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Thinking about luck

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Abstract

Luck looms large in numerous different philosophical subfields. Unfortunately, work focused exclusively on the nature of luck is in short supply on the contemporary analytic scene. In his highly impressive recent book Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard helps rectify this neglect by presenting a partial account of luck that he uses to illuminate various ways luck can figure in cognition. In this paper, I critically evaluate both Pritchard’s account of luck and another account to which Pritchard’s discussion draws our attention—viz., that due to Nicholas Rescher. I also assess some novel analyses of luck that incorporate plausible elements of Pritchard’s and Rescher’s accounts.

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Correspondence to E. J. Coffman.

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Coffman, E.J. Thinking about luck. Synthese 158, 385–398 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9046-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9046-8

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