Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Two claims about epistemic propriety

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments against both claims.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Adler J. E. (2002) Belief’s own ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Black M. (1952) Saying and disbelieving. Analysis 13: 25–32

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandom R. (1983) Asserting. Nous 17: 637–650

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brandom R. (1994) Making it explicit. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown J. (2008) The knowledge norm for assertion. Philosophical Issues 18: 89–103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown, J. (Forthcoming). Knowledge and assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  • Chisholm R. (1977) Theory of Knowledge. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Coffman, E.J. (ms). Lenient accounts of warranted assertability.

  • Coffman, E.J. (Forthcoming a). Does knowledge secure warrant to assert? Philosophical studies.

  • Coffman, E.J. (Forthcoming b). Is justified belief knowledge? Philosophical books.

  • DeRose K. (1991) Epistemic possibilities. Philosophical Review 100: 581–605

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeRose K. (1996) Knowledge, assertion and lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 568–579

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeRose K. (2002) Assertion, knowledge, and context. Philosophical Review 111: 167–203

    Google Scholar 

  • DeRose K. (2009) The case for contextualism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Douven I. (2006) Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility. Philosophical Review 115: 449–485

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman R. (2000) The ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 667–695

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green M., Williams J. (2007) Introduction. In: Green M., Williams J. (eds) Moore’s paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hawthorne J. (2004) Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kawall J. (2002) Other-regarding epistemic virtues. Ratio 15: 257–275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig J. (2003) The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig J. (2005) Truth is not the primary epistemic goal. In: Steup M., Sosa E. (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, Malden, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig J. (2009) Assertion, knowledge, and lotteries. In: Pritchard D., Greenough P. (eds) Williamson on knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Lackey J. (2007) Norms of assertion. Nous 41: 594–626

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lackey, J. (Forthcoming). Assertion and isolated secondhand knowledge. In J. Brown & H. Cappelen (Eds.), Assertion: New philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Levin J. (2008) Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76: 359–384

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moore G. E. (1963) Commonplace book, 1919–1953. Allen & Unwin, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Pryor J. (2005) There is immediate justification. In: Steup M., Sosa E. (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, Malden, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Rescorla M. (2009) Assertion and its constitutive norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79: 98–130

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds S. L. (2002) Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies 110: 139–161

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slote M. (1979) Assertion and belief. In: Dancy J. (eds) Papers on language and logic. Keele University Library, Keele

    Google Scholar 

  • Sutton J. (2005) Stick to what you know. Nous 39: 359–396

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutton J. (2007) Without justification. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Unger P. (1975) Ignorance: A case for scepticism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel J. (1990) Are there counterexamples to the closure principle?. In: Roth M., Ross G. (eds) Doubting: Contemporary perspectives on skepticism. Kluwer, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson G. (2004) Asserting and promising. Philosophical Studies 117: 57–77

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weiner M. (2005) Must we know what we say?. Philosophical Review 114: 227–251

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson T. (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright C. (1996) Response to commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 911–941

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA

    E. J. Coffman

Authors
  1. E. J. Coffman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to E. J. Coffman.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Coffman, E.J. Two claims about epistemic propriety. Synthese 181, 471–488 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9742-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9742-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation