of Christ's Soul, 221.

⁸² STh I-II, q. 41, a. 4 ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de malo insolito.” On the peculiarity of Thomas's treatment of admiration in Christ, see Gondreau, The Passions of Christ's Soul, 414-27.

⁸³ Gondreau, The Passions of Christ's Soul, 453.

⁸⁴ For a thorough exposition of Thomas's christological and anthropological sources in developing his account of Christ's passions, see Chs. 1 and 2 in Ibid.

⁸⁵ STh III, q. 7, a. 2: “Unde, cum gratia Christi fuerit perfectissima, consequens est quod ex ipsa processerint virtutes ad perficiendum singulas potentias animae, quantum ad omnes animae actus. Et ita Christus habuit omnes virtutes.”

⁸⁶ STh III, q. 7, a. 3: “Et ideo, excluso quod res divina non sit visa, excluditur ratio fidei. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis plene vidit Deum per essentiam, ut infra patebit. Unde fides in eo esse non potuit,” and STh III, q. 7, a. 4: “Christus autem a principio suae conceptionis plene habuit fruitionem divinam, ut infra dicetur.”

⁸⁷ See STh III, q. 34, a. 1.

⁸⁸ STh III, q. 15, a. 10.

⁸⁹ STh III, q. 15, a. 2 ad 3: “[F]ortitudo spiritus aliqualis ostenditur ex hoc quod resistit concupiscentiae carnis sibi contrariantis, sed maior fortitudo spiritus ostenditur si per eius virtutem totaliter comprimatur, ne contra spiritum concupiscere possit. Et ideo hoc competebat Christo, cuius spiritus summum gradum fortitudinis attigerat. Et licet non sustinuerit impugnationem interiorem ex parte fomitis, sustinuit tamen exteriorem impugnationem ex parte mundi et Diaboli, quos superando victoriae coronam promeruit.”

⁹⁰ Jean-Pierre Torrell explores the important distinction between ‘moral exemplarity’ and ‘ontological exemplarity’ in Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 110-125. Similarly, Joseph Wawrykow argues that for Thomas, Jesus is the ultimate moral exemplar and that the notions of virtue and human flourishing are themselves shaped by conformity to Jesus and the reception of Jesus’ virtues and gifts in “Jesus in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Winter 2012): 13-33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹¹ Adams describes the connection between the Incarnation and our own beatitude: “For Aquinas […], Christ as prototype and head pioneers human excellence – both natural and supernatural – by exemplifying it, to a large extent even during his earthly career. If union with God is the human end, Christ's human nature enjoys if from its beginning by virtue of the Incarnation,” What Sort of Human Nature?, 52.

⁹² As Gondreau explains, “Aquinas secures as much inspiration from the affective occurrences surrounding Jesus’ own life in the development of his teaching on the integral role of passion in the exercise of virtue as he takes from Aristotle's writings (though, of course, Aristotle has considerably more to say on the subject). That the sinless and supremely virtuous Christ should himself be subject to movements of passion makes therefore a decided impact on Aquinas, a fact that should not be abstracted from the Dominican's conviction that virtue (or holiness) and passion are not inherent adversaries, or from Thomas’ consequential remark that ‘the moral virtues… cannot be without the passions.’ In short, for St. Thomas (as for Augustine), Christ, in his human passions, fully discloses the truth of human affectivity,” The Passions of Christ's Soul, 320.

⁹³ De Ver, q. 26, a. 10 ad 6: “[I]n Christo nulla permixtio facta est gaudii et doloris. Nam gaudium fuit in superiori ratione ex illa parte qua est principium sui actus: sic enim Deo fruebatur; dolor vero non erat in ipsa nisi secundum quod laesio corporis attingebat eam ut actum corporis mediante essentia in qua radicatur, ita tamen quod actus rationis superioris nullatenus impediebatur: et sic erat et purum gaudium et purus dolor; et sic utrumque in summo.”

⁹⁴ STh I, q. 98, a. 2 ad 1: “[H]omo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde non est similis ratio.”

⁹⁵ STh I, q. 102, a. 2 ad 1: “[N]on est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis.” See also STh I, q. 102, a. 4.

⁹⁶ Reinhard Hütter writes, “The acts of the sense appetite are to support and intensify the acts of reason such that the embodied intellect advances ever more efficaciously on the road toward the true and the good; the homo viator is ever to proceed in order to achieve his or her twofold final end. And because sanctifying grace (by way of the infused theological and moral virtues) reaches all the way down to heal and re-order the passions and allow them to contribute even more fully to the perfection of the moral act,” in “Body Politics,” 99.

⁹⁷ Pinckaers, “Reappropriating Aquinas's Account,” 277.

⁹⁸ Thomas's position on this matter remains controversial, even among Thomists. Even very fine readers of Thomas, such as Torrell, Gondreau, and Thomas Weinandy take issue with Thomas on this point. I do not have the space to reproduce their arguments adequately (let alone engage them in a meaningful way), but I only hope that I have gestured toward another way we might be motivated to follow Thomas on this issue. For a careful and systematic response to the concerns of Thomas's detractors that argues on metaphysical grounds, see White, Thomas Joseph, “The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision,” The Thomist 69 (2005): 497-534CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁹ See, for example, STh I, q. 95, a. 4.