

for *g*, contrary to the hypothesis. (4) If asked in a subsequent epistemological discussion, "Do your utterances about color agree with your phenomenal field?" he will say "Yes, of course," as otherwise the physical sequence etc. (5) If asked by a philosopher, "Is there something you have discovered about epistemology or the mind-body problem, which for some reason you are unable to communicate to us by words or gestures?" he would reply, "No, there is not."

All this is not merely the familiar behaviorist thesis about the "other one," for these points apply where *oneself* is the "knowing subject." What do I "know," having experienced *r* instead of *g*? If I read the same books, insist that I hold the identity view, argue the same views on epistemology, publish the same opinions, what kind of "knowledge" is this? Could I, for example, "remember" this miracle? I could not say or write anything to suggest it to myself; all obtainable records of my reports would lead me to wonder whether I had not "really seen" *g* as usual (although I could not wonder aloud, nor with sub-vocal speech!). This is certainly a peculiar sort of knowing.

#### Correction

Paul Edwards is now a member of the faculty of Washington Square College, New York University, and is no longer affiliated with the College of the City of New York as erroneously reported in connection with his article in the January issue.