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Heuristics, justification, and defeasible reasoning

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Abstract

Heuristics can be regarded as justifying the actions and beliefs of problem-solving agents. I use an analysis of heuristics to argue that a symbiotic relationship exists between traditional epistemology and contemporary artificial intelligence. On one hand, the study of models of problem-solving agents usingquantitative heuristics, for example computer programs, can reveal insight into the understanding of human patterns of epistemic justification by evaluating these models' performance against human problem-solving. On the other hand,qualitative heuristics embody the justifying ability of defeasible rules, the understanding of which is provided by traditional epistemology.

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Colburn, T.R. Heuristics, justification, and defeasible reasoning. Mind Mach 5, 467–487 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974978

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